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VIOLENCE, VOTE CHOICE, AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SECURITY IN 
BRAZILIAN STATES  
Douglas Aaron Block, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
This dissertation examines the relationship between politics and violence in Brazilian states.  I 
challenge the assumption that ideology alone leads political parties from the left and right to 
implement different public security policies.  Using a mixed method approach, I argue that 
politicians’ responses to violence depend on how security issues affect their electoral success.  
This process occurs in a four-stage cycle that involves elections, the provision of resources for 
law enforcement, the distribution of these resources and violence.  Chapter 1 uses the lens of 
retrospective voting to examine how violence influences elections.  I show that contrary to 
Western democracies, where conservative parties gain when security issues arise, security is a 
double-edged sword for Brazilian political parties.  Voters punish/reward right parties more 
harshly than they punish/reward leftist parties for security failures/successes.  In Chapter 2, I 
then analyze the policies that governors implement to address crime rates.  Using state budgetary 
data, I show that while left and right parties advocate different security policies during the 
campaign, in office, they both turn to law enforcement to address crime.  However, their 
spending priorities depend on political competition.  Right parties spend more on law 
enforcement when they face leftist competitors that they can paint as being soft on security, 
while leftist parties spend more on security when they face centrist or other leftist competitors.  
Chapter 3 turns to the issue of how governors distribute law enforcement resources.  I show that 
governors send more police officers to large municipalities that are important for their electoral 
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success.  Chapter 4 then integrates the findings from previous chapters to examine how resources 
and ideology influence municipal homicide rates.  I show that homicide rates decline in states 
where the governor is from a right party and when states spend more on education.  However, 
the effects that law enforcement has on crime depends on state wealth and the cities voting 
behavior.  In the concluding chapter, I summarize the main findings and discuss the project’s 
overall importance.   
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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In the 1980s, democracy began to return to Latin America as military dictatorships fell 
throughout the region.  In the three decades that have followed, the region’s formal democratic 
institutions have remained remarkably strong, and many countries have made considerable 
progress in reducing poverty and inequality.  Despite these political and social advances, the 
region continues to struggle with epidemic levels of violence, which are now the most important 
political issue in many countries (Imbusch, Misse and Marrion 2011).  Between 2007 and 2015, 
Latin America had almost 1.1 million homicides, making it the world’s most violent region 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2017).   
 Policy makers and scholars have traditionally viewed violence as a criminal justice 
problem.  However, violence and insecurity have major implications for the region’s economic 
development.  An Inter-American Development Bank study estimates that crime and violence 
annually cost Latin America $145 billion, or more than 14 percent of the region’s gross domestic 
product (Londoño and Guerrero 1998).1  In Brazil, homicide alone cost the economy an 
estimated US$7.53 billion and 2.15 million years of life in 2012 (Sachsida and Mendonça 2013).  
This economic burden falls most strongly on poor neighborhoods that are the epicenters of this 
violence.  
                                                     
1 Direct costs include medical attention, years of life lost, and public and private security expenditures. Meanwhile, 
the indirect costs include deterioration of investment and production and reduction in consumption and work. 
2 
 
 In addition to its economic costs, security problems have important implications for 
democracy in the region.  The Latin American public views violence as one of the region’s most 
pressing issues and is more willing to support a military coup under high levels of crime (Pérez 
2003).  Other research finds that support for and satisfaction with democracy decline as crime 
rates rise (Fernandez and Kuenzi 2010; Bateson 2012; Carreras 2013).  In high crime 
environments, the public is also more willing to support non-democratic measures, including 
extrajudicial killings, to stamp out crime.   
 Brazil has not been immune to this trend.  Figure 1.1 shows Brazil’s annual homicide rate 
between 1991 and 2015.  Although there was a slight decline in violence between 2003 and 
2007, overall violence increased more than 35 percent.  With a population of around 200 million 
people, the raw number of lives lost is overwhelming.  Official government data document 
1,147,602 homicides during this period.   
 
 
Figure 1.1: Brazil’s Homicide Rate per 100,000 Residents, 1991-2015 
3 
 
 While a burgeoning literature has emerged on the relationship between national politics, 
government policies and violence, scholars have largely ignored the role of subnational political 
actors.  However, a closer examination of the data reveals that while Brazil has seen an overall 
rise in violence in recent years, levels of violence vary widely across states.  Table 1.1 shows 
average homicide rates per 100 thousand residents in Brazil’s 26 states and the federal district 
during two periods: 1991-2002 and 2003-2015.  During this time, homicide rates declined more 
than 25 percent in the states of Roraima and Rio de Janeiro and 50 percent in São Paulo.  
However, they increased more than 200 percent in nine states, including Maranhão where it went 
up by 305 percent.  These differences suggest that subnational factors are playing an important 
role in violence across Brazil.  What are these factors and why do they vary over time and across 
states?  
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Table 1.1: State Homicide Rates per 100 Thousand Residents, 1991-2015  
 
Region State      Homicide Rate Homicide Rate Change (%) 
     
  1991-2002 2003-2015  
North     
 Acre 21.5 23.4 8.8 
 Amapá 33.7 33.4 -1.0 
 Amazonas  18.4 27.2 48.0 
 Pará 13.9 36.0 259.0 
 Rondônia 34.7 33.6 -3.0 
 Roraima 39.4 29.0 -26.3 
 Tocantins 11.5 21.5 86.8 
Northeast     
 Alagoas 25.7 55.9 217.5 
 Bahia 11.1 31.2 281.1 
 Ceará 13.4 31.9 238.1 
 Maranhão 7.4 22.6 305.4 
 Paraíba 13.8 31.0 224.6 
 Pernambuco 46.7 45.1 -3.5 
 Piauí 5.6 14.5 258.9 
 Rio Grande do Norte 9.3 26.9 289.2 
 Sergipe  20.6 34.6 65.0 
Center-West     
 Distrito Federal 32.3 30.8 -4.6 
 Goiás 19.3 34.3 77.7 
 Mato Grosso 28.6 33.7 17.8 
 Mato Grosso do Sul 30.0 28.1 -6.3 
Southeast     
 Espírito Santo 45.0 48.5 7.8 
 Minas Gerais 9.3 21.3 229 
 Rio de Janeiro 51.0 36.8 -27.8 
 São Paulo 35.8 17.8 -50.3 
South     
 Paraná 16.9 29.7 75.7 
 Rio Grande do Sul 16.1 20.6 28.0 
  Santa Catarina 8.2 12.2 48.8 
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1.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between local politics, state policies and violence 
in Brazilian states.  There is a variety of theoretical lenses that I could use to analyze this 
relationship.  One of the most common would be a traditional institutionalist approach that looks 
at variation in formal rules across states.  However, this approach would shed minimal light on 
patterns of subnational violence in Brazil.  Law enforcement is a state issue, with each state 
having a military and civil police force controlled by the governor.  The military police conduct 
street patrols to prevent and repress criminal activity, while the civil police investigate crimes 
after they occur and arrest individuals based on gathered evidence.  There are no municipal law 
enforcement agencies, and federal law enforcement agencies can only engage in defined tasks 
that include patrolling national highways, investigating interstate crimes and policing the 
country’s borders.  Meanwhile, governors have minimal power over criminal law.  Only the 
national Congress can make or modify criminal laws, which then apply uniformly to all states.      
 Political rules also do not help explain differences in violence across states since the 
federal government makes and enforces rules for state elections.  Gubernatorial elections occur 
throughout the country on the same day every four years and require the winning candidate to 
obtain a majority of votes.  If no candidates obtains a majority of votes, there is a runoff election 
between the top two candidates.  Prior to 1998, governors could only serve one term in office.  
However, political reforms passed in 1997 now allow governors to serve two consecutive terms. 
 This dissertation uses the lens of rational-choice theory to address the link among local 
politics, state policies and everyday crime in Brazil.  Rational choice theory assumes that given a 
list of choices, people will be able to order their preferences from most to least preferred.  Based 
on this ordering, they will choose the option that they believe is the most beneficial.  My core 
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argument is simple.  Politicians respond to security problems and implement security policies 
based on how security problems affect their electoral success.  These responses, in turn, alter 
people’s incentives to engage in crime and explain changes in violence over time.   
 The argument that electoral politics will influence state security policies has begun to 
emerge in a small but burgeoning literature.  This research suggests that the government may not 
implement policies that can help reduce violence in situations where violence can be politically 
beneficial.  Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos (2013) argue that the Colombian government 
selectively target paramilitary groups and does not eliminate these groups in areas where they 
help coerce voters into supporting the president and his political allies.  Hoelscher (2015) and 
Trejo and Ley (2016), meanwhile, show that state and national governments in Brazil and 
Mexico do not coordinate security policy with local governments when there is an opposition 
party is in power in an effort to increase violence that will discredit these competitors.   
 Any theory should make explicit its foundational assumptions to allow the reader to 
evaluate its plausibility.  The extant research on crime and politics rests upon two assumptions 
that are difficult to defend.  First, it assumes that the government has the power to incite or limit 
violence when it is beneficial to do so.  There are many situations, however, where the 
government would benefit electorally from reducing violence but has been unable to do so.  
When elections are forthcoming, incumbents would benefit from declining crime rates, yet crime 
rates often remain stable in election years.       
 Second, most studies focus on cases where the government is confronting well-organized 
criminal organizations or terrorist groups.  There are some large, well-organized criminal groups 
in Brazil, such as the First Command of the Capital (PCC) in São Paulo and Red Command (CV) 
in Rio de Janeiro.  However, both in Brazil and throughout Latin America, crime often involves 
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many decentralized local actors that operate only in a small area of a city.  In these situations, the 
literature is silent about the policies that governments will implement to address crime and 
violence.  The lack of research on government responses to everyday crime limits the literature’s 
generalizability across different security contexts.  It also leaves a gap in our knowledge of 
which polices are most effective at reducing crime and violence. 
1.1.1 Project Assumptions  
I make four assumptions in this project.  First, I assume that crime-fighting tools, which are a 
central focus in this project, can be effective.  This assumption is the foundation for the rational-
choice approach to crime control and rests on the belief that individuals who may engage in 
crime respond to incentives (Becker 1968).  This rationality enables governors to reduce violence 
through concerted efforts to tackle the problem rather than relying on luck during their time in 
office.  These efforts take many shapes and include allocating more resources for violence 
prevention through education and law enforcement, prioritizing security and creating 
comprehensive public security plans. 
 Second, I assume that political parties from the left, center and right project different 
images regarding public security.  As in most countries, right parties in Brazil emphasize law and 
order through policing and crime repression policies, while left parties highlight how social ills 
affect crime and violence (Soares 2005; Cano 2006; Sapori 2007).  Meanwhile, the policies that 
centrist parties advocate are less clear.  Scholars typically avoid discussing centrist parties, 
choosing instead to group them with right parties and assuming that there is only a left-right 
division.  I explicitly address this simplification in the project, showing how it leads to erroneous 
conclusions about the role of ideology in determining public security policies.  Although parties 
project different images, I do not assume that ideology causes governors to behave differently in 
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practice or that right governors are more effective at reducing crime.  These are arguments that I 
test in this project, and the evidence, in fact, challenges many of these assumptions.     
 In assuming that parties from the left, center and right advocate different public security 
policies, it is necessary to address the issue of party switching, since much has been made of the 
issue in Brazil (Mainwaring 1999; Power 2000; Ames 2002).  If candidates are consistently 
changing to parties from different parts of the ideological spectrum in an effort to “find the best 
deal,” we should question whether ideology has any influence on how voters view candidates 
when it comes to public security.  It is not possible to examine every gubernatorial candidates’ 
political career to see whether they joined a new party just prior to the election.  However, 
among politicians who run for governor more than once, there is remarkable stability in their 
ideological leanings.  Between 1990 and 2010, 803 candidates ran for office with 140 
participating in more than one election.  Out of these 140 candidates, 122 remained in the same 
ideological group across elections.  In addition, six out of the 18 candidates who switched to a 
different ideological group, waited at least 8 years before competing in a second election.   
   Third, I assume that Brazilian politicians and political parties seek to retain/obtain control 
of state governorships.  This assumption is uncontroversial in the literature.  Governorships are a 
desirable political office with governors wielding widespread power in national and state politics 
(Ames 2002; Samuels 2003).  Governors control state budgets and have vast power over the 
judiciary and the public security apparatus.  They also provide electoral coattails for federal 
deputies, which allow them to influence their voting behavior in the national Congress (Abrucio 
1998; Samuels 2000).   
 Fourth, since governorships are desirable positions, I expect that governors’ responses to 
violence will vary depending on how violence affects their electoral interests.  While violence is 
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an important public policy issue, governors have different levels of resources, face differing 
limits on their informal power and must take into account which policies will be most beneficial 
for advancing their political careers (Ames 1990).  Therefore, they must make decisions about 
how to best allocate their resources and time among the myriad of policy issues that they 
oversee.  These final two assumptions implicitly rest on the premise that institutions matter and 
alter the behavior of political actors.   
 In using a rational-choice approach, I do not assume that governors are unconcerned 
about what happens to the people they govern.  Politicians may be greatly concerned about 
violence.  However, their ability to implement policies to address violence and other policy 
issues requires them to obtain/retain political office.  Therefore, they may choose to allocate their 
resources and to focus their attention on other policy issues.  I also do not assume that they will 
always choose the most effective policies.  Governors may implement public security policies 
that are ineffective in reducing crime rates.  I expect, however, that they will implement those 
policies that they believe will be most effective conditional on how they affect their electoral 
interests.  
1.1.2 Brazil’s Party System 
Any project that makes assumptions about political parties in Brazil must provide careful 
justification given the high level of fragmentation in Brazil’s party system.  In 2015, the 
government officially recognized 35 political parties, with many other parties attempting to gain 
recognition and the television time and government funding that follow (TSE 2015).  Since the 
country’s return to democracy in the 1980s, this fragmentation has been the source of much 
criticism and debate.  Lamounier and Meneguello (1986) argued that as the country began to 
return to democracy in the 1980s, clientelism, centralization of state power and permissive 
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electoral rules were to blame for its fragmented political system.  Mainwaring (1988) echoed this 
characterization, describing the country’s political parties as being underdeveloped and having a 
“gelatinous character,” leading political competition to depend on familial and personal rivalries.  
In this system, clientelism rather than programmatic policies drove electoral outcomes.  
Implicitly, these scholars assumed that ideology did not matter in Brazil.   
 Understanding these early critiques that ideology does not matter in Brazil, requires a 
basic understanding of the political context in which they emerged.   In October 1965, the 
country’s military regime passed Act N° 2, which abolished all political parties.  Just two months 
later, on November 20, it passed Complementary Act N° 4, establishing a two-party system. 
Politicians could join either the government-aligned party, the National Renewal Alliance 
(ARENA), or the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB).  ARENA consisted 
overwhelmingly of politicians from defunct conservative parties while politicians opposed to the 
military government joined the MDB (Powers 2000, 54-56).  Despite the MDB’s limitations as 
an opposition party with minimal access to state resources, it began winning a significant share 
of seats in Congress and many municipal and state elections.  By 1978, it controlled almost 40 
percent of seats in the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies and state assemblies (Powers 2000, 62).  
The MDB’s growing power concerned the military government.  Seeking to fracture the 
opposition, it returned the country to a multi-party system in 1979.      
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 During this return to a multi-party system, there was an unsurprising growth in the 
number of parties due to three concurrent factors.  First, during the military regime, legal 
opposition to the military government meant joining the MDB.  This limitation, together with the 
decentralized construction of the party across states, led the MDB to serve as a catch-all party, 
making it difficult for the party to develop strong ideological leanings (Kinzo 1988; Maciel 
2014).  With the return of a multi-party system, politicians who joined the MDB out of political 
necessity could now form parties that better reflected their ideological positions.2   
 Second, with ARENA/PDS increasingly losing support in legislative elections, many of 
its members began reading the writing on the wall that the military regime was nearing an end.3  
Concerned about how association with the dictatorship would influence their future electoral 
success, they began joining the PMDB.  In addition, the PDS contained rival conservative 
factions that bitterly competed among themselves during elections under the military regime.  
With the lifting of restrictions on party formation, these factions split and created rival 
conservative parties, including the powerful Liberal Front Party (PFL) led by José Sarney, who 
became Brazil’s president in 1985 (Powers 2000, 66-70; Ferreira 2002).   
  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 The military government forced the MDB to change its name to the PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement 
Party) in December 1979 in an effort to paint it as just another political party, rather than a movement seeking the 
return of democratic governance.   
3 ARENA changed its name to the Democratic Social Party (PDS) on January 31, 1980.  
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 Finally, the government began relaxing restrictions placed on the political left.  
Beginning in 1979, the government allowed leftist politicians, who played a strong role in the 
country’s politics prior to the military coup, to return from political exile.  Two of these 
politicians, Leonel Brizola and Miguel Arraes, created the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) and 
the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), which are currently two of the country’s strongest leftist 
parties.  These politicians could now serve as the standard-bearers for political views that the 
military government had outlawed for more than 13 years.  In 1985, Congress farther reduced 
restrictions on leftist parties, ending the ban on Marxist parties.   
 Given these three factors, it is unsurprising that scholars in the early post-democratization 
period viewed parties as fragmented and lacking coherent ideological positions.  New parties 
were emerging and politicians were frequently changing parties as they sought to understand the 
unstable rules of the game.  In hindsight, however, scholars began to reevaluate their initial 
assessment of the country’s parties.  Mainwaring, Meneguello and Power (2000) showed that 
while there was high party fragmentation, politicians from right parties had clear ideological 
differences from their counterparts in center and left parties going back to the 1980s.   
 During the National Constitutional Assembly, held in 1987 and 1988 to write a new 
federal constitution, constituents from conservative parties differed from their counterparts in 
center and left parties on issues related to democracy and the military regime.  While 71 percent 
of members from non-conservative parties wanted to revoke all secret decrees issued during the 
military regime, only 16.1 percent of constituents from conservative parties support this 
amendment.  In the 1990s, the issues changed but the differences between the parties remained.  
Politicians from conservative parties more strongly supported pro-market neoliberal economic 
policies that included lowering taxes and opening markets, while opposing the nationalization of 
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natural resources, the strengthening of workers’ rights and more spending on social programs.  
Outside the economic realm, they supported stronger crime control policies while opposing the 
legalization of abortion and rights for homosexuals.  Mainwaring, Meneguello and Power sum 
up this evidence as follows:  
 The image, prevalent before, of non-programmatic parties with only small differences 
 between them, is wrong. The right parties are not highly ideological in the sense of 
 aligning themselves vigorously and defending a coherent group of policies, but the 
 programmatic distances are large in the elite environment (2000, 42).4 
1.1.2.1 Leftist Parties in Brazil 
 
While right parties have been at the center of debate over whether ideological differences exist in 
Brazil, there is less controversy surrounding left parties.  Left parties display strong party 
discipline with federal deputies voting with the party more than 90 percent of the time.  Deputies 
from these parties also acknowledge that parties play a central role in their campaigns and 
affiliation with the party is crucial to their electoral success (Mainwaring 1999, 136-174).  
Among the left, there are three main parties: the Workers’ Party (PT), the Brazilian Socialist 
Party (PSB) and the Democratic Labor Party (PDT).   
 Much of the recent literature on leftist political parties in Brazil [e.g. Keck 1992; 
Branford 2003; Hunter 2010; Gómez Bruera 2013] has focused on the Workers’ Party.  The 
emphasis on the PT is largely due to their success in national elections that include conquering 
the presidency four times since the country’s return to democracy.  There may exist, therefore, a 
tendency to classify the country’s political competition as PT versus anti-PT.  Simply assuming 
that this scheme travels to state politics, however, is problematic.   
                                                     
4 Author’s translation from Portuguese text.   
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 While the PT is the dominant leftist party at the national level, its power in the states is 
much more subdued.  Between 1990 and 2010, leftist parties collectively won 47 gubernatorial 
elections.  Breaking down these wins by parties shows that the PT is not the hegemonic force 
among the left.  The PT won just 18 elections, whereas the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) and 
the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) won 17 and 9 governorships, respectively.  Two minor leftist 
parties, the Popular Socialist Party (PPS) and the National Mobilization Party (PMN) won the 
other three elections.  Given this division of power among several left parties, viewing 
competition as occurring among left, center and right parties, rather than PT versus anti-PT, is a 
much more effective way of analyzing the relationship between politics and public security.    
1.1.2.2 Centrist Parties 
 
While there are clear ideological distinctions between left and right parties in Brazil, the area in 
between is more nebulous.  In Brazilian gubernatorial elections, the center primarily refers to two 
parties: the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the Brazilian Social Democratic 
Party (PSDB).  Together, they have won 74 out of the 75 gubernatorial elections won by centrist 
parties in Brazil.  In the classic Downsian model, political competition occurs along a left-right 
dimension (Downs 1957).  This unidimensional model assumes that in a multi-party system, 
there will be centrist parties that advocate positions on issues, such as public security, which are 
in between the positions that left and right parties hold.   
 Scholars consider the PSDB, formed by PMDB dissidents in 1988, to be a centrist party 
in the traditional sense of the word, although its ideological positions have moved from center-
left in the early 1990s to center-right in the 2000s (Mainwaring 1999; Powers 2000).  There are 
also, however, parties that do not fall clearly along the ideological spectrum.  At times, 
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politicians from these parties may agree with position held by left or right parties, but these 
differences are inconsistent across states and over time.  Voters support politicians from these 
catch-all parties due to the economic benefits they provide rather than the programs they 
advocate.  The PMDB is the quintessential example of this type of party.  At the federal level, it 
was part of 15 out of 19 governing coalitions between October 1988 and December 2010, 
supporting presidents from left, right and centrist parties (Maciel 2014, 30-31).  In this project, I 
will refer to both types of parties as centrist, although I recognize that their behavior is likely to 
differ from traditional centrist parties.  Put another way, in line with accepted practices, I identify 
“centrist parties” as any party that is not from the right or the left.    
1.1.3 The Argument 
Given the use of rational choice as the theoretical lens and the assumptions outlined above, I 
argue that the relationship between local politics and violence occurs in the four-stage cycle 
shown in Figure 1.2.  In the Election Stage, states hold gubernatorial elections.  During this 
stage, the voters are in charge and they must make two choices.  First, they must evaluate the 
incumbent party’s security performance and decide whether to punish/reward it at the ballot box 
for rising/declining levels of crime and violence.  Voters are more likely to hold the incumbent 
party responsible for policy performance when there is strong clarity of responsibility (Powell 
and Whitten 1993; Duch and Stevenson 2008).  In Brazil, where security rests squarely in the 
governor’s hands, voters have a clear view of who is responsible for public safety, making it 
more likely that they will hold the incumbent responsible for public security failures and 
successes.  When crime declines and voters choose to support the incumbent party, the first stage 
ends.  However, in situations where crime and violence have worsened and they decide to vote 
against the incumbent party, they must decide which of the opposition parties to support.  
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 In two-party systems, where most of the research on crime and violence originates, the 
choice is simple.  Voters punish the incumbent by supporting the opposition candidate or 
abstaining from voting.  However, the situation is more complex in multiparty systems, in which 
Brazil is an extreme case.  In gubernatorial elections, on average, voters have a choice of six 
candidates.  The presence of multiple candidates forces voters to decide which opposition 
candidate they believe provides the best possible solution to the security problem.   
 
 
Figure 1.2: The Four-Stage Politics and Violence Cycle 
 In the Resource Provision Stage, which follows the election, governors must decide what 
type of policies they should implement to address crime.  Their first option is to focus on 
poverty, inequality and other underlying social structures that lead to higher crime rates.  By 
modifying individuals’ personal situations, the government can reduce their incentive to engage 
Election Stage
Resource 
Provision Stage
Resource 
Distribution 
Stage
Violence Stage 
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in crime.  These policies, while effective in the long term, may be slow at reducing crime.  This 
is problematic for governors who receive pressure to implement policies that will lead to rapid 
improvements in security.   Most often, voters (and politicians) believe that the punitive 
approach to security is the most effective option to achieve this goal.  This leaves governors with 
the second option, i.e., crime repression.  Governors can make it more costly to commit crimes 
through increased spending on law enforcement and other policies that lead to greater 
punishment for committing crimes.   
 After they decide how much of the state’s resources they will allocate to both crime 
prevention and crime repression, the cycle enters the Resource Distribution Stage.  In this stage, 
governors must decide how to distribute law enforcement resources throughout the state when 
there are not enough resources to go around.  A policy-maximizing approach suggests that the 
governor should allocate resources using technical criteria that reduce crime to its lowest 
possible level.  However, career-interested governors must also take into account how the 
distribution of these resources will affect their future electoral success.  
    Finally, in the Violence Stage, governors experience the outcomes that their approaches 
to public security produce and the cycle continues.  This stage shows how providing more 
resources for crime prevention and crime repression, along with the strategies that governments 
use to distribute these resources, affect violence.  It also answers a central question that underlies 
the study of politics and crime.  Does it matter whether a left, center or right party controls the 
government or does the ability for any politician to reduce crime and violence rest solely on how 
they allocate resources to crime repression and crime prevention policies? 
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1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In this project, I examine the four-stage relationship between violence and politics in Brazilian 
states.  Each chapter helps evaluate the central argument that I make in this project.  Governors’ 
responses to security problems depend on how these problems affect their electoral success and 
these responses, in turn, explain changes in violence.  The questions and the hypotheses tested in 
these chapters are as follows.   
 
Chapter 2: How does violence affect support for political parties across the ideological  
                  spectrum?   
  
       H1: An increase in violence under a left governor will increase support for right   
  parties but will have no effect on support for centrist parties.  
 
       H1: An increase in violence under a center governor will increase support for right   
  parties but will have no effect on support for centrist parties.  
 
       H3: An increase in violence will increase support for candidates from both ideological  
  groups that are not in power.    
  
       H4: An increase in violence when there is a left (right) incumbent party will increase  
  support most strongly for right (left) non-incumbent parties rather than centrist  
  parties. 
 
       H5: Incumbent right parties will lose more electoral support from rising crime rates  
  than incumbent center and left parties. 
 
Chapter 3: How do electoral interests influence the resources that governors devote to different  
                  security policies? 
 
       H1: Governors from right parties will spend more on security than governors from     
                        left parties only when their primary political opponent is from a left party.    
 
       H2: Governors from left parties will spend more on education than governors from  
             right parties only when their primary political opponent is from a right party 
 
       H3: Governors from centrist parties will spend more on security than governors from    
  left parties only when their primary political opponent is from a left party.    
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      H4:  Governors from centrist parties will spend more on education than governors  
  from right parties only when their primary political opponent is from a right party.  
     H5: Governors who run for reelection will spend more on security than governors who  
           do not run for any political office.  
   
Chapter 4: How do electoral interests influence the distribution of law enforcement resources  
                  within states? 
 
       H1: The larger the percentage of a governor’s total votes that comes from the  
             municipality, the more police officers the municipality will receive.  
 
       H2: The higher the percentage of a governor’s total votes that comes from the  
             municipality, the more police officers that surrounding municipalities will  
             receive. 
 
       H3: The greater support a municipality gives to state deputies allied with the  
  governor, the more police officers it will receive.    
 
       H4: Municipalities with allied mayors will receive more police officers than  
             municipalities with mayors from opposition parties.      
 
Chapter 5: How do ideology, resources for law enforcement and education, and the distribution  
                  of law enforcement resources affect municipal violence? 
 
       H1: More state spending on law enforcement will lead to lower homicide rates.  
       H2: More state spending on law enforcement will reduce crime rates most strongly in   
  large municipalities that give the governor a large number of votes (regardless of  
  the total amount of resources spent on security).  
 
      H2a: In states with low levels of spending on law enforcement, support for the  
             governor will have no effect on homicide rates. 
 
       H3: Crime rates will be lower when the governor and the mayor are from the same   
   party.  
 
       H4: Municipalities in states with governors from right parties will have lower  
              homicide rates than municipalities in states with governors from left parties. 
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1.3 METHODOLOGY 
To test these arguments, I utilize a mixed methodological approach that combines municipal and 
state security and violence data from 1991 to 2014 with case studies and interviews.  I conducted 
interviews between July 2015 and June 2016 in the six states highlighted in Figure 1.3: Rio de 
Janeiro, Paraná, Pernambuco, Sergipe, Rio Grande do Norte and Bahia.  I selected states based 
on violence and political party competition.  More specifically, I included states where violence 
was increasing, as well as states where it was decreasing.  I also chose states that had governors 
from left, centrist, and right parties since partisan politics models, along with popular opinion, 
assumes that ideology leads politicians to implement different public security policies. 
 My original plan was to focus the political interviews on governors since they are the 
central focus of my project.  In all six states, I visited governors’ offices and made formal 
interview requests to their staff.  However, no governors agreed to participate in an interview.  
As a result, I decided to focus my efforts on state deputies.  State assemblies are a training 
ground for many state governors, and deputies are able to provide insights into the important 
debates regarding public security, particularly the role that ideology places in determining 
support for specific public security policies.  They also play an integral role in the state’s budget 
negotiations.  Both these issues take center stage in the project. 
 In each state, I visited the state assembly, where all deputies have office space and 
extensive staff.  Rather than targeting only deputies who focus on public security, I took a broad 
approach to obtaining interviews and visited the office of every deputy.  If deputies were unable 
to conduct an interview on a specific day, I made return trips to the office unless their staff 
indicated that the deputy would not participate in the interview.  Obtaining some interviews 
required as many as five office visits, but the strategy was successful.  As Table 1.2 shows, I had 
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an overall success rate of 42 percent, interviewing 119 out of the 285 deputies.  This is the 
largest set of interviews or survey data that researchers have ever obtained from state deputies in 
Brazil.  
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Figure 1.3: Fieldwork States 
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Table 1.2: State Interview Statistics, 2015-2016 Fieldwork 
          
State 
 
Total State 
Deputies 
Deputies 
Interviewed 
Deputy Interview Success  
Rate (%) 
Other 
Interviews 
     
Bahia 63 24 38.1 3 
Paraná 55 31 56.4 2 
Pernambuco 49 25 51.0 5 
Rio de Janeiro 70 25 35.7 6 
Rio Grande do Norte 24 9 37.5 2 
Sergipe 24 5 20.8 0 
     
Total 285 119 41.8 18 
     
 
 During these interviews, I used a semi-structured interview script that asked a variety of 
questions about public security in the state.  Since I did not obtain data about individuals or 
identifiable private information, the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board 
determined that the project did not involve human subjects and gave permission to begin 
interviews on December 4, 2014.  The full semi-structured interview script is available in 
Appendix A.    
 Before each interview, I informed the deputies that these interviews were anonymous and 
that I would not use their name in the project.  To further guarantee anonymity, I took 
handwritten notes and did not use an audio recorder.  At the end of each day, I typed the notes 
from each interview into a separate document that included their responses as well as my 
observations about the interview environment and their behavior during the interview.   
 To obtain interviews with public security officials, I used a three-pronged strategy.  First, 
in each state I visited the state agency in charge of all law enforcement agencies as well as the 
military police headquarters and requested interviews with the Secretary of Public Security and 
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the head of the military police.  This approach proved successful in only one state.  Second, each 
state’s Legislative Assembly has military police officials who provide security for the legislature 
and serve as policy advisors.  In three states, I was able to interview these officials or use their 
connections to obtain interviews with key public security actors.  Finally, when interviewing 
state deputies I also asked them for recommendations of public security officials whom I should 
interview.  In one state, a deputy who works primarily on public security issues arranged an 
interview with the state’s Secretary of Public Security and a senior aide to the head of the 
military police.  In another state, the former head of the military police worked for a deputy, and 
he gave me an interview and arranged other interviews with military police officials.  Using this 
strategy, I obtained 18 interviews with high-ranking individuals who work with public security.    
 The mixed methodological approach has important theoretical and methodological 
advantages.  From a theoretical standpoint, the study of violence and politics has often focused 
on a single case study or a short period, typically when there is a sudden surge or decline in 
violence.  Although these events are interesting, they are anomalies rather than the norm of 
everyday politics.  Utilizing quantitative data across a 25-year period allows me to analyze how 
violence affects politics when it is high and increasing, as well as low and decreasing.  From a 
methodological standpoint, panel data extending across multiple years allows me to utilize 
techniques to correct for variety of issues that include lagged effects, time effects and 
unobservable state and municipal differences that can bias the statistical findings.  Together, my 
approach’s theoretical and methodological benefits allow me to generalize findings across 
different social and economic contexts beyond Brazil and to make stronger causal arguments 
about the relationship between politics and violence.   
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 The qualitative research also plays an important role.  Altogether, I conducted 137 
interviews with state deputies from 25 parties, members of the public security apparatus and non-
governmental organizations.  These interviews helps me highlight when the on-the-ground 
reality matches the results found using the large-N analysis and when it differs.  They also 
provide crucial information for the project’s four short case studies.     
1.4 PROJECT ORGANIZATION 
 This project proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 begins with an analysis of how violence affects 
support for gubernatorial candidates across the ideological spectrum.  I argue that while right 
parties traditionally have a strong reputation for being more competent on security issues, this 
reputation is a double-edged sword.  When they are unable to reduce violence, opposition parties 
are able to challenge this ownership and win electoral support by offering alternative crime 
prevention policies (Petrocik 1996; Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen 2003; Holian 2004).   
 Using municipal crime and voting data from 135 gubernatorial elections in Brazil, I show 
that violence has uneven effects for political parties across the ideological spectrum.  More 
specifically, voters only punish incumbent parties for a rise in violence when the governor is 
from a right party.  I argue that this is due to their emphasis on law enforcement that stresses 
short-term results.  I also show that the electoral punishment that right parties receive benefits 
both non-incumbent centrist and left parties that see their electoral support increase.    
 Chapter 3 then focuses on how ideology and electoral interests influence the resources 
that governors allocate to address public security problems.  Partisan budget models suggest that 
politicians from right parties focus on crime prevention through law enforcement and more 
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stringent punishment for offenders, while politicians from left parties focus on crime prevention 
through education and social programs.  Using state budget data from 1991 to 2014, I show that 
across the ideological spectrum, there are no differences in the resources that governors allocate 
to education.  There are, however, differences in the resources they allocate to law enforcement, 
depending on political competition.   
 When governors from leftist parties, who are often viewed as soft on crime and violence, 
face competition from centrist and other left parties, they spend more on law enforcement to 
distinguish themselves as the best candidate to deal with security problems.  However, they do 
not utilize this strategy when facing right parties, which have the reputation for being the most 
adept at addressing violence.  In contrast, governors from right parties only spend more on law 
enforcement when they face strong leftist opponents, who they can paint as being weak on the 
issue.  When they face centrist or other right parties, they allocate resources to other policy areas.     
 In Chapter 4, I then focus on the distribution of law enforcement personnel.  While 
governors from both left and right parties spend more on law enforcement to gain electoral 
support, the strategies that they use to distribute these resources is largely unknown.  Using data 
on the distribution of military police officers in the state of Minas Gerais between 2007 and 
2015, I argue that governors distribute law enforcement resources based on electoral interests, 
rather than technical factors designed to minimize crime rates.  I find that the primary factor 
influencing changes in the number of police officers that a municipality receives is the share of 
the governor’s votes statewide that come from the municipality.  The larger the share, the more 
police officers that the municipality receives.  In addition, using spatial modeling techniques, I 
show that when governors distribute police for political purposes, neighboring cities lose police 
officers.    
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 The final chapter examines how governors’ public security policy choices influence 
homicide rates.  I argue that governors have four mechanisms that can they can use to tackle 
rising crime rates: providing more resources for law enforcement, distributing more resources to 
specific geographical areas, coordinating public security policies with local political actors and 
emphasizing different public security policies.  Using municipal homicide data from 1997 to 
2014, I test each of these mechanisms and find mixed evidence that governors use them and that 
they are effective in reducing violence.     
 I show that in isolation, more spending on law enforcement does not reduce municipal 
homicide rates; what matters is the state’s wealth and how cities vote in gubernatorial elections.  
For support for the governor to influence homicide rates, the state must spend at least R$100 
(about $33) per capita on law enforcement.  I argue that this decline occurs because the governor 
is giving these cities more law enforcement resources to bolster electoral support.  However, for 
government policy to matter, states need to spend a minimum amount on security.  In poor states, 
governors simply do not have enough security resources that they can use to reward those areas 
that give them more electoral support.     
 There is more mixed evidence that governors use the other mechanisms to reduce crime.  
Cities with mayors from the same party as the governor do not have lower homicide rates, 
suggesting that the governor makes security policies and distribute resources based on their own 
electoral interests, rather than the interests of the local political allies.  Meanwhile, homicide 
rates decline 10 percent when a right governor is power.  However, these results are sensitive to 
model specifications.   
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2. CHAPTER 2: VIOLENCE AND VOTING IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS  
What impact do crime and violence have on support for political parties across the ideological 
spectrum?  In recent years, Brazil has experienced rising levels of insecurity.  Between 1989 and 
2015, the country lost more than 1.2 million people to criminal violence.  As Figure 2.1 shows, 
the overall number of homicides has exhibited an upward trend, more than doubling from 28,706 
in 1989 to 58,138 in 2014.  Taking into account population size, the national homicide rate per 
100,000 residents increased more than 45 percent from 19.5 victims in 1989 to 28.4 victims in 
2015. 
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Figure 2.1: Homicides in Brazil, 1989-2015 
 Most research suggests that rising levels of crime and violence benefit right and center-
right political parties that take a tough on crime approach to security (Garland 2000; Chevigny 
2005; Dammert 2012; Holland 2013).  This chapter challenges these findings using a rational-
choice approach to crime control.  I argue that while voters support tough on crime measures, 
they are more willing to abandon them when they do not work.  This, in turn, makes it possible 
for non-incumbent political parties to win electoral support while advocating diverse approaches 
to crime control. 
Using municipal data from 135 gubernatorial elections between 1994 and 2010, I show 
that opposition political parties across the ideological spectrum gain support when violence rises.  
However, their electoral gains depend on the incumbent party’s ideology.  Non-incumbent left 
parties see the largest electoral gains from increasing violence when a right party is in power and 
30 
 
vice-versa.  I also show voters punish political parties unequally for rising crime rates.  More 
specifically, incumbent right parties lose electoral support at a higher rates than their 
counterparties in leftist parties do.  Meanwhile, centrist opposition parties lose support when 
crime rates rise under a left incumbent party but see an increase in support when it rises under a 
right incumbent party.  I attribute these differing effects to voters rejecting public security 
policies that fail to reduce violence. 
2.1 CRIME AND PUBLIC SECURITY POLICIES  
Crime and violence are key concerns for Brazilian voters.  Between 2006 and 2016, the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) asked people to identify the most important problem 
facing the country.  As Table 2.1 shows, in all years until 2016, when the country’s economic 
crisis peaked, more than 20 percent of survey respondents identified security as the country’s 
most pressing problem.5  In addition, between 2006 and 2014, voters considered security to be a 
more important issue than economic problems, corruption or healthcare.  Concern over public 
security is similar for respondents across the socioeconomic spectrum. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 Security contains the following categories: violence, drug trafficking, delinquency and lack of security  
Economy contains the following categories: economic crisis, unemployment and inequality. 
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Table 2.1: Brazil’s Most Important Issue, (%) 
              
 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 
Security 31 28 27 22 31 9 
Economy 24 18 20 18 10 38 
Corruption 14 11 9 11 12 19 
Healthcare 9 18 14 21 26 9 
Source: LAPOP, 2006-2016 biannual survey         
 
 
 For governors, public security is an important electoral issue.  Brazil is a federal country 
and its 1988 Constitution gives states and the federal governments control over public security.  
In each state, there are two police forces: the civil police and the military police.  The civil police 
investigate crimes after they occur and conduct long-term criminal investigations.  Meanwhile, 
the military police patrol cities in an effort to prevent and repress criminal activity.  While the 
Constitution gives the federal government the power to organize and maintain both police forces, 
it places them under the governor’s control.6   Apart from these two groups, there are no local 
law enforcement agencies in Brazilian states.7  This institutional arrangement creates high clarity 
of responsibility, which makes voters more likely to hold governors accountable for their success 
or failures in addressing security problems (Powell and Whitten 1993; Duch and Stevenson 
2008).  It also makes gubernatorial elections an ideal place to examine how violence influences 
support for political parties from different ideological groups.    
                                                     
6 The military police in Brazil are similar to the National Guard in the United States. They are reserve members of 
the military that the government can call to duty in times of emergency.  In addition, they use military rankings and 
have an organizational structure that is similar to the armed forces.     
7 Some large wealthier cities have public security agents called municipal guards that protect city and state property.  
Recently, the government passed law 13,022/2014 giving them law enforcement powers.  However, this law is 
currently under review at the Supreme Court since the Federal Constitution explicitly states that only civil and 
military police are law enforcement officials at the state level. 
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2.1.1 Approaches to Crime Control 
While there are disagreements about outcomes in many policy areas, public security is not one of 
them.  Security is a consensus issue, an issue where everyone agrees on the desirability of a 
particular outcome (Stokes 1963).  While political parties agree on the desirability of reducing 
crime and violence, they may emphasize different methods to achieve this goal.  These differing 
approaches to security are important since gaining support on consensus issues requires that 
voters believe that the party has the best set of policies to address the problem (Egan 2013, 30-
31).  Politicians must also demonstrate that they are successful at achieving policy proposals.   
 A rational-choice approach to crime control offers governments divergent policies to 
address the problem.  The first approach focuses on minimizing crime by increasing the expected 
costs of engaging in criminal activity, thus making it less attractive to potential offenders 
(Becker 1968).  Cross-nationally, there have been strong efforts to reduce actual and perceived 
increases in crime through tough on crime measures that include increased law enforcement 
spending and longer prison sentences, among other policies (Garland 2000; Dammert 2012, 
133).  Even in countries where trust in law enforcement institutions is low, the public is 
increasingly making demands for more police officers and penal institutions (Dammert 2012, 
22).     
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The second approach focuses on reducing crime by providing individuals with alternative 
opportunities and job skills that will enable them to obtain more money from lawful employment 
(Ehrlich 1975).  The emphasis on prevention through social policies has spawned a large body of 
research on the relationship between crime and education (Ehrlich 1975; Raphael and Winter-
Ebmer 2001; Groot and van den Brink 2010; Machin, Marie and Vujić 2011; Meghir, Marten, 
Schnabel 2012). As one state deputy from the Workers’ Party (PT) in Rio de Janeiro stated, 
“educate children today so that you will not have to punish them as adults.”8   
 There are two reasons why education reduces crime rates (Machin, Marie and Vujić 
2011).  First, education provides individuals with skills that make them more successful in the 
job market (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001; Groot and van den Brink 2010; Machin, Olivier 
and Vujić 2011).  As wages rise and unemployment decreases, crime rates decline (Grogger 
1998; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001).  Second, educational activities occupy time that 
individuals may otherwise spend in criminal activity (Ehrlich 1975; Jacob and Lefgren 2003; 
Luallen 2006; Anderson 2015).  The literature refers to this phenomenon as the ‘self-
incapacitation effect’ (Tauchen et al. 1994).   
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 Personal interview, Rio de Janeiro, October 15, 2015. 
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 In Brazil, voters support both law enforcement and prevention-based approaches to 
public security, although there is a strong preference for law enforcement.  Between July 2015 
and June 2016, I interviewed state deputies in six states and asked them what requests they 
receive from voters to better public security.  As Table 2.2 shows, approximately two-thirds of 
deputies indicated that voters only made requests for law enforcement resources.  This included 
demands for more police officers, street patrols and police stations, among other policies.9  
Meanwhile, the other deputies indicated that voters demanded social policies or a combination of 
social policies and law enforcement. 
Table 2.2: Voter’s Security Requests to State Deputies  
       
State Law Enforcement Social Policies Both Policies 
    
Bahia 15 2  1  
Paraná 17  2  7  
Pernambuco 10  6  0  
Rio de Janeiro 9  2  4  
Rio Grande do Norte 4  1  2  
Sergipe 3  1  0  
    
Total Deputies 58 (67%) 14 (16%) 14 (16%) 
Source: Author’s Interviews, July 2015-June 2016 
 
  
  
 
 
                                                     
9 Many deputies who received demands from voters for more law enforcement resources criticized this approach to 
public security.  One deputy in Rio de Janeiro said that voters focus on these policies because they are ignorant 
(Personal interview, Rio de Janeiro, October 15, 2015).   
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 Taken together, viewing crime as an economic decision offers contrasting approaches to 
public security.  Policies that emphasize punitive measures view increasing the cost of crime as 
the best deterrence.  Meanwhile, approaches that emphasize better employment opportunities and 
increasing education levels focus not on raising the cost of crime, but rather on increasing the 
benefits of acting legally.  In the next section, I examine how ideology influences which 
approach political parties advocate to address rising crime rates. 
2.2 POLITICAL PARTIES AND CRIME  
Governments can improve public security by increasing the costs of crime through an emphasis 
on law enforcement or by using social policies and education to increase the benefits from acting 
legally.  While the evidence supports both approaches to crime control, much of the research on 
politics and crime has focused on the former policy.  The evidence suggests that the left-right 
ideological divide plays a strong role in determining the type of policies that political parties 
support and implement.  More specifically, right parties focus on law enforcement while left 
parties focus on social programs.  In this discussion, however, the literature is largely silent on 
the crime control policies that centrist parties adopt. 
 In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party has traditionally advocated a law-and-
order oriented political platform (Millie 2008).  In France and Italy, rising crime rates and 
growing perceptions of insecurity led France’s center-right government under Jacques Chirac 
and Italy’s center-right government under Silvio Berlusconi to fight crime through policies that 
included hiring more police officers and longer prison sentences (Shea 2009).  Across Western 
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Europe, populist right-wing parties have gained considerable support in recent years by 
campaigning on a law-and-order platform linking crime to immigration (Betz 1993; Smith 2010).   
 Additional evidence from the Americas supports the argument that conservative parties 
take a tough on crime approach.  In the United States, the Republican Party has a more law-and-
order oriented electoral campaign platform and voters view it as being better able to tackle crime 
(Egan 2013).  Meanwhile, in El Salvador, the conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance 
(ARENA) party was also able to gain support by emphasizing tough-on-crime policies 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Holland 2013).  In recent years, centrist and populist parties in 
Europe and Latin America have begun adopting a similar approach to crime control in an effort 
to reduce right parties’ advantage on the issue (Chevigny 2005; Millie 2008).  As Lab (2004) 
argues: 
When issues of crime and criminal justice are raised for discussion among many people, 
particularly politicians and policy makers, prevention is nowhere to be found. Instead, the 
focus is on arrest, prosecution and punishment of offenders. There may be many reasons 
for this type of response, but perhaps the major reason that politicians and policymakers 
turn to these responses is that arrest, prosecution, and punishment are well known to the 
general public and represent the appearance of doing something about crime…The 
priority for politicians and policy makers is to show what they have accomplished, and 
traditional measures of criminal justice system response are easy to enumerate (683-684). 
 
 If voters demand punitive policies to address public security, then rising crime rates 
should increase support only for those parties that place a stronger emphasis on addressing crime 
through law-and-order policies.  This has typically been right-wing parties (Chevigny 2005; 
Egan 2013; Holland 2013; Millie 2008; Shea 2009).  Based on the extant literature, therefore, 
when crime rises and there is a centrist or leftist governor in power, voters will shift their support 
to right parties.  They will not give more support to non-incumbent left and centrist parties since 
they view them as being less effective at reducing crime rates than right parties.  This leads us to 
expect the following. 
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H1: An increase in violence under a left governor will increase support for right parties but will  
      have no effect on support for centrist parties. 
 
H2: An increase in violence under a center governor will increase support for right parties but      
      will have no effect on support for left parties.  
 
 
 Underlying the current research is the assumption that the public’s support for tough on 
crime measures precludes them from also supporting preventive policies that address the 
underlying social causes of crime.  Evidence from surveys, however, strongly challenges this 
assumption.  In 2012, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey asked 
Brazilians what they viewed as the most effective policy to fight crime.  A nearly equal number 
of respondents said that social programs and harsher laws are the best ways to reduce crime.  
Other surveys from Western countries show widespread support for treating non-violent youth 
offenders more leniently than adults (Roberts 2004).  A large minority also believes that 
reducing unemployment and increasing social programs are the most effective ways to reduce 
crime and that people prefer to invest more in crime prevention than building new prisons 
(Doobs 2000).  In addition, a majority of people believe that the main purpose of prison should 
be rehabilitation, as opposed to punishment, and they are more willing to spend additional money 
on prevention rather than punishment efforts (Cullen, Vose and Jonson 2012).  Cross-nationally, 
there is strong support for these preventative measures (Roberts and Hastings 2012).   
 This approach to public security that emphasizes punishment as well as prevention is 
most common among left parties.  When crime rates rose in El Salvador, despite the National 
Republican Alliance’s (ARENA) tough on crime approach, the leftist FMLN (Farabundo Martí 
National Liberation Front) was able to gain electoral support by providing a comprehensive 
crime policy that included addressing socioeconomic factors influencing crime (Holland 2013).  
Similarly in the United States, while candidates from the Democratic Party have emphasized 
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more spending on law enforcement in recent years, they continue to support to non-punitive 
based crime prevent efforts (Marion and Farmer 2003; Marion and Oliver 2012).  These findings 
extend to Brazil. 
 During interviews with state deputies in Brazil, I asked them to define public security and 
indicate what type of policies the government should implement to improve the security 
situation.  Based on their definition of public security and the policies they advocated for 
reducing crime and violence, I classified their approaches to public security along a continuum.  
The first category, law enforcement, indicates that deputies emphasized punitive policies, such as 
hiring more police officers, building more prisons and increasing law enforcement spending.  
The second category, combination, indicates that deputies discussed the need for a combined 
approach that emphasizes social policies as well as strengthening law enforcement to reduce 
crime and violence.  Finally, social policies indicates that deputies emphasized social policies, 
such as education and poverty reduction, as the best way to reduce security problems.  
 Next, I classified deputies according to their party’s ideological position using Power and 
Zucco’s (2009) index.  With 35 national political parties, the index measures ideology using 
parties’ voting behavior in the national Congress and classifies parties similarly to other 
measures that use expert opinions and elite questionnaires (Tarouco and Madeira 2013).  Since 
Power and Zucco classify parties based on surveys with federal deputies, they do not have 
ideological classifications available for all political parties that run in state elections.  For these 
parties, I classify ideology using historical documents and official party information.  Annex 1 
lists each party’s ideological classification.    
 As Table 2.3 shows, only 51 percent of deputies from right parties viewed social policies 
or a combination of social and law enforcement policies as the best way to increase public 
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security.  In contrast, 85 percent of deputies from leftist parties supported these policies.  Among 
three important leftist parties, the Workers’ Party (PT), the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) and 
the Party for Socialism and Liberty (PSOL), all 26 deputies I interviewed said that social policies 
or a combination of law enforcement and social policies is the best way to increase security.  Not 
a single deputy from these parties viewed law enforcement as the best solution to the problem. 
   
Table 2.3: Security Policies Supported by State Deputies  
      
 Law Enforcement Combination Social Policies 
    
Left Parties 6 23 10 
Center Parties 11 14 5 
Right Parties 20 18 3 
    
Total 37 (34%) 55 (50%) 18 (16%) 
Source: Author’s Interviews, July 2015-June 2016 
 
  
  
 Interviews with two deputies in Rio de Janeiro further illustrate the differences between 
politicians from the right and left.  The deputy from the rightist party said that in his view there 
are three pillars for public security.10  The first is to strengthen the laws because prison sentences 
are too short.  The second is to provide more security for police officers, since they often work 
extensive overtime each month and if they are involved in a shooting incident the government 
quickly arrests them to quell public attention.  The third is better family planning to reduce the 
number of children among poor families, since with large families and low income it is 
impossible to provide adequately for everyone.  When asked about human rights, he said that he 
supports the rights for victims and those individuals who, despite poverty and other problems, 
choose to follow the law and work to better themselves.  However, he does not have sympathy 
                                                     
10 Personal Interview, September 23, 2015, Rio de Janeiro 
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for criminals.  He argued that we cannot see poverty as a reason for crime, since most poor 
individuals are workers who are not committing crimes.  Similarly, there are people from the 
upper social classes who have excellent opportunities but still engage in crime. 
 In contrast to the rightist deputy, the deputy from the left party focused on preventative 
measures.11  When asked about public security, he said that education is important because it 
prevents youth from becoming involved with criminal activities.  He also noted that when he 
served as mayor of a major city in the state, they implemented other prevention-based programs 
that focused on music and the arts.  He argued that differences in approaches to public security 
depend on ideology with left parties wanting to address crime through social programs, while 
right parties want to use more police.    
 In summary, a significant portion of the public supports using a combination of tougher 
policing and prevention policies that address the underlying socioeconomic cause of crime.  This 
support, in turn, should lead voters to support parties that advocate a wide range of policies to 
address security problems and not only right parties that focus on policing.  I expect, therefore, 
that when a left party is in power and violence increase, voters will give more support to both 
centrist and right parties.  Similarly, when a centrist party is in power and violence increases, 
both left and right parties should see an increase in support.  Finally, both centrist and left parties 
will see an increase in support when violence rises and a right party is in power.  Put more 
simply, voters will punish candidates from the ideological group that is in power for rising crime 
rates and move their support to the other ideological groups that are not in power.  
H3: An increase in violence will increase support for candidates from both ideological groups  
      that are not in power.  
                                                     
11 Personal Interview, September 22, 2015, Rio de Janeiro 
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2.2.1 Crime and Non-Incumbent Party Support 
While rising crime rates may benefit non-incumbent parties from across the political spectrum, 
the level of additional support that they receive is likely to depend on their ideological stance on 
public security issues in relation to the incumbent party.  For parties to gain support from rising 
crime rates, voters must believe that they have the best approach to address the problem (Egan 
2013).  If a party is in control of the government and crime increases, then voters will begin to 
question that approach to public security.  This, in turn, opens the door for parties that advocate 
opposing policies to gain electoral support as voters punish the incumbent party for poor 
performance (Cummins 2009; Booth and Seligson 2009, ch.4).   
 It is not possible to determine directly whether Brazilian voters perceive differences in 
how political parties at different parts of the ideological spectrum respond to crime.  Major 
national surveys, including the Brazilian Electoral Study (BES) and the LAPOP survey, have 
never asked respondents whether they perceive differences in parties’ security policies or which 
party they view as most competent at handling security issues.12  The extant literature in Brazil, 
however, emphasizes that the left and right take different approaches to security that coincide 
with cross-national generalizations about left and right parties.  Right parties dominate the issue 
and focus on law enforcement and crime repression.  In contrast, left parties are less vocal and 
advocate education and social programs to reduce crime (Da Silva 1990; Soares 2005; Cano 
2006; Sapori 2007).   
 It is important to highlight that in the extant literature on crime control, there is almost no 
discussion on centrist parties.  Research in Brazil, in particular, either ignore these parties or 
implicitly assume that any party not from the left is from the right.  This assumption, however, 
                                                     
12 I have also been unable to locate any other local surveys that address the issue. 
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contradicts the broad literature (Mainwaring 1999; Powers 2000; Mainwaring, Meneguello and 
Power 2000; Maciel 2014) showing that centrist parties clearly differ from right parties.  In 
particular, they lack clear ideological positions, which gives them flexibility to offer either a 
more police or prevention-centered approach to public security.  Center parties’ positions on 
public security is likely to depend on who is in power, if they are not. 
   While the literature emphasizes differences between left and right parties, politicians 
disagree about the role that ideology plays in determining actual security policies.  I asked state 
deputies how the left-right divide and other factors affect their colleagues’ responses to security 
issues.  Thirty-five deputies did not answer the question or gave answers that were too vague to 
code.  Among the 74 deputies whom responded to the question, answers fell into four categories: 
ideology, ideology and personal differences, personal differences and government-opposition. 
Table 2.4: Determinants of State Deputies’ Approaches to Public Security 
          
 Ideology 
Yes          No 
 
Ideology &  
Personal Differences 
 
Personal  
Differences 
 
Government-
Opposition 
 
38% 18% 9% 24% 11% 
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 As Table 2.4 shows, 47 percent of deputies agreed with the traditional view that ideology 
or a combination of ideology and individual factors are the primary determinants of how deputies 
approach security issues.  A large minority, 24 percent, disagreed with this assessment and said 
that personal factors, such as the deputy’s career background and whether they had an 
established electoral base, determined their responses to security problems.  More specifically, 
new politicians focus heavily on security issues since this offers them an electoral niche.  
Another 11 percent said the opposition-government divide is the most important factor.  When 
politicians are part of the opposition, they criticize the government and call for alternative 
policies, regardless of what the governor is doing.     
 Although politicians disagree about whether ideological differences affect actual 
responses to security problems, parties fashion the belief that these differences exist.  I surmise 
that voters will use these reputational differences as a heuristic to determine which opposition 
party they will support when the incumbent fails to address security problems.  Left parties 
emphasize education and social programs as the solution to security problems, while right parties 
focus on tough-on-crime policies.  In contrast, centrist parties are stuck between the two.  They 
do not have a strong reputation for either set of policies.  As a result, I expect that when violence 
rises and a centrist party is in power, voters will divide their support among left and right parties. 
In contrast, since left and right parties have clear policy positions and voters will reject policies 
that do not work, rising crime rates when there is a left(right) incumbent party will increase 
support most strongly for right(left) parties rather than centrist parties.  
H4: An increase in violence when there is a left (right) incumbent party will increase support  
     more strongly for right (left) non-incumbent parties rather than centrist parties. 
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2.2.2 Crime and Incumbent Party Punishment 
A second issue that we must consider is how much voters punish the incumbent party when 
crime rises.  Retrospective voting models typically focus on whether or not voters punish/reward 
the incumbent party for their failure/success at addressing consensus issues.  Strongly absent in 
the literature, however, is the issue of the policies that governments can use to address these 
issues.  As has been noted throughout the chapter, however, public security is different from 
many consensus issues since governments can fight crime using both short-term and long-term 
policies.  Voters have an incentive to punish parties divergently for rising crime rates, depending 
on whether their policies emphasize short or long-term solutions to crime.  
 Short-term solutions focus on creating a stronger repressive apparatus through policies 
that include hiring more police officers, building more prisons and building a stronger 
intelligence system, among others.  Long-term solutions, in contrast, focus on identifying the 
underlying socioeconomic factors leading to crime.  These differences map onto the left-right 
ideological spectrum with right parties advocating more short-term policies, while left parties 
focus on long-term solutions (Betz 1993; Marion and Farmer 2003; Millie 2008; Shea 2009; 
Smith 2010; Marion and Oliver 2012; Egan 2013; Holland 2013).  Meanwhile, centrist parties 
use a moderate combination of the two policies.   
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 When right parties emphasize short-term solutions, voters will expect that they will 
deliver rapid reductions in crime.  Their failure to achieve these objectives will be glaringly 
public, especially since public security is perhaps their strongest electoral issue.  Voters will also 
punish centrist and leftist parties for their failure to reduce crime.  However, since their crime 
control policies focus more on preventative measures, voters are likely to have fewer 
expectations that they will reduce crime.  Therefore, while I expect that voters will punish 
incumbent parties across the ideological spectrum for rising crime rates, the punishment will be 
strongest for right parties.  
H5: Incumbent right parties will lose more electoral support from rising crime rates than  
      incumbent center and left parties. 
2.3 THEORETICAL MODELS AND DATA 
To test these arguments, I use municipal homicide and electoral data from gubernatorial elections 
between 1994 and 2010.  Using municipal data is advantageous for studying the impact of 
violence on party support since homicide rates within states vary greatly across cities.  To 
measure support for left, centrist and right gubernatorial parties, I use election data from all 26 
states and the federal district.  Since I am interested in how violence affects support for parties at 
different parts of the political spectrum, I use the collective vote share that all candidates in each 
ideological group receive in the first round of gubernatorial elections.13  I calculate the vote share 
by dividing each ideological group’s votes by the total number of valid votes cast in the 
municipality.  I classify each party’s ideological position using Power and Zucco’s (2009) index 
                                                     
13 If no gubernatorial candidates receive at least 50 percent of votes, there is a runoff election between the top two 
candidates.   
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of ideology, which utilizes voting behavior in the national Congress.  For parties that only 
participate in state politics, I classify their ideological group using historical documents and 
official party information.  
 As Table 2.5 shows, since 1994 there has been a decline in the number of right governors 
in Brazil. This decline appears to have primarily benefited left parties that went from controlling 
only six governorships, in 1994, to twelve in 2010.  Meanwhile, the number of centrist governors 
has remained steady across the five elections.  The rapid rise of leftist parties in state elections 
coincided with the Workers’ Party’s (PT) control of the presidency that began in 2002. 
Table 2.5: Total Governors by Ideological Group and Year, 1994-2010 
          
 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
      
Left Governors 6 6 10 12 12 
Center Governors 15 13 13 13 13 
Right Governors 6 8 4 2 2 
      
N 27 27 27 27 27 
 
  
 
 Table 2.6 provides summary statistics for model covariates.  Right parties have the lowest 
collective vote share averaging around 17 percent in municipalities across the five elections.  In 
contrast, centrist parties dominate gubernatorial elections, having an average of 39 percent of 
votes.  These differences are in line with data showing that throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
centrist parties have maintained control of the governorship in most states.   
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Table 2.6: Summary Statistics 
         
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
Municipal Factors      
  Right Vote Percentage 17.33 20.57 0 87.40 
  Center Vote Percentage 38.81 26.12 0 94.56 
  Left Vote Percentage 25.43 20.36 0 95.41 
  Homicide Rate (log) 0.55 0.62 0 3.10 
  Population Size (log) 9.41 1.11 6.60 16.22 
  GDP per Capita (log) 4,315 4,943 139 142 
  Poverty Reduction 60.36 22.68 0.31 98.92 
State Factors     
  Unemployment Rate 8.48 2.28 3.1 19.1 
  Political Party Change 0.03 0.18 0 1 
  Incumbent Candidate 0.40 0.49 0 1 
  Right Incumbent Party 0.19 0.39 0 1 
  Center Incumbent Party 0.62 0.49 0 1 
  Left Incumbent Party 0.18 0.39 0 1 
  Right Coalition Parties 4.94 4.35 0 19 
  Center Coalition Parties 8.11 5.70 0 23 
  Left Coalition Parties 9.39 4.41 0 26 
  Total Right Candidates 1.84 1.35 0 5 
  Total Center Candidates 1.65 0.98 0 5 
  Total Left Candidates 3.48 1.53 0 6 
  Viable Right Candidate 0.46 0.59 0 1 
  Viable Center Candidate 0.84 0.37 0 1 
  Viable Left Candidate 0.79 0.41 0 1 
National Factors      
  Inflation Rate 480 766 5 1928 
     
n=25,120         
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 Crime statistics in Brazil suffer from a systematic reporting bias that makes wealthier 
victims more likely to report crime victimization than poorer victims (Caldeira 2000, 112).  In 
addition, the data that do exist are often unavailable beyond the past five years.  Therefore, using 
data on all types of crime or even just major crimes, such as armed robbery and violent crime, 
may provide erroneous evidence regarding the influence of crime on support for the different 
non-incumbent parties.  Given these problems, I measure public security using homicide data.  
 Homicide data are the most reliable indicators of violence and serve as a key source for 
debates regarding public security (Murray, Cerqueira and Kahn 2013).  In Brazil, the military 
and civil police register homicides as public security incidents.  However, there are discrepancies 
in their reporting methodologies.  Most importantly, these institutions measure homicide 
incidents, which indicates that at least one person was murdered.  This measure underestimates 
the number of homicides since it does not provide information on the actual number of victims.  
In addition, the lack of coordination between the civil and military police leads the government 
to count some homicides more than once (Caldeira 2000). 
 Given the problems with official police data on homicide violence, I use public health 
records.  The Ministry of Health’s System of Information on Mortality (Sistema de Informações 
sobre Mortalidade or SIM) contains municipal-level homicide data that includes information on 
the age, gender, race, marital status and municipal residence of the victim, as well as whether the 
homicide occurred through gun violence.14  Since even a few homicides in a small municipality 
can lead to an extremely high homicide rate, I measure the homicide rate per 10,000 people in 
the year prior to the election using the log value as follows: log(Homicide Rate+1).  
                                                     
14 The government codes homicides based on where the victim lived rather than where the actual incident occurred. 
They code it this way since most homicides are officially confirmed at hospitals as opposed to location where they 
occurred.      
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 Municipalities in Brazil vary in size from 663 to more than 11 million inhabitants.  It is 
unclear whether left and right parties will have more support in smaller or larger municipalities.  
However, smaller municipalities are likely to have more variance in party support since even a 
few voters changing whom they support can widely alter the results.  To control for this issue, I 
include the log of the municipal population in the analysis.       
 Several state level political factors are also likely to influence support for each 
ideological group.  Left, center and right parties may all benefit when the incumbent party is 
from their ideological group since having control of the state executive provides them with 
resources that they can use to gain votes.  The variables right incumbent, left incumbent and 
centrist incumbent indicates the governor’s ideology.  It takes a 1 when the governor is from that 
ideological group and a 0 otherwise.  Beginning in 1998, Brazil allowed governors to run for one 
consecutive reelection.  Therefore, I also include incumbent candidate to indicate whether the 
incumbent candidate is running for reelection.   
 In 1998 and 2006, six candidates ran for reelection but switched to a party from a 
different ideological group.15  I include two additional dichotomous variables to control for these 
factors.  Lost candidate indicates that the ideological group lost an incumbent governor who ran 
for reelection but switched to a party from another ideological group.  Meanwhile, gained 
candidate, indicates that the ideological group gained an incumbent candidate from another 
ideological group.  I expect that the ideological group that gains the incumbent governor will see 
an increase in support while the group that loses the incumbent governor will see a decline in 
support.  
                                                     
15 In 1998, incumbent candidates changed ideological groups in Mato Grosso (Dante de Oliveira, PDT-PSDB) and 
Paraná (Jaime Lerner, PDT-PFL).  Meanwhile, in 2006, incumbent candidates changed in Amazonas (Eduardo 
Braga, PPS-PMDB), Espírito Santo (Paulo Hartung, PSB-PMDB), Rondônia (Ivo Cassol, PSDB-PPS) and 
Tocantins (Marcelo Miranda, PFL-PMDB).  
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Many elections include multiple candidates from left, right and centrist parties.  
Therefore, I include three variables, left candidates, center candidates and right candidates to 
indicate the total number of candidates from each ideological group.  I expect that when an 
ideological group has more candidates, its vote share will increase since rather than switching to 
another ideological group, voters may be able to find a candidate that better represents them 
within the group.  In contrast, they will lose support when they must compete with multiple 
candidates from other ideological groups.     
 Brazil’s open list proportional electoral system for federal and state deputies has led to 
the creation of 35 officially recognized parties (TSE 2015).  The large number of parties means 
that rather than running alone, most gubernatorial candidates form large electoral coalitions.  
Therefore, I include coalition parties to indicate the total number of parties that support 
candidates from left, right and centrist parties.  I expect that all ideological groups will receive 
more support when they have more coalition partners. 
 Although there is a plethora of political parties in each state, gubernatorial elections do 
not always include viable candidates from all ideological groups.  In some states, parties from 
one or more ideological groups may simply not put forth their own candidate, choosing instead 
to either endorse no candidate or support a candidate from another ideological group.  They often 
make these deals in exchange for promises of states resources if the candidate wins control of the 
governorship or an agreement that the gubernatorial candidate’s party will support their 
candidate for other political offices, such as federal deputy or senator.  In these situations, voters 
may not have the option of choosing an entirely different approach to public security.   
 In other situations, there may be candidates from all three ideological groups.  Candidates 
from a particular group, however, may not have a realistic chance of winning the election or may 
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lack name recognition among voters.  Small parties, such as the leftist Socialism and Liberty 
Party (PSOL) consistently have a candidate in the race, even though their candidates often 
receive only one or two percent of the popular vote.  Voters understand that voting for them is 
unlikely to affect public security policies since they do not have a realistic chance of winning 
these elections.  In these situations, voters who want to express their displeasure with the 
incumbent ideological group’s public security policies may simply vote for a viable candidate 
from any other ideological group.  To control for this issue, I include the variable, viable 
candidate, which indicates that the ideological group in power had at least one candidate who 
received 10 percent of valid votes in the election. 
 Brazil has experienced major economic changes in recent years that are likely to affect 
gubernatorial elections.  Between 1994 and 2010, the country drastically reduced extreme 
poverty.  However, the most pronounced reductions began in 2002 when the left-leaning 
Workers’ Party (PT) controlled the presidency and implemented internationally known social 
programs including Bolsa Família.  Between 2002 and 2010, the percentage of residents living 
below one-half of the minimum salary decline almost 24 percent.  Although these reductions 
were the result of national level policies, voters may reward gubernatorial candidates linked to 
the PT.  As a result, I expect to find that declines in municipal poverty levels will increase 
support for left parties.  I measure poverty reduction as the percentage of the municipality’s 
population that lives below one-half of the minimum salary.  In addition, I use the log value of 
GDP per capita to control for municipal economic growth.    
 According to the partisan model of macroeconomic theory, voters vary in the concern 
over economic policy (Hibbs 1977; Alesina and Sachs 1988).  Wageworkers, who high 
unemployment affects more strongly, tend to vote for left parties.  In contrast, right party voters 
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tend to be more affluent, thus, they are more concerned with inflation.  Therefore, I include the 
state unemployment rate and the log of the national inflation rate in the model.  I expect that 
higher unemployment rates will increase support for left parties while higher inflation rates will 
increase support for right parties.      
2.4 EMPIRICS AND ANALYSIS 
I test the arguments by first examining how changes in violence affects support for right, centrist 
and left parties in individual elections, using ordinary least squares regression and clustering 
standard errors by state.  I measure change by subtracting each covariates’ value in time t from 
its value in time t-1.  Using this technique, I lose information on how violence affects support for 
parties in the 1994 elections.  This measurement strategy, however, provides a stronger causal 
argument since it directly measures changes rather the simply looking at how violence causes 
support for parties to be higher or lower, on average, across municipalities.   
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 Rather than provide the raw estimates, in Table 2.7, I show how a standard deviation 
change in violence and other municipal covariates, along with the state’s unemployment rate, 
influence support for parties in each ideological group.  This strategy allows us to compare the 
relative importance of violence to other model covariates.  For each ideological group, I calculate 
the impact of violence on their support under four situations: (1) the ideological group has a 
governor in power and puts forth a viable candidate, (2) the ideological group has a governor in 
power but does not put forth a viable candidate, (3) the ideological group is not in power but has 
a viable candidate and (4) the ideological group is not in power and does not have a viable 
candidate.  For the state level political covariates, the coefficient show how a one-unit change 
influences support for each group of parties.  I include full tables with all interaction terms and 
measures of goodness of fit in Appendix B.        
 As Table 2.7 shows, during the 1998 elections, voters did not punish any incumbent 
party’s ideological group for a rise in violence when they had a viable candidate participating in 
the election.  Centrist parties actually see a small increase in their support when violence rises 
under their tenure.  Similarly, no group with a viable candidate saw its support rise when 
violence increased when it was not in power.  There are conflicting ways to interpret this lack of 
retrospective security voting during the 1998 elections.   
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Table 2.7: Changes in Violence and Support for Political Parties 
            
  1998 2002 2006 2010 
Right Parties       
Municipal 
Factors      
 Violence (In Power, Viable Candidate) -1.37 -0.32+ -0.93+ 0.33 
 
Violence (Out of Power, Viable 
Candidate) -0.83 0.61* -0.99 0.74 
 
Violence (In Power, No Viable 
Candidate) -0.21 0.17+ 1.34** -0.11 
 
Violence (Out of Power, No Viable 
Candidate) 0.30 -0.51 -0.26 0.30 
 Municipal GDP Growth 0.65 0.71 -0.38 -1.48+ 
 Population Minimum Salary  12.29* 1.52* -0.39 -0.74 
 Population Growth  (log) 0.07 -1.00* 0.55+ -0.32 
State Factors      
 Right Governor -14.18* -17.19+ -42.35** -18.32** 
 State Unemployment Rate -2.41 2.75+ -1.24 -4.65** 
 Lost Incumbent Candidate   17.39 -21.62** 
 Gained Incumbent Candidate 8.86 24.62   
 Right Incumbent Candidate  -5.94 -3.59 21.23** 5.76 
 Right Coalition Parties  0.43 1.40* 3.85*** 4.93*** 
 Total Left Candidates  -0.49 0.64 8.70** 5.62*** 
 Total Right Candidates  11.53** 5.13* 0.37 -4.47+ 
 Total Center Candidates  -2.37 -1.44 0.10 -1.96+ 
Center Parties      
Municipal 
Factors      
 Violence (in Power, Viable Candidate) 0.10* -0.39 -0.10 -0.52** 
 
Violence (Out of Power, Viable 
Candidates) -0.44 -0.22 0.36 -1.35 
 
Violence (in Power, No Viable 
Candidate) -0.88** 0.45 -1.83 -0.22*** 
 
Violence (Out of Power, No Viable 
Candidate) 1.39+ -0.46 -0.53 1.97*** 
 Municipal GDP Growth -0.72 0.49 -2.29** 0.83 
 Population Minimum Salary  -2.92 -0.82 0.79 0.88 
 Population Growth  (log) -0.20 -1.16* -0.73 0.54 
State Factors      
 Center Governor -66.94*** -28.91+ -23.56* -18.651 
 State Unemployment Rate -4.20 2.47 -5.24 -6.14* 
 Lost Incumbent Candidate   -43.15+ -43.4*** 
 Gained Incumbent Candidate 40.17*** 19.45+ 36.32*** -3.23 
 Center Incumbent Candidate  -15.51** 8.81** 6.38 7.89 
 Center Coalition Parties  -0.38 -0.58 -0.27 -1.03+ 
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Table 2.7 
(Continued) 
     
 Total Left Candidates  -4.74 1.4 5.9 4.94* 
 Total Right Candidates  -14.67*** -2.05 -4.05 -14.52*** 
 Total Center Candidates  5.97+ 4.67+ 9.72** 7.11** 
Left Parties      
Municipal 
Factors      
 Violence (in Power, Viable Candidate) -2.89 -0.43 0.61 0.39+ 
 
Violence (Out of Power, Viable 
Candidates) 0.35 -0.11 0.21 0.59 
 
Violence (in Power, No Viable 
Candidate) -1.32* -0.544 2.64 1.16*** 
 
Violence (Out of Power, No Viable 
Candidate) 0.32 -0.23 0.28 0.01 
 Municipal GDP Growth -0.002 -0.40 0.32 -0.07 
 Population Minimum Salary  -5.01 0.70 0.71 -1.76+ 
 Population Growth  (log) -0.10 0.43 0.27 -0.56 
State Factors      
 Left Governor -37.44** -8.88 -10.35 -19.17** 
 State Unemployment Rate 3.19 -2.17 5.19 3.90* 
 Lost Incumbent Candidate 17.30 -37.3*** -42.5*** -46.45*** 
 Gained Incumbent Candidate   78.33*** 33.67*** 
 Left Incumbent Candidate  1.79 15.91* 21.05+ 12.19* 
 Left Coalition Parties  3.05* 1.24* 1.18 1.29** 
 Total Left Candidates  -1.78 1.15 -10.39* -2.07 
 Total Right Candidates  -1.99 -1.43 -0.96 -0.37 
  Total Center Candidates  8.31 -3.90+ -4.39 2.54 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
56 
 
 The first way is that voters focused more on economic than security issues.  The Center 
for Studies on Public Opinion (CESOP) at the State University of Campinas has a database of 
public opinion polls from select states in each election.  In 1998, survey organizations asked 
voters in 19 states to identify their state’s top-3 problems.  On average, 76 percent of voters 
identified unemployment as one of the state’s most important problem, while only 29 percent 
identified security issues.  The empirical evidence provides mixed support for this argument.  In 
the models, changes in state unemployment rates and municipal GDP growth do not affect 
support for any of the ideological groups in these elections.  Right parties, however, do see a 
large increase in support when poverty declines.  
 The second way to interpret the lack of retrospective voting is that voters ignored security 
problems and chose instead to reward incumbent governors’ ideological groups for the country’s 
success in controlling inflation.  In 1994, the country’s inflation rate was 2076 percent.  
However, the Real Plan, a national plan to address the economic crisis, reduced inflation to only 
3.2 percent in 1998.  Even though unemployment continued to be a problem, voters likely 
rewarded governors for price stabilization, which affected their everyday lives.  Since the 
government measures inflation at the national level, however, I cannot test this theory using 
cross-sectional data.   
 In subsequent elections, the effect of violence diverges depending on the ideology of the 
party that is in power and whether there is a viable candidate from that ideological group.  In line 
with expectations, violence reduces support for right parties when they are in power and put forth 
a viable candidate in the 2002 and the 2006 elections.  However, it does not influence their 
support in the 2010 elections.  The lack of punishment for right parties in the 2010 election is not 
as puzzling as it first seems.  In 2006, candidates from right parties won the election in only 
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Goías and the Federal District, which are located in the center of Brazil.  Since the Federal 
District accounts for only one observation, the influences of violence on support for incumbent 
right parties in 2010 depends entirely on the state of Goías.  In Goías, Alcides Rodrigues Filho 
from the Progressive Party (PP) won the 2006 gubernatorial election.  Rodrigues Filho was the 
vice-governor for seven years (1999-2006) in the center-right coalition led by Marconi Perillo 
from the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) and served as the state’s governor for the 
last nine months of 2006.  Although a right party candidate had never served as the state’s 
governor, he won the election with crucial backing from Perillo.   
 In 2010, Rodrigues Filho was unable to run for reelection since he took control of the 
governor’s office more than six months prior to the 2006 elections.16  In this election, Perillo 
once again ran with a center-right coalition and won the gubernatorial elections.  It is likely that 
given Perillo’s backing of Rodrigues Filho in 2006, voters did not punish right parties for 
increases in violence since they viewed Rodrigues Filho’s time in office as an extension of 
Perillo’s mandate.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
16 If a vice-governor is in control of the governor’s office for more than six months, the government considers it to 
be his/her first term. 
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 For left and center parties with viable candidates, rising levels of violence when they 
were in power during the 2002 and 2006, did not lead to a decline in support.  In 2010, support 
for left parties actually increased when they were in power and violence increased, while support 
for centrist parties declined slightly.  I suspect that the anomalous findings for left parties in 2010 
are due to the Bolsa Família social program.  This program, which Luiz “Lula” Inácio da Silva, 
the country’s president from the left-leaning Workers’ Party (PT), instituted in 2004, gives cash 
transfers to low income families.  While the program does not give governors direct control over 
these resources, it is widely recognized as being a policy of the Lula government, likely 
benefiting governors from left parties.   
 Taken together, the year-by-year analysis suggests that violence has a stronger effect on 
support for right parties than it does on support for left and centrist parties.  This supports the 
argument that right parties highlight their reputation for being tough-on-crime and voters, who 
support them, hold them accountable for their successes or failures in addressing violence.  This 
effect, however, depends on whether right parties put forth viable candidates. 
 When no viable right candidate emerges, retrospective voting does not occur and minor 
candidates from right parties actually see a rise in support when violence increases.  This 
conditionality highlights the difficulty that voters face in holding the government accountable for 
security problems in Brazil’s extreme multiparty system where parties may emerge or disappear 
from one election to the next.  In cases where violence is rising, potential candidates from right 
parties may simply choose to run for a different political office or even enter into a coalition with 
center or left parties to avoid punishment.  Governor Roalba Ciarlini used this strategy in the 
state of Rio Grande do Norte.  In 2014, her approval rating was at only seven percent due to 
rising levels of violence and other problems.  She withdrew her reelection bid and her party, the 
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conservative Democratas (DEM), threw their support behind the centrist candidate from the 
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB).  Two years later, voters in the city of Mossoró 
seemingly forgot these problems and elected her mayor.   
 The other political and economic covariates have varying effects across ideological 
groups and elections.  During most years, left and right parties benefit when the number of 
political parties in their electoral coalition increases.  Having an incumbent candidate is 
advantageous for left parties in most years but only increases support for right and center parties 
in 2002 and 2006, respectively.  Ideological groups across the political spectrum also tend to 
gain support when they gain an incumbent candidate from another group and lose support when 
the governor changes his party affiliation.  At the municipal level, reducing poverty increases 
support only for right parties in 1998 and 2002.  For center and left parties, it has either no effect 
or leads to a decline in support.    
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2.4.1 Violence and Support for Alternative Crime Control Measures   
I next test whether voters show signs that they are reject law enforcement or social prevention 
measures by switching their support to parties at the other end of the political spectrum when 
crime rises.  That is, voters who previously supported left parties, now vote for a candidate from 
a right party and vice versa.  Figures 2.2 to 2.4, shows how a unit increase in violence affects 
support for left, centrist and right parties in each election under these differing conditions.17  
There is less evidence to support this theoretical argument.  When the incumbent governor’s 
party is from the left(right) and violence rises, there is not statistically significant increase in 
support for right(left) parties.  During the 1998 elections, left parties actually show a decline in 
support when violence rises and governor is from a right party.   
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 The full tables are available in Appendix A. 
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Figure 2.2: Violence & Changes in Support for Right Parties 
 
Figure 2.3: Violence & Changes in Support for Centrist Parties 
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Figure 2.4: Violence & Changes in Support for Left Parties 
2.4.2 Alternative Model Specifications 
Since I have data on the same municipalities across time, I test the robustness of the results using 
both fixed effect and Arellano-Bond models.  These models provide different ways to measure 
changes in violence and support for each ideological group in panel data.  The fixed effects 
methodology controls for fixed unobservable features in each municipality that cause violence 
and municipal support for candidates from each ideological group to be higher or lower, on 
average.  It identifies change by examining how deviations from the mean value of each 
covariate affects changes in support for each ideological group.  This estimation strategy also 
allows me to include inflation as a factor that affects support for governors.  
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 The Arellano-Bond model, meanwhile, controls for temporal dependences in the data by 
including the lagged dependent variable as a covariate.  These dependences may exist since each 
ideological group’s vote share is likely to depend on it vote share in the last election.  In addition, 
the independent variables may have lagged effects.  Since there is autocorrelation in the 
idiosyncratic error term, typical Arellano-Bond models that allow us to avoid estimation biases 
by including lags of the difference term as an instrument for the lagged difference term are not 
valid.  Instead, I used the second lagged difference, thus I lose three waves of data.  While this 
strategy reduced the autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic error term, it did not eliminate it.  I am 
unable, however, to use deeper lagged differences since I have data from only five elections.    
 In Table 2.8, I show how a standard deviation in each of the municipal covariates 
influences support for left, right and centrist parties.  For the state level political covariates, the 
coefficient show how a one-unit change influences support for each group of parties.18  The 
results broadly support the evidence from the cross-sectional analysis that violence reduces 
support for the right when a right party is in power but has minimal to no effect on support for 
incumbent center and left parties.  Put simply, voters expect the right to do a better job at 
addressing security issues.   
 In these models, there is more mixed evidence to support my argument that voters reject 
public security policies that do not work by turning to parties at the opposite end of the political 
spectrum has more mixed evidence.  In line with expectations, right parties see a rise in support 
when violence increases and a left party is in power.  In contrast, when a right party is in power 
and violence increases, support goes up for both center and left parties in some models.   
 
                                                     
18 Full models are available in the chapter appendix. 
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Table 2.8: Violence and Political Party Support, Panel Models 
        
  Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond 
Right Parties     
Municipal Factors    
 Violence (In Power, Viable Candidate) -3.78*** -1.30* 
 Violence (In Power, No Viable Candidate) 0.63 -1.36* 
 Violence (Left Governor in Power) 1.55+ 0.95*** 
 Violence (Center Governor in Power) 0.19 -0.10 
 Municipal GDP Growth 0.22 -0.5 
 Population Minimum Salary  3.02 4.08*** 
 Population Growth  (log) -0.06 2.21 
State Factors   
 Right Governor -13.05** -31.64*** 
 State Unemployment Rate -0.30 -0.79 
 Lost Incumbent Candidate 0.18 
 
 Gained Incumbent Candidate 6.07  
 Right Incumbent Candidate  -0.54 10.23* 
 Right Coalition Parties  1.27** 3.97*** 
 Total Left Candidates  1.05 8.14*** 
 Total Right Candidates  0.78 -11.96*** 
 Total Center Candidates  -2.63* -3.12** 
National Factor    
 Inflation (log) 0.55  
Center Parties    
Municipal Factors    
 Violence (in Power, Viable Candidate) -0.27 0.03*** 
 Violence (in Power, No Viable Candidate) -0.17 -0.61*** 
 Violence (Left Governor in Power) -3.19 1.77*** 
 Violence (Right Governor in Power) -0.14* 1.74*** 
 Municipal GDP Growth 1.25 0.9 
 Population Minimum Salary  0.66 4.2** 
 Population Growth  (log) -3.67 1.19 
State Factors    
 Center Governor -2.73+ 66.12*** 
 State Unemployment Rate -0.80 8.65*** 
 Lost Incumbent Candidate -33.11*** 
 
 Gained Incumbent Candidate 32.31*** 7.31 
 Center Incumbent Candidate  4.26 5.71**  
 Center Coalition Parties  1.69*** 5.04*** 
 Total Left Candidates  -1.05 -6.90*** 
 Total Right Candidates  -6.30*** 8.20**  
 Total Center Candidates  4.31* -0.81 
National Factor    
 Inflation (log) -0.03  
Left Parties    
Municipal Factors    
 Violence (in Power, Viable Candidate) -1.25 -0.93 
 Violence (in Power, No Viable Candidate) -0.93 0.17 
 Violence (Center Governor in Power) -0.84 -1.41* 
 Violence (Right Governor in Power) 0.04 1.34*** 
 Municipal GDP Growth -0.41 -1.36 
 Population Minimum Salary -0.18 -8.41*** 
 Population Growth  (log) -4.52 -5.32* 
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Table 2.8 (Continued)    
State Factors.    
 Left Governor 9.57    52.97*** 
 State Unemployment Rate 2.08+    -18.41*** 
 Lost Incumbent Candidate -31.60*** -83.90*** 
 Gained Incumbent Candidate 43.56***  
 Left Incumbent Candidate  17.37*** -5.28* 
 Left Coalition Parties  1.48**  0.20 
 Total Left Candidates  1.00    13.10*** 
 Total Right Candidates  1.31 -8.68*** 
 Total Center Candidates  -2.52*   19.15*** 
National Factor    
  Inflation (log) -0.452      
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
2.4.3 Politics and Public Security 
Taken together, the evidence provide several insights into the relationship between everyday 
violence and electoral politics.  Contrary to what we would expect from extant research, while 
voters reward right parties when they are successful at reducing crime, they also punish them 
harshly when the fail to address security issues.  In contrast, there is less evidence that they 
punish centrist or left parties for rising crime rates.  From a public policy standpoint, these 
findings contradict the argument that the winning electoral strategy is to take a tough on crime 
stance.  Although this can be viable electoral strategy, it carries great risk with voters 
rewarding(punishing) parties that advocate this stance while largely ignoring changes in security 
when the incumbent parties advocate a more preventative approach to crime control.   
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For politicians, these changes in support are most likely to matter when they influence the 
final electoral outcomes.  In Table 2.9, I use data from the 1994 to the 2014 elections to highlight 
how changes in violence affect which ideological group controls the governorship. When 
violence rises under the tenure of a right party governor, the right loses control of the 
governorship in 68 percent of the elections.  In this same situation, their counterparts in left 
parties retain control of the governorship 47 percent of the time.  For centrist parties, there are 
more mixed results.  They retain control of the governorship more than 60 percent of the time 
regardless of whether violence increases or decreases under their tenure.   
Table 2.9: Changes in Violence and Control of the Governorship 
          
Ideology Increasing Violence Decreasing Violence 
     
 Won Governorship Lost Governorship Won Governorship Lost Governorship 
     
Left  7 8 5 3 
Center  24 15 10 5 
Right 7 15 4 5 
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These findings have important implications for politics and public security.  Most 
scholars have argued that Latin American politicians win electoral support because they 
emphasize tough-on-crime policies (Dammert 2012; Holland 2013).  The evidence in this 
chapter, however, provides an important caveat to this assumption.  If right parties fail to control 
crime, voters will turn against them.  These results are in line with issue ownership theory, which 
argues that while parties can “own” an issue by developing reputations for being able to better 
address it than opposition candidates, poor performance can injure their reputation in the short 
term (Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al. 2003).  Therefore, rather than having all Brazilian states 
converging on the use of tough on crime policies, I find that there are shifts in how they address 
crime depending on the ideology of the political party that is in power. 
The other political factors largely conform to expectations.  All ideological groups see an 
increase in support when they have more coalition parties supporting them.  They also lose 
support when an incumbent governor runs for reelection but switches to a party in a different 
ideological group.  Conversely, the group that gains this candidate sees an increase in support.  
Meanwhile, an incumbent candidate advantage is present with each group gaining support when 
a candidate runs for reelection.  Inflation does not influence support for any ideological groups. 
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2.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter assessed the impact that violence has on electoral support for right, center and left 
parties when they are in and out of power.  Using municipal data from Brazilian gubernatorial 
elections between 1994 and 2010, I showed that rising crime rates reduce support most strongly 
for right incumbent parties.  There was also some evidence that voters shift their support to 
left(right) parties when crime rises and a right(left) party is in power. 
 These findings contradict the assumption that rising levels of crime and violence are 
beneficial for right parties that advocate tough on crime policies.  Although they can gain support 
for reducing violence, their failure to do so has more dire consequences for their electoral 
success than it does for centrist or left parties.  This suggests a variation on the ‘mythical 
punitive punishment’ problem where politicians tend to overestimate voters’ support for tough 
on crime measures (Roberts 2004b).  Although voters may support punitive policies, they also 
judge parties that use these policies more harshly for failures to address crime.  For political 
parties that do not emphasize these policies, crime has less of an effect on their electoral support.   
 The variation in punishment for parties across the ideological spectrum has important 
implications for public security policies.  If politicians know that rising levels of violence will 
influence their electoral support differently depending on the policies they offer, then it is likely 
that we will find approaches to public security depending on the party that is in power.  This, in 
turn, may help explain the widely varying increases and decreases in state homicide rates that we 
have seen during the past 20 years in Brazil.  I address both these issues in later chapters.      
 This chapter also suggests that context matters when examining the influence of violence 
on political parties’ support.  Most of the research on violence and voting behavior comes from 
North America and Western Europe where voting is a voluntary act of citizenship.  Therefore, 
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voters’ support for particular public security policies may not represent the average citizen’s 
view on the issue.  Brazil, in contrast, has strict compulsory voting laws for all literate citizens 
between the ages of 18 and 70.  The increased participation of voters from across the 
socioeconomic context due to these rules may help explain why voters in Brazil support parties 
that offer different public security policies.  Although we cannot test the argument in this study, 
it is an issue worth exploring in future cross-national research.   
 In the next chapter, I turn my attention to state public security policies.  Using state 
budget data from 1991 to 2014, I test that the claim and “common wisdom” that left and right 
parties focus on different public security policies.  I argue that while ideology matters, governors 
do not blindly allocate resources to education and law enforcement to address security problems.  
Rather, their strategies depend on political competition, which varies by state and electoral cycle.    
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3. CHAPTER 3: THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SECURITY SPENDING  
In Chapter 2, my analysis of 135 gubernatorial elections between 1994 and 2010 showed that 
voters only punish incumbent right parties for rising crime rates due to their electoral platforms 
emphasizing crime prevention through law enforcement that focuses on short-term results.  This 
chapter turns to the issue of how politics influence the policies that governors use to address 
rising crime rates.  It analyzes whether left and right parties, which advocate different solutions 
to public security problems, allocate more resources to those policies emphasized in their 
electoral platforms.  Between 1991 and 2014, real per capita spending on public security rose 
267 percent, from R$36 to R$96.  However, states vary widely in the resources that they allocate 
to law enforcement.   
 Figures 3.1 through 3.5 divide states by geographical region and show how their 
spending on public security has changed between 1991 and 2014.  While all states spent more on 
security, the size of the increase varies greatly.  Piauí and Ceará are neighboring states in 
northeast Brazil with similar levels of inequality and economic development.  Between 1991 and 
2014, the homicide rate in both states more than quadrupled.  However, while Ceará responded 
by increasing per capita spending on law enforcement by more than 500 percent, in Piauí it rose 
only 52 percent.  These differences leave us with the puzzling issue of why the difference.  Why 
do some states spend more than others do on law enforcement and other crime prevention 
policies?   
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Figure 3.1: Per Capita Security Spending in Northern States, 1991-2014 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Per Capita Security Spending in Northeastern States, 1991-2014 
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Figure 3.3: Per Capita Security Spending in Southern States, 1991-2014 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Per Capita Security Spending in Southeastern States, 1991-2014 
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Figure 3.5: Per Capita Security Spending in Center-West States, 1991-2014 
 This chapter challenge traditional partisan budget models, which posit that politicians 
from right parties allocate more resources for police-oriented public security policies (Budge and 
Hofferbert 1990; Wenzelburger 2014).  Using state budgetary data from 1991 to 2014, I show 
that governors across the ideological spectrum allocate resources for public security based on 
electoral politics rather than ideological beliefs.  Governors of all stripes emphasize crime 
prevention policies that are popular, allow them to distribute benefits to their supporters and 
promise positive results in the short term.  This approach causes both leftists and rightists to 
emphasize law enforcement, which enables them to show that they are directly confronting 
public security problems, to the detriment of long-term crime prevention policies.  However, the 
amount of resources that they allocate for law enforcement varies depending on local political 
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competition.  More specifically, governors invest a larger portion of the state budget on law 
enforcement when this investment distinguishes them from their political competitors.    
 When governors from leftist parties face competition from other leftist and centrist 
parties, they will spend more on security to demonstrate to voters that they are most competent to 
address the issue.  However, they will not spend more on security when they face opponents 
from right parties that traditionally “own” security issues.  Governors from right parties, in 
contrast, will spend more on security only when they face a strong leftist opponent who they can 
paint as being weak on security issues. 
 Beyond challenging partisan budget models, this chapter furthers our knowledge of 
public security policy in two ways.  First, it compares the different policies that governments use 
to increase public security.  Most studies group together spending on a variety of public security 
policies ranging from hiring more law enforcement officers and strengthening the court system, 
to building more prisons.  They also overlook resource allocation to non-punitive based security 
measures, including education and social programs, which are an essential part of the discourse 
by many leftist parties.  My disaggregation of these budgetary areas shows that although 
politicians regularly discuss education as an important long-term crime preventative measure, 
ideology only affects law enforcement spending.   
 Second, most research on the responses of politicians to public security problems focuses 
on Western democracies.  The majority of these countries, however, already have low and 
declining crime rates.  In the United States, nationwide violent crime and homicide rates fell 
more than 45 percent between 1995 and 2013 (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2018).  Similarly, 
in the United Kingdom, homicide rates declined 39 percent during this period (World Bank 
2014).  In contrast, Brazilian states have experienced widely divergent patterns of crime.  In São 
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Paulo, the homicide rate declined 54 percent between 1991 and 2014.  Meanwhile, in Bahia, the 
homicide rate during this period increased almost eightfold rising from 5 to 39 victims per 100 
thousand residents.  A subnational analysis of state budgets in Brazil allows us to see how 
politicians in varying political circumstances alter budgetary priorities in the face of large 
increases and decreases in crime rates. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows.  The first section provides a brief overview of 
federalism in Brazil and highlights the limits placed on governors’ autonomy.  The second 
section examines the extant research on ideology and budgetary allocations.  It also moves 
beyond ideology and examines how career interests and variation in state political competition 
influence governors’ spending decisions.  The third section then provides the empirical models to 
test how these factors influence the policies that governors use to address public security 
problems.  In the fourth section, I return to the cases of Piauí and Ceará to explain why governors 
in these neighboring states have taken implemented vastly different approaches to public 
security.  The final section concludes with a discussion on my findings’ theoretical implications 
and avenues for future research. 
3.1 FEDERALISM IN BRAZIL  
To understand how public demands influence budgetary allocations, it is first necessary to 
understand the formal institutions governing the different levels of government in Brazil.  In 
1889, the military launched a coup d’état.  Two years later, the new government passed the 1891 
Constitution, using the U.S. Constitution as a model.  The Constitution, which was a reaction to 
the government’s heavily centralized rule, dispersed power to the states and was Brazil’s first 
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experience with federalism (Rosenn 2005).  Over the next century, the amount of power that the 
federal government delegated to state and municipal governments oscillated as the country 
moved back and forth between dictatorship and democracy.  In 1988, the country passed its 
current constitution, which provides detailed information on the powers delegated to federal, 
state and municipal governments.   
 The federal government retains sole power over a variety of policies and crucial 
infrastructure including federal highways, railways, international borders, the banking industry, 
immigration, and regional development plans.  It also shares powers over important policy areas 
with local governments.  Federal, state and municipal governments jointly control education and 
healthcare spending.19  Meanwhile, the federal and state governments oversee courts, policing, 
social security, culture, environmental and natural resource protection, agriculture, food 
distribution, housing, sanitation, social welfare and hydroelectricity.   
 The Constitution requires the federal government to spend 13.2 percent of revenues not 
transferred to state or municipal governments on healthcare and 18 percent on education.  
Beyond these constitutional minimums, the federal government’s control in joint policy areas is 
limited to setting rules and passing laws governing the policies of municipal and state 
governments.  In the absence of federal rules and laws, states and municipalities are free to 
allocate resources to different policy areas as they see fit (Rosenn 2005).  Along with the broad 
responsibility assigned to state and local government, has come a growth in resources.  By 1990, 
more than 50 percent of all government expenditures were at the state or local level (Shah 1991). 
  
                                                     
19 Municipal governments control preschools and basic education (7 to 14 years old) in addition to preventative 
healthcare.  The state government, meanwhile, has control over the broader education system, including state high 
schools and universities.   
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 While governors have sweeping powers to build new programs and alter budgetary 
allocations in response to electoral interests, they must also contend with two important legal 
obligations.  First, the federal government has used its power in joint policy areas to mandate 
minimum budgetary allocations.   The Constitution requires governors spend at least 25 percent 
of tax revenues and federal transfers on education and another 12 percent on public healthcare.  
They are also required to share their revenues with local governments.  More specifically, they 
must transfer 25 percent of all sales and service taxes and 50 percent of taxes on motor vehicle 
ownership to municipal governments.   
 Second, governors have minimal ability to reduce personnel expenditures. The 
Constitution gives most public servants tenure after three years of service, with judges receiving 
this tenure after only two years.  Barring misconduct or extreme failure to fulfill their duties, 
these employees retain their position until retirement.  After retiring, they receive a lifetime 
government pension that is equal to the highest salary they earned as a public employee and 
annual costs of living adjustments.  As the country’s population has aged, state governments 
have been paying for a growing number of retired employees who are using scarce state 
resources without helping governors achieve their policy goals.  In the next section, I turn to the 
issue of how ideology influences resource allocation for public security in light of these powers 
and restrictions. 
3.2 IDEOLOGY AND STATE BUDGETS 
The role that politics plays in the allocation of government resources has long been a source of 
contentious debate.  In this debate, two models loom large: the partisan model and the 
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governance model.  The partisanship model rests on the assumption that voters elect politicians 
based on the policies they advocate during the campaign.  When they are in office, politicians 
fulfill these promises by allocating resources to those issues that are important for their 
supporters (Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Wenzelburger 2014).  Politicians from left parties 
traditionally focus on social issues such as healthcare, social security and education.  In contrast, 
politicians from right parties focus on reducing the national debt, public security and national 
defense.  These differences cause budgetary allocations to shift depending on the ideology of the 
political party that is in power. 
 The governance model, in contrast, argues that while politicians have policy preferences, 
they are unable to allocate more resources to their preferred policy areas since it is difficult to 
alter spending for many government services, such as social security and education, regardless of 
which party is in power.  In addition, economic crises and other unforeseen circumstances, often 
force politicians to allocate more resources to policy areas that are outside their party platforms 
(King et al. 1993; Epp, Lovett and Baumgartner 2014).  As a result, there will be minimal 
changes in the allocation of resources to different policy areas when politicians from different 
ideological backgrounds take control of the government.  The governance model finds some 
support in criminal justice research, which shows that while politicians may want to provide high 
levels of public security, they are often unable to do so because of limited budgets (Jackson and 
Carroll 1981; McDowall and Loftin 1986).   
 Underlying both partisan and governance budget models is the assumption that 
politicians want to allocate more resources to specific policy areas to demonstrate their 
commitment to those issues.  For many policy areas, such as healthcare and education, this 
approach requires them to redirect resources specifically to those issues.  However, public 
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security goes against this trend.  Politicians can tackle public security problems by allocating 
resources to a variety of policy areas including education, social programs, law enforcement, 
courts and prisons. 
 
3.2.1 Punitive and Preventive Crime Control Policies 
In his seminal work, Becker (1968) argues that people commit crimes based on expected 
economic benefits.  Using this rational-choice approach to security, criminologists have argued 
that making crime less attractive is the most effect way to reduce it.  Therefore, governments 
should allocate more resources to law enforcement, the penal system and the judicial system.  
This punitive approach to public security has found widespread support among politicians and 
the public throughout the developed and developing world (Swimmer 1974; Fox 1979; 
Greenberg and Kessler 1982; Loftin and McDowall 1982; Chamlin and Langworthy 1996; 
Garland 2001; Pratt and Cullen 2005; Dammert 2012).   
 Sociologists have criticized the punitive approach to public security for ignoring the 
underlying socioeconomic causes of crime (Enrlich 1975).  As poverty and inequality increase, 
individuals have a greater incentive to engage in criminal behavior since it provides more 
economic benefits relative to alternative opportunities (Liska, Chamlin, and Reed 1985; Sever 
2003; Stucky 2005, 24).  Poverty and inequality may also affect crime through other mechanisms 
ranging from fewer social controls and deviant subcultures in poor communities (Pare and 
Felson 2014), to a decline in the legitimacy of institutional rules and frustration with one’s 
relative economic position (Brush 1996; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997).   
 While there is debate about the causal mechanism linking poverty and inequality to 
crime, there is a consensus that decreasing poverty and inequality reduce crime rates (Loftin and 
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Hill 1974; Humphries and Wallace 1980; Smith and Parker 1980; Pratt and Cullen 2005).  This 
approach suggests that politicians can effectively fight crime by implementing prevention-based 
policies that alter individual incentives to engage in crime.  For the government, investing in 
policies that reduce poverty and inequality can be just as effective in reducing crime as providing 
more money for law enforcement. 
 Although the government can fight crime using both prevention and punitive-based 
policies, most research from developed countries suggests that political parties with conservative 
and liberal ideologies emphasize different approaches to public security (Da Silva 1990; Soares 
2005; Gerber and Hopkins 2011; Guillamón, Bastida and Benito 2013; Wenzelburger 2014).  
Politicians from left parties focus on crime reduction through increased spending on social 
programs and education that help reduce poverty and inequality.  In contrast, politicians from 
right parties focus on crime control by increasing the cost of crime through more spending on 
punitive measures.   
 Using this partisan budget approach, Gerber and Hopkins (2011) find that following close 
elections, independent and Republican Party mayors spend 2 percent more on traditional security 
policies than mayors from the Democratic Party.  Guillamón, Bastida and Benito (2013) also 
show that conservative mayors in Spain spend more on public security than their liberal 
counterparts do.  Wenzelburger (2014) compares spending across 28 Western democracies and 
finds that this effect is conditional.  Conservative parties only spend more on public security 
when there are few institutional veto players or a low debt to budget ratio.  Contradicting this 
previous work, dos Santos et al. (2015) examine state budgets in Brazil between 1999 and 2010 
and find that left parties actually spend more than center or right parties on public security, 
although they do not theorize on why Brazil differs from other places. 
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 While these studies show that ideology influences spending priorities, they leave two 
issues unaddressed.  The first issue is which tough-on-crime policies ideology affects.  Whereas, 
Gerber and Hopkins (2011) and dos Santos et al. (2015) focus only on law enforcement 
spending, Wenzelburger (2014) uses OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) data that group together spending on police, courts, the penal system and 
firefighters.  However, these studies do not disaggregate the data to examine how politicians 
allocate resources to the different institutions involved with a tough-on-crime approach.  In 
Brazil, governors control three institutions that increase security through punitive measures. 
 First, there is law enforcement.  Brazil’s 1988 constitution gave governors control over 
law enforcement in the states and there are no municipal law enforcement agencies.  Each state 
has two law enforcement agencies: the military police and the civil police.  The military police 
are the preventative arm of the government.  Military police officers patrol the streets and makes 
arrests when they catch individuals committing crime.  Meanwhile, the civil police investigate 
crimes after they occur and engage in long-term criminal investigations.       
 The second institution is the penal system, which consists of prisons and jails to hold 
individuals convicted or accused of committing a crime.  The Ministry of Justice oversees the 
penal system while the National Penitentiary Department manages it.  Although the federal 
government has formal control over penal institutions, states manage and staff most prisons.  
Brazil’s penal population has grown dramatically in recent years rising more than 267 percent 
from less than 233,000 inmates in 2000 to more than 622,000 in 2014 (Ministry of Justice 2014). 
 The third institution is the judicial system.  Reducing crime requires both arresting and 
convicting individuals who violate the law.  This requires an effective court system that is able to 
bring the defendants to trial in a speedy manner.  Successfully convicting individuals accused of 
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crimes increases public security by removing them from the general populace.  The underfunding 
of Brazil’s judicial system and prison overcrowding have led the government to release many 
individuals from the penal system without having a trial. 
 While governors have the option to increase spending on all these policies, they must 
grapple with budgets that are insufficient to address all the needs for better courts, prisons and 
police.  These limited resources force governors to prioritize which of the tough-on-crime 
policies they will emphasize.  When comparing across the three institutions that scholars 
typically associate with crime control, a key difference emerges; they vary in their ability to 
allow governors to distribute resources to their supporters.   
 Increased spending on courts allows the government to place suspected criminals on trial 
statewide, while the penal system can increase public safety by holding individuals accused 
and/or convicted of crimes.  Since these institutions deal with people throughout the state, they 
benefit state residents regardless of where they live.  This prevents governors from directing 
these resources to specific constituencies within the state.   
 When the government spends more money on law enforcement, it can use these resources 
for a variety of purposes including hiring more police officers, building new police stations or 
buying other resources such as vehicles that allow the police to patrol cities.  However, the 
government has flexibility with how it can distribute these resources.  Although some states have 
guidelines specifying the criteria that the government should use to distribute police officers, 
governors can direct law enforcement resources to specific geographical areas with minimal 
public oversight.  Many states classify information on law enforcement as data that are vital to 
public security, thus they do not need to release it to the public.  This secrecy and the lack of 
fixed criteria for the distribution of resources, allows them to send more police officers to 
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specific municipalities in response to political interests.  In the next chapter, I show that the 
politicization of security is a common strategy with governors sending more police officers to 
populous municipalities that are important for their electoral success. 
 Taken together, spending on all three policies allows governors to show that they are 
tough on crime.  However, only spending on law enforcement allows them to show that they are 
tough on crime and reward their supporters.  As I showed in Chapter 2, these policies are also 
popular among the public with 67 percent of state deputies saying that voters’ primary demands 
are for more police officers.  I expect that the high level of support for greater policing and 
governors’ ability to use these resources to benefit supporters in specific geographical areas, will 
affect their budgetary decisions.  State governors from right parties, which take a tough-on-crime 
approach, will devote a larger share of their budget for law enforcement than left parties do.  
However, since stronger courts benefit the entire state, right parties will not spend more on these 
institutions than left parties do.  This common wisdom from the literature suggests the following. 
CW1: Governors from right parties will spend more on law enforcement than governors from left     
          parties but they will not spend more on courts.  
 The second issue relates to the broader conceptualization of public security.  The study of 
public security typically focuses only on law enforcement spending while ignoring spending on 
non-punitive crime prevention methods (Gerber and Hopkins 2011; Wenzelburger 2014; dos 
Santos et al. 2015).  However, the extant literature in Brazil argues that leftist parties’ approach 
public security with an emphasis on prevention (Da Silva 1990; Soares 2005; Cano 2006; Sapori 
2007).  If governors from left parties are tackling crime through preventative measures, 
overlooking these policies will erroneously show that they are ignoring the issue when, in fact, 
they are using a different policy approach.  Education is the crime prevention method that has 
received the most attention. 
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 The rational-choice approach suggests two reasons why education reduces crime rates 
(Machin, Marie and Vujić 2011).  First, education makes crime less attractive by providing 
individuals with skills that help them obtain higher salaries in the legal job market.  Moreover, as 
individuals obtain more specialized job skills, they have fewer incentives to participate in 
criminal activities.  This occurs since skills individuals develop at technical colleges and 
universities allow them to obtain better job opportunities but do not help them commit crimes 
more effectively (Ehrlich 1975). 
 Second, since young males engage in criminal behavior at higher levels than all other 
groups, education may deter crime by occupying time that they would otherwise spend in 
criminal activity.  Tauchen, Witte and Griesinger (1994) refer to the phenomenon as the ‘self-
incapacitation’ effect.  When schools are not in session due to teacher workdays, employee 
strikes or inclement weather and there are lower minimum dropout ages, criminal activity 
increases (Jacob and Lefgren 2003; Luallen 2006; Anderson 2014).  Together, the partisan 
approach to public security, which is based on the common wisdom in the literature, suggests the 
following.     
CW2: Governors from left parties will spend more on education than governors from right  
         parties. 
 
3.2.2 Political Competition  
While the extant literature gives ideology a prominent role in determining how governments 
allocate resources, politicians must balance public security with other policy areas that are 
important to their constituents such as healthcare, infrastructure and low unemployment.  
Governorships are a prestigious post for ambitious politicians in Brazil with governors wielding 
power in both national and state politics (Ames 2002; Samuels 2003).  They are in charge of 
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state budgets and have vast control over the judiciary and public security apparatus, while at the 
national level they provide a coattail for federal deputy candidates and have a strong influence on 
their voting behavior in the national Congress (Abrucio 1998; Samuels 2000).  Governors, 
however, also have different levels of resources, face differing limits on their power and must 
take into account which policies will be most beneficial for advancing their political careers 
(Ames 1990).   
 Partisan budget models assume that politicians from left and right parties allocate 
resources to different policy areas to demonstrate their commitment to those issues.  They also 
posit that left and right parties “own” certain issues.  Voters view left parties as more competent 
at managing social issues and education while right parties have a reputation for being stronger 
on policing and security issues.  These differences allow voters to distinguish parties from one 
another during elections.  However, Brazil’s open list proportional electoral system for state and 
federal deputies has created an extreme multiparty system with more than 35 officially 
recognized political parties (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2016).  The plethora of political parties 
has led to different patterns of electoral competition within each state.  Figure 3.6 maps state 
political competition based on whether the state elected a governor from a left, right or centrist 
party in elections between 1990 and 2010. 
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Figure 3.6: Governor Ideologies by State, 1990-2010 
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 This map shows five distinct patterns of political competition: Right-Center-Left, Center-
Right, Center-Left, Right-Left and Center-Center.  In the southeast, which holds the country’s 
three most populous states (Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and São Paulo), the centrist Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) 
dominate state politics with their competition primarily arising from each other as well as the 
leftist Workers’ Party (PT) and the Democratic Labor Party (PDT).  Since 1990, right parties 
have not won any governorships in this region despite crime increases and only centrist parties 
have controlled the governorship in Minas Gerais and São Paulo.  In contrast, in the northeast 
region, there is more variety in political competition with governors coming from major left, 
center and right parties.   
 Competition within states may also vary across elections.  Candidates from political 
parties across the ideological spectrum can be formidable political opponents even if they never 
win the governorship.  Governors’ successes in addressing security problems drive some of these 
changes in competition.  Table 3.1 shows that when violence is decreasing, the top-two 
candidates are from the same ideological groups in 64 percent of consecutive elections.  In 
contrast, when violence increases, the percentage declines to 41 percent.  The decline in stability 
is even more pronounced when we consider that when violence is increasing, the incumbent 
governor’s ideological group does not even finish among the top-two candidates in 20 percent of 
the elections.   
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Table 3.1: Changes in Political Competition as Violence Increases and Decreases  
      
Increasing Violence 
   
Stable Competition Changes in Competition No Incumbent Group 
   
33 (41%) 32 (39%) 16 (20%) 
   
Decreasing Violence 
   
Stable Competition Changes in Competition No Incumbent Group 
   
54 (64%) 30 (26%) 8 (10%) 
   
  
 Partisan budget models are silent on the role that variation in political competition will 
have on governor’s budgetary allocations.  For parties seeking to build or maintain their 
reputation for being strong in specific policy areas these differences in competition are likely to 
affect their spending priorities.  Table 3.2 shows the percentage of years when the governor’s 
strongest opponent in the last election was from a left, centrist or right party.  When left 
governors are in power, they face a leftist or centrist competitor more than 50 percent of the 
time.  Similarly, right governors face a right or centrist opponent more than 70 percent of the 
time.  
Table 3.2: Governors and their Primary Electoral Competitors (%) 
   
 Right Governor Center Governor Left Governor 
    
Left Competitor 28 50 18 
Center Competitor 49 19 37 
Right Competitor 23 31 45 
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 A casual analysis of Brazilian gubernatorial elections may lead observers to question 
whether competition should influence spending on security policies since there are, on average, 
six candidates participating in each election.  A closer examination of electoral results suggests 
that despite facing many competitors, winning candidates often have a strong idea about their 
likely opponent’s ideology in the following election.  Between 1990 and 2010, there were 162 
gubernatorial elections.  In 126 elections, or approximately 78 percent of all elections, the second 
place candidate’s vote share surpassed the third place candidate by more than 10 percentage 
points.  In another 8 percent of elections, the third place candidate’s vote total was within 10 
percentage points of the second place candidate, but both candidates were from the same 
ideological group.  Governors faced greater uncertainty about their likely future political 
competitor’s ideology in only 14 percent of elections where the third place candidates was from 
a different ideological group and finished within 10 percentage points of the second place 
candidate.    
 For right governors, spending more on security will not distinguish them from their 
political competition when their opponents are also from right parties.  Since voters view right 
parties as strong on security issues, they will expect similar security policies from both 
candidates.  Therefore, more spending on law enforcement will provide minimal electoral 
advantages.  Leftist governors will face the same problem in using their reputation for being 
strong on social issues and education to their advantage in the election when their primary 
competitor is from another left party.  Governors from both left and right parties will have less of 
an incentive to distinguish themselves by spending more in the core policy areas where they are 
stronger when they face opponents with similar ideological beliefs.   
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 Similar patterns are likely to arise when governors from left and right parties face 
competition from centrist parties.  While all political parties in Brazil have clientelistic linkages 
with voters, centrist parties, especially the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), are 
well known for obtaining electoral support by delivering material benefits to their supporters 
(Ames 2002; Samuels 2003).  They also lack coherent positions on important public policy 
issues, including education and security.  These two features provide them with flexibility to 
alter budgetary allocations and policy positions in response to political competition.   
 If governors from leftist parties spend more on education and social programs to reduce 
crime, their centrist opponents can emphasize the need to take a more balanced approach to 
security that recognizes a strong role for both law enforcement and preventative measures.  
Similarly, when facing governors from right parties, centrist opponents can emphasize the need 
to engage in crime prevention through more spending on social programs and education.  This 
strategy played out in Rio de Janeiro.  During the 2006 gubernatorial campaign, Sérgio Cabral 
from the PMDB faced Denise Frossard from the leftist Popular Socialist Party (PPS).  
Throughout the campaign, Cabral emphasized a balanced approach to public security that called 
for fighting crime through social programs in conjunction with a stronger police presence.   
 The third situation is when rightist governors face opponents from left parties and vice 
versa.  This occurs primarily in northern and northeastern states, such as Bahia, Amapá and 
Pernambuco.  These situations are when governors will follow traditional partisan budget 
models.  For right parties spending more on security will allow them to distinguish themselves 
from their leftist opponents.  In contrast, left parties can demonstrate their commitment to crime 
prevention through education and social policies.  Therefore, in contrast to the popular wisdom, 
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which suggests that right governors always spend more on security and left governors spend 
more on education, I expect to find that their behavior varies according to political competition. 
H1: Governors from right parties will spend more on security than governors from left parties  
      only when their primary political opponent is from a leftist party.    
 
H2: Governors from left parties will spend more on education than governors from right parties       
      only when their primary political opponent is from a right party.   
 
 The final category that we must consider is centrist parties.  When centrist governors face 
competition from left parties, emphasizing educational issues is not a winning electoral strategy 
since they will have difficulty in establishing themselves as more competent than their 
competitors.  They will face similar problems on security issues when facing opponents from 
right parties.  They can, however, develop distinguish themselves as being stronger on 
education(security) issues compared to right(left) parties.  In contrast, when they face 
competition from other centrist parties, there are no clear expectations regarding their spending 
behavior.  Since neither party owns the education or security issue, their opponents can quickly 
counteract their efforts to establish a reputation on these issues.  Taken together, therefore, I 
expect to find the following.     
H3: Governors from centrist parties will spend more on security than governors from left parties  
      only when their primary political opponent is from a leftist party.     
 
H4: Governors from centrist parties will spend more on education than governors from right 
parties only when their primary political opponent is from a rightist party.     
 
 In summary, governors from different ideological groups may prefer to implement 
different policies to address crime and violence.  However, variation in political competition 
plays a crucial role in determining how budgetary choices will affect their electoral success.  
These electoral effects, in turn, alter how they distribute government resources to different crime 
control policies.   
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3.2.3 Political Careers 
While ideology leads governors from left and right parties to prefer different security policies, 
these beliefs must contend with individual governor’s career interests as well as the environment 
in which they operate.  Brazil’s 1988 constitution initially allowed governors to remain in office 
for one four-year term.  However, in 1997, Congress passed a constitutional amendment 
allowing executives at the federal, state and local level to run for one consecutive term.  Since 
the 1998 elections, 75 percent of eligible governors have run for reelection.   
 There is wide variation in post-gubernatorial career paths among lame duck governors 
and those who did not run for reelection.20 As Table 3.3 shows, almost 50 percent of governors 
ran for federal office while three died before completing their term.21 Surprisingly, 38 percent of 
governors did not seek any political office over the next two years.  Some of them worked for 
their political party’s state offices but the majority returned to the private sector or opened non-
governmental organizations.  While Samuels (2003) claims that ambitious politicians seek state 
executive offices, less than ten percent of former governors competed in mayoral elections. 
Table 3.3: Governors’ Post-Gubernatorial Career Paths 
   
Non-Government job 38% (33) 
Died in Office  3% (3) 
Federal Agency  6% (5) 
Federal Political Office  47% (41) 
State Political Office  7% (6) 
  
N=88   
  
  
                                                     
20 I chose two years as the cutoff point since all states hold municipal elections two years after gubernatorial 
elections, thus allowing me to analyze whether governors remained involved in local politics.    
21 Edmund Pinto (Acre, 1990-1992) was only governor killed in office.  In 1992, he traveled to São Paulo to meet 
with a parliamentary commission investigating fraud involving public works and the Brazilian company Odebrecht. 
A gunman entered his room and the room of another hotel guest and shot both men.   
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 The impact that differing career paths have on spending is an important issue.  During 
interviews in Brazil, one state deputy from the Workers’ Party (PT) told me that people support a 
policy where “police shoot first and ask questions later” while another deputy, who is also from 
the PT, said that voters want to fight “violence with violence.”2223  Given voters’ demands, 
governors running for reelection are likely to spend more on law enforcement, compared to lame 
duck governors and those not running for reelection.   
 The policies for governors who leave politics or run for other political offices is less 
clear.  While more spending on law enforcement may increase support for governors running in 
senate or mayoral elections, higher spending on non-security pork barrel goods, such as road 
projects, improved sanitation or providing political jobs to supporters, may be a more effective 
strategy to win votes.  Meanwhile, among governors who return to the private sector or start their 
own non-governmental organizations, pork barrel goods may allow them to be more successful 
in these endeavors.  Given this mixed evidence, I expect to find the following.  
H5: Governors who run for reelection will spend more on security than governors who do not   
      run for any political office.  
 
 Another factor likely to influence governors’ budgetary priorities is the closeness of the 
election.  In Brazil, governors must win a majority of the votes to win the election.  If no 
candidate earns a majority of votes there is a runoff election where the top two candidates 
compete.  Competition for governorships varies widely among states.  In Paraná, a large state in 
southwest Brazil, the winning governor’s primary competitor receives, on average, 45 percent of 
the popular vote and there has never been an election where the competitor won less than 38 
percent.  In contrast, in Bahia, a large state in northeastern Brazil, governors won elections in 
                                                     
22 Personal Interview, Paraná, December 2, 2015.  
23 Personal Interview, Paraná, December 1, 2015. 
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1998 and 2010 against competitors who obtained only 16 percent of the popular vote.  Given the 
importance of public security as an electoral issue, I expect that vulnerable governors running for 
reelection will spend more on public security than non-vulnerable governors do.  I classify 
governors as vulnerable if their primary competitor in the last election received at least 47 
percent of the popular vote.  Using this criterion, 33 percent of governors were vulnerable.     
3.2.4 Additional Determinants of Budgetary Allocations  
The political-business cycle literature suggests that politicians increase spending during electoral 
years to bolster their electoral support (Nordhaus 1975; Rose 2006).  In Brazil, research finds 
that mayors increase spending in election years (Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2011).  Increasing 
spending during election years allows governors to demonstrate to voters that they are 
confronting crime and violence in a heads-on-manner.  Therefore, I include a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether it is an election year.   
 While electoral politics and individual career choices are likely to vary state spending 
patterns, governors face state economic realities that vary on two fronts.  The first is the size of 
the budget.  Wealth is highly concentrated in Brazil with eight states producing more than 76 
percent of the country’s GDP (Valor 2014).  In 1991, Bahia’s per capita budget of R$271 was 
less than a third of São Paulo’s budget of R$899 per capita.  However, as the Brazilian economy 
grew in the 1990s and early 2000s, states began to benefit from increasing tax revenues and 
government transfers.  Between 1991 and 2014, per capita budgets more than doubled in 18 
states of the country’s 27 states.  Having more resources can allow governors to prioritize 
security while also providing more resources to other public policies. 
 Despite the growth in budgets, Brazilian states became increasingly indebted.  
Throughout the 1990s, state governments were in charge of collecting and spending a large share 
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of all government revenues (Samuels 2003, ch.8-9).  During this time, they borrowed heavily 
from state development banks and international lenders to fund infrastructure projects.  They 
were eventually unable to pay back their debt and threatened to default.  The federal government 
agreed to take over this debt.  However, as part of this agreement, it passed the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law in 2000.   
 The Fiscal Responsibility Law attempted to alter states spending patterns.  It placed limits 
on hiring procedures during the six months prior to an election, limited the percentage of the 
budget that state governments can spend on personnel and made it more difficult for states to 
engage in deficit spending (Samuels 2003).  With these new institutional constraints, 
governments seeking to gain electoral support by allocating resources to different policies related 
to public security have to better plan out their budgetary priorities.   
 Even with these legal restraints in place, governors regularly leave their successors with 
large debts that force them to prioritize state spending priorities.  When Sérgio Cabral took 
control of Rio de Janeiro’s state government in 2007, he inherited a billion dollar debt from the 
previous administration.24 Similarly, following the 2014 elections, eight newly elected 
opposition governors inherited approximately U.S.$3.64 billion in debt from their predecessors.25  
When governors enter office and have large debt repayments, they have fewer resources to spend 
on public policies.  Therefore, as state debt spending rises, there will be less spending on both 
education and law enforcement.     
                                                     
24 Folha de São Paulo. 2006. “Eleito herda Estado com déficit de R$ 2,2 bi.” October 30. Factiva. 
25 Folha de São Paulo. 2015. “Ex-governadores deixaram dívidas de R$ 7,4 bi a rivais.” January 15. Factiva. 
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3.3 DATA AND ANALYSIS  
 I test these arguments using data from Brazil’s 26 states between 1991 and 2014 and the 
Federal District between 1991 and 2001.  This 24-year period covers six gubernatorial 
administrations following the passage of the country’s 1988 constitution that gave governors 
control over public security.  I do not include the Federal District in my analysis after 2001 since 
in 2002, the federal government passed law 10,633 that made the Federal District’s military 
police, civil police and firefighters federal employees, thus removing their salaries from the state 
budget.  Table 3.4 provides summary statistics for all model covariates. 
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics 
         
 Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
     
Security Budget Percent 7.90 2.78 .92 17.53 
Judiciary Budget Percent 6.63 2.39 0.84 28.74 
Education Budget Percent 17.36 3.97 4.47 28.49 
Debt Repayment Percent 3.80 3.70 0 48.98 
Per Capita Budget (Brazilian Reais) 980 506 194 3,439 
Right Party Governor 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Center Party Governor 0.46 0.43 0 1 
Left Party Governor  0.30 0.46 0 1 
Left Competitor 0.34 0.48 0 1 
Center Competitor 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Right Competitor 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Close Election 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Reelection Run 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Other Political Office 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Election Year 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Homicides 1,681 2,333 51 15,758 
Homicide Rate 26.30 13.30 3.52 71.39 
Inequality 0.56 0.05 0.42 0.69 
Population  6,463,350 7,716,848 217,583 44,000,000 
Population Density (km2) 60.71 91.83 0.97 482.66 
     
N=636     
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 Since state budgets often mirror the budget from previous years, I use an Arellano-Bond 
model that includes the lagged dependent variable in the model.  I analyze data yearly rather than 
by political administration for two reasons.  First, there are several cases when the regional 
electoral courts invalidated elections due to fraud or vote buying during the campaign.  In this 
situation, the court can declare the second place candidate as the winning governor or it can hold 
a new election.  This often leads the state to have a governor from a new ideological group in the 
middle of an administrative term.   Analyzing the data by administration would misidentify how 
the governor’s ideology and changes in political competition, which are the primary covariates of 
interest, influence spending patterns.  Second, governors are likely to respond to events, such as 
a rise in homicide rates, as they occur.  A yearly examination of the data provides greater insight 
into how governors respond to these events, especially in cases where there are strong changes in 
important model covariates, such as state debt, homicide rates and budget expenditures. 
 My primary measure of spending on security policies is the percentage of the state’s total 
budget that the government allocates to law enforcement, education and the judiciary.  State 
budgets vary widely due to differing population sizes and wealth.  Comparing spending using per 
capita budgetary allocations is problematic since governors in wealthier states, such as São 
Paulo, are likely to spend more per capita on security than governors from poorer states, 
regardless of ideology.  However, I do include these models in the Appendix C since politicians 
may argue that they are prioritizing these policies areas by providing more resources for them, 
even if they are receiving a smaller share of the overall budget.  
 I gathered the budget data from the National Treasury Secretary (STN), which requires 
all states to submit annual budget data.  State expenditures for education, law enforcement and 
the judiciary remain relatively stable over time but do exhibit wide swings in select years.  In 
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investigating these sudden changes, I found that they are a result of how states classify pension 
payments.  In most years, they consider pension payments to be part of total expenditures on 
education, the judiciary and security personnel.  However, in some years, individual states 
reclassify these expenditures and place them into the social security and social assistance 
budgetary category.  I address this problem by examining each state’s transparency website to 
determine whether pensions were included in the education, judiciary and public security 
budgets.  When they are not included, I examine the social security and social assistance budget 
to determine the amount of money spent on these pensions.  In cases, where the government does 
not directly identify pension expenditures for educators, members of the judiciary and public 
security personnel, I estimate these expenditures by using the last available year of pension data, 
and assuming that the percentage of the state’s pension expenditures spent on personnel in each 
area remained the same.  When this information is unavailable, I remove the observations from 
the analysis.   
 Another issue arises for spending on law enforcement personnel.  State governments 
occasionally move spending on law enforcement in a specific year to another budgetary category 
for unknown reasons.  For example, in Acre, a small state in northwestern Brazil, the percentage 
of the budget devoted to law enforcement declined from 5 percent in 1996, to 0.5 percent in 1997 
and 1998, before returning to 7 percent in 1999.  During these two years, the government 
decided to move salary payments for all government personnel to the Administration and 
Planning budgetary category before returning them to their respective categories in 1999.  In 
these situations, I analyzed individual state’s budget data to identify the missing information.  
When detailed budgets are unavailable, I also removed the observations from the analysis.  
Altogether, this strategy led to the loss of approximately 2 percent of observations. 
100 
 
 I classify governors as being from right, center or left parties using Power and Zucco’s 
(2009) index of party ideology in Brazil.  The index measures ideology based on parties’ voting 
behavior in the national Congress and classifies parties similar to other measures based on elite 
questionnaires and expert opinions (Tarouco and Madeira 2013).  As Figure 3.7 shows, partisan 
control over state government has varied widely between 1991 and 2014.  In 1990, when Brazil 
held its first gubernatorial elections under the new constitution, right parties captured almost 60 
percent of the governorships.  However, by 2006, they controlled governorships only in the 
Federal District and Goiás.  Their loss primarily benefited left parties that went from winning 
only three governorships in 1990 to 12 governorships in 2006.  The left’s advances in state 
politics came primarily from northern and northeastern states.  In these regions, they went from 
winning only three governorships during the 1998 elections to 11 governorships in the 2006.      
 
 
  
Figure 3.7: State Governors Elected by Year, 1990-2010 
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 Nationwide Brazil has more than 30 political parties.  However, power over state politics 
rest primarily in the hands of large parties that have a strong national presence.  Between 1990 
and 2010, just five political parties won 82 percent of the gubernatorial elections: the Liberal 
Front Party (Right, 24 mandates), the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Center, 40 
mandates), the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Center, 34 mandates), the Workers’ Party 
(Left, 18 mandates) and the Brazilian Socialist Party (Left, 17 mandates).26    
 
 
  
Figure 3.8: Center, Left and Right Governors’ Budgetary Allocations 
  
                                                     
26 The Liberal Front Party changed its name to Democrats (DEM) in 2007.  
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 Figure 3.8 shows the average percentage of the state budget that governors from left, 
center and right parties, which are labeled “L”, “C” and “R,” respectively, spent on education, 
police and the judiciary.  Contrary to what we would expect from traditional partisan budget 
models, between 1991 and 2006, governors from left parties spent the most on public security.  
Meanwhile, after 2006, governors from centrist parties spent the most on public security 
although the law enforcement spending gap between ideological groups declined.   
 During the 24-year period examined, the ideological group that spent the most on 
education and the judiciary also varied.  Governors from left parties spent more on the judiciary 
than center and right parties between 1995 and 2006 but only spent more on education between 
1999 and 2002.  In contrast, right governors spent more on education during two periods; 1995-
1998 and 2002-2006.  Taken as a whole, while there are differences in how governors from the 
left, center and right allocate state resources for security policies, these differences are limited.  
This initial evidence provides minimal support for the argument that ideology alone drives 
governors’ decisions when choosing how to allocate resources to different public security 
policies.  
 
3.2.1: Technical Considerations and Budgetary Allocations   
 
In addition to political factors and states’ economic situations, I include technical factors that a 
rational-choice approach to security suggests will influence security spending.  The first one is 
crime.  As crime rates rise, government spending on security should also increase in an effort to 
reduce its impact on society.  Crime data are often unavailable beyond the past five years and the 
data that do exist suffer from systematic reporting biases (Caldeira 2000, 112).  Given these 
problems, I measure crime using homicide data.  Homicide data are the most reliable indicators 
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of violence and are a key source of information for debates on public security in Brazil (Murray, 
Cerqueira and Kahn 2013).  I measure crime using both the homicide rate per 100,000 people as 
well as the total number of homicides in the state.   
 The second factor is unemployment.  Governance theories of budgets argue that 
politicians must respond to events that occur while they are in office (King et al. 1993, Epp, 
Lovett and Baumgartner 2014).  High unemployment levels may force state governors to divert 
resources away from public security and focus their spending on other areas such as social 
programs.  Finally, I include the population size as well as population density per square-
kilometer.  Studies find that crime rates are higher in areas with larger populations due to factors 
including lower social capital and larger transient populations (see Rotolo and Tittle [2006] for 
an overview).  Meanwhile, population density has an unclear influence on crime rates (Harries 
2006).  Some studies finds that it increases crime rates while others suggest that it has either a 
negligible or a negative effect on them.  I am agnostic about the impact that population growth 
and higher population density have on crime rates. 
 Sociological theories of crime argue that income inequality is a key factor influencing 
spending on public security (Liska, Chamlin and Reed 1985; Stucky 2005, 24).  Rising levels of 
low-income individuals lead wealthier segments of the population to feel more insecure.  The 
government assuages these fears through more spending on public security.  I use the GINI index 
to measure income inequality.  A 0 on the GINI index indicates complete equality in household 
income while a 1 indicates complete inequality.  The average value of the GINI index is .62.   
 In 1988, the federal government elevated the territories of Amapá and Roraima to states.  
A debate ensued over who was responsible for government employees in these territories at the 
time they became states since the federal government originally hired these employees.  In 1998, 
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the federal government passed a law taking financial responsibility for all government employees 
in these ex-territories at the time they became states, and in 2002, they applied this same rule to 
Roraima, which was also an ex-territory.  In 2002, federal law 10.486 of July 4, 2002 also 
extended the federal government’s financial responsibility.  It gave members of the military 
police in ex-territories the same benefits that members of the military receive, leading to a large 
increase in resources spent on security in these states.  I include an ex-territory variable, which 
indicates that the federal government was paying for state employees.  
3.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 
3.4.1 Politics and Spending on Law Enforcement and the Judiciary 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show how electoral politics and career interests influence spending on 
policing and the judiciary.  Model 1 measures the impact that ideology has on both areas of the 
budget while controlling only for spending in the previous years.27  In this basic model, which 
includes dummies for the governors’ party, governors from right parties spend less on policing 
than governors from left parties and there is no discernable differences in the resources that 
center and left governors allocate to this policy area.  However, these differences disappear once 
I take into account additional socioeconomic and political factors in Model 2.  There is also no 
evidence that governors from right and centrist parties allocate a larger portion of the budget for 
the judiciary.    
                                                     
27 While I include time fixed effects for all models, I do not include them in the chapter tables. 
105 
 
Table 3.5: Ideology and Law Enforcement Spending (%)  
          
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
    
Security Budget (t-1) 0.56*** 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 
 (0.09) (0.1) (0.11) (0.10) 
Right Governor -0.66** -0.33 -1.20** -0.33 
 (0.25) (0.34) (0.46) (0.32) 
Center Governor -0.10 0.08 -0.03 0.49* 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.24) (0.2) 
Right Competitor   -0.08 0.18 
 
  (0.29) (0.30) 
Left Competitor   -0.04 0.66* 
 
  (0.24) (0.31) 
Right Governor  x Right Competitor   1.22**  
   (0.42)  
Right Governor  x Left Competitor   1.98***  
   (0.51)  
Center Governor x Right Competitor    -0.53 
    (0.38) 
Center Governor x Left Competitor    -1.01** 
    (0.37) 
Reelection Run  -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 
 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) 
Political Office  0.01 -0.12 -0.04 
 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) 
Close Election  0.18 0.18 0.20 
 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) 
Election Year  -3.08*** -2.92*** -3.04*** 
 
 (0.62) (0.65) (0.59) 
Homicides  0.00007 0.0002 0.0001 
 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Homicide Rate  -0.002 -0.01 -0.003 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Inequality  4.08** 4.02* 3.67* 
 
 (1.53) (1.68) (1.78) 
Population  -0.0000002 -0.0000001 -0.0000002 
 
 (0.0000002) (0.0000002)            (0.0000002) 
Population Density  0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Per Capita Budget  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Debt Repayment (%)   -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** 
 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ex-Territory  -0.43 -0.63 -0.48 
 
 (1.57) (1.64) (1.46) 
Constant 3.81*** 7.66*** 6.96*** 7.49*** 
 (0.83) (1.87) (2.0) (1.83) 
  
   
N 584 498 498 498 
+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 ***.001, robust standard errors in parentheses  
 
 
106 
 
Table 3.6: Ideology and Judicial Spending (%) 
          
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
    
Security Budget (t-1) 0.27* 0.19** 0.19** 0.21** 
 (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Right Governor -0.90 -0.91 -1.22 -0.61 
 (0.55) (0.88) (1.05) (0.77) 
Center Governor -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 0.51 
 (0.31) (0.41) (0.54) (0.41) 
Right Competitor   0.17 0.44 
   (0.50) (0.51) 
Left Competitor   -0.23 0.49 
   (0.34) (0.57) 
Right Governor  x Right Competitor   0.62  
   (0.75)  
Right Governor x Left Competitor    1.49  
   (1.07)  
Center Governor x Right Competitor    -0.51 
    (0.42) 
Center Governor x Left Competitor    -1.21* 
    (0.57) 
Reelection Run  -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
  (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) 
Political Office  -0.28 -0.38 -0.30 
  (0.33) (0.37) (0.30) 
Close Election  -0.0006 0.04 0.006 
  (0.32) (0.28) (0.31) 
Election Year  -0.51* -1.94*** -2.15*** 
  (0.24) (0.45) (0.47) 
Homicides  -0.002 -0.0001 -0.0002 
  (0.002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Homicide Rate  0.01 0.01 0.003 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Inequality  6.96 6.20 6.77 
  (3.78) (3.89) (3.64) 
Population  -0.000001** -0.0000009** -0.0000008** 
  (0.0000003)     (0.0000003)            (0.0000003) 
Population Density  0.04 0.03 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Per Capita Budget  -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
  (0.0006) (0.005) (0.0006) 
Debt Repayment (%)   0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ex-Territory  0.50 0.34 -0.29 
  (0.56) (0.71) (0.83) 
Constant  11.41** 11.40** 11.39** 
  (3.95) (4.15) (4.03) 
  
   
N 559 491 491 491 
+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 ***.001, robust standard errors in parentheses  
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 The initial results do not provide support for traditional partisan budget models.   
Conservative governors do not spend more on policing or the judiciary than their leftist 
counterparts do, suggesting that there is a disconnect between rhetoric and reality.  These 
findings contradict the widely accepted evidence from the United States (Gerber and Hopkins 
2011) and Europe (Guillamón, Bastida and Benito 2013; Wenzelburger 2014) that the 
government spends more on security when a conservative party is in power.  There is also no 
evidence that ideology influences how conservative governors allocate their resources.  
However, the issue of how election competition affects governors’ spending choices remains.  
 Models 3 and 4 test the electoral competition hypothesis, which posits that political 
competition affects the amount of resources conservative and centrist governors allocate to law 
enforcement.  In Model 3, I interact the right governor variable with two variables that indicate 
whether a right governor’s primary electoral opponent in the last election was from a left or right 
party.  Model 4 follows the same pattern.  It interacts the center governor variable with the same 
two variables indicating whether the centrist governor faced competition from a left or centrist 
party.  These interaction terms show how right and center governors’ spending on law 
enforcement and the judiciary differs from left governors’ spending when they face different 
political opponents.  I identify the governor’s primary electoral opponent as the political party 
that finished second in the last election.   
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 For right parties, the evidence suggests that their spending on law enforcement is 
contingent on political competition.  More specifically, governors from right parties spend more 
on law enforcement relative to left parties only when they face competition from the left.  
Meanwhile, centrist governors spend more on law enforcement than leftist governors do, but the 
results are contrary to expectations.  They spend more when they face competition from centrist 
opponents and less when their competition comes from leftist opponents.   
 In Table 3.7, I identify the change in how much governors from right and centrist parties 
spend on law enforcement under different patterns of political competition.   To demonstrate the 
relative importance of political competition, I also show how a standard deviation increase in the 
other statistically significant model covariates affects the percentage of the state budget spent on 
law enforcement.  For the election year covariate, which is dichotomous, the coefficient shows 
how law enforcement spending differs during election years.     
Table 3.7: % of State Budget Spent on Law Enforcement 
    
 Law Enforcement 
Right Party Governor   
          Left Party Opponent +0.74 
          Center Party Opponent -1.20 
          Right Party Opponent -0.06 
Center Party Governor   
          Left Party Opponent -0.52** 
         Center Party Opponent +0.49* 
         Right Party Opponent 0.04 
Election Year -2.92 
Inequality +0.20 
Per Capita Budget -1.52 
Debt Repayment -0.22 
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 When their primary opposition is from leftist competitors, governors from right parties 
devote almost three-quarters of a percentage point more of the state’s total budget to law 
enforcement.  With law enforcement consuming, on average, 7.9 percent of states’ total budgets, 
this change represent a 9 percent increase in security spending.  In other situations, political 
competition changes their spending patterns in the opposite direction.   Right governors most 
commonly face opponents from centrist parties, and when they do, they spend significantly less 
on law enforcement than their counterparts in left parties do.  In an otherwise average state, 
governors from right parties spend around 15 percent less when they faced a centrist opponent in 
the election.  When they face an opponent from another right party, they spend around 1 percent 
less on security during all years of their administration.  
 In contrast to governors from right parties, centrist governors spend around 6.5 percent 
less than their counterparts in left parties when the face competition from the left.  In contrast, 
when they face competition from the center, they spending around 6 percent more.  The greater 
spending on law enforcement when facing centrist competitors may be an attempt by centrist 
parties to distinguish themselves from other centrists by developing a reputation as being 
stronger in this important policy area.     
3.4.2 Politics and Education Spending 
In Table 3.8, I use these same models to test whether leftist and centrist parties focus on 
improving security through increased spending on education rather than law enforcement.  There 
is no evidence, however, to support traditional partisan budget models or my electoral 
competition hypothesis.  States do not spend more on education when a governor from a left 
party is in power even when a left governor faced competition from a right party in the last 
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election.  There is also no evidence that centrist governors try to distinguish themselves by 
spending more on education when they face strong competition from right party candidates.   
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Table 3.8: Ideology and Education Spending (%)  
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Education Budget (t-1) 0.45*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Left Governor -0.39 -0.44 0.32 -0.39 
 (0.36) (0.55) (0.85) (0.67) 
Center Governor -0.17 -0.33 -0.53 -0.38 
 (0.50) (0.60) (0.59) (0.54) 
Right Competitor  0.97 0.27 
   (0.77) (0.47) 
Left Competitor  0.86 0.88 
   (0.84) (0.71) 
Left Governor x Right Competitor  -1.19  
  (0.64)  
Left Governor x Left Competitor  -0.90  
  (1.12)  
Center Governor x Right Competitor   0.31 
   (0.73) 
Center Governor x Left Competitor   -0.67 
   (0.67) 
Reelection Run 0.06 -0.01 0.08 
  (0.24) (0.26) (0.28) 
Political Office 0.08 -0.03 0.01 
  (0.40) (0.38) (0.39) 
Close Election 0.15 0.22 0.26 
  (0.31) (0.37) (0.35) 
Election Year 0.66 0.89 -0.29 
  (0.99) (1.06) (0.67) 
Homicides  0.0002 0.0002 0.002 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Homicide Rate -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Inequality  -10.97* -10.59** -11.41** 
  (4.37) (4.08) (4.32) 
Population  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Population Density 0.002 -0.01 -0.005 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.033) 
Per Capita Budget -0.004* -0.004* -0.004 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Debt Repayment (%) -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.17*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ex-Territory  0.90 1.01 0.86 
  (1.17) (1.55) (1.45) 
Constant 9.63*** 22.74*** 22.49*** 22.59*** 
 (1.17) (4.77) (4.74) (4.86) 
     
N 578 498 498 498 
* 0.05 ** 0.01 ***.001, robust standard errors in parentheses  
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3.4.3 Partisanship and Spending Priorities 
Taken together, there is minimal support for traditional partisan budget models.  While 
partisanship affects spending on public security, its influence depends upon political 
competition.  Governors from right parties spend more on law enforcement only when they face 
a leftist opponent.  When their competition comes from centrist and other right parties, they 
spend less on security.  These findings contradict the popular belief that right parties always take 
a tough-on-crime approach to security in Brazil.  Although governors from right parties advocate 
these policies during the campaign, they implement them selectively when they are in office.  
Their budgetary priorities, instead, appear to be driven by how allocating more resources to law 
enforcement will influence their electoral success as opposed to strong ideological beliefs.   
  There is also no empirical evidence that ideology or political competition leads left or 
centrist parties to spend more than right parties on education.  This finding contradicts the left’s 
electoral platform that emphasize addressing the underlying social conditions that influence the 
likelihood that individuals will commit crimes.  The lack of partisanship in education spending is 
likely due to the constitutional requirement that states spend at least 25 percent of tax revenues 
and government transfers on education.  Given the vast amount of resources that states are 
already spending on education, it may be difficult for leftist governors to justify allocating more 
resources for it.  In line with governance budget models, this floor on education spending 
appears to mitigate large spending swings when governors from different parties and ideological 
beliefs gain power.   
 Put another way, institutions work.  By setting spending floors on education, the federal 
government is able to tie politicians’ hands and prevent them from playing politics with this 
important policy area.  In contrast, in law enforcement, where there are no constitutional minimal 
113 
 
requirements, there is strong politicization with spending swings occurring depending on who is 
in power and the political competition they face.  The popular press and public security 
practioners in Brazil are aware of this problem.  In recent years, a growing number of politicians 
and scholars have called for the government to address the law enforcement deficit by mandating 
minimum spending requirements for public security.  To date, however, the federal government 
has refrained from intervening in this crucial policy area.      
 Turning our attention to the overall model, governors running for reelection or another 
political office at the state or national level do not spend more on education, the judiciary or law 
enforcement than governors who leave politics.  Similarly, governors who win close elections do 
not spend more than those who win with a wider margin of victory.  Among the other political, 
social and technical factors, there are uneven effects depending on the type of policy we 
examine.  Population growth leads to more spending on the judiciary but does not affect 
spending on education or law enforcement.  Meanwhile, more homicides lead states to increase 
spending on law enforcement although states with higher homicide rates do not spend more.  In 
line with expectations, higher inequality leads to more spending on the police but reduces 
education spending.  State finances have effects that are largely in line with expectations.  Higher 
state debt reduces spending on the judiciary and education but does not affect spending on the 
judiciary. States also spend a smaller percentage of their budgets on security, education and the 
judiciary as their budgets grow larger.   
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3.5 NORTHEAST NEIGHBORS: THE CASES OF CEARÁ AND PIAUÍ 
I return to the cases of Ceará and Piauí, which motivated the chapter, to highlight how these 
mechanisms function in state politics.  More specifically, I show that governors in both states 
largely behave in line with expectations, with resource allocation for public security depending 
on political competition.  The states are neighbors in northeastern Brazil and have many other 
similarities.  As Table 3.9 shows, in 1991, the states had similar budgets and levels of economic 
development.  While Ceará was more populous and had a higher homicide rate, it spent less per 
capita and a smaller portion of its budget on security.  Over time, however, this changed with 
security spending declining relative to other budgetary areas in Piauí, while it increased in Ceará.  
In this section, I explore how state politics influenced governors’ security spending priorities in 
these states.    
 
Table 3.9: Ceará and Piauí Socioeconomic and Security Comparison, 1991-2010 
             
  Ceará   Piauí  
Year 1991 2000 2010 1991 2000 2010 
       
Population 6,366,647 7,200,167 8,448,055 2,582,137 2,753,373 3,119,015 
Homicide Rate 9.5 17.1 31.8 4.0 8.4 13.2 
GDP per Capita R$5090 R$7081 R$9217 R$4264 R$4868 R$7073 
Security Budget (%) 4.32 5.16 6.0 8.97 8.59 5.22 
Per Capita Security R$12 R$28 R$50 R$21 R$39 R$42 
Per Capita Budget R$272 R$548 R$839 R$237 R$449 R$797 
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and the Ministry of Health 
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3.5.1 Ceará: The Land of Technocrats 
Ceará’s modern political history began in 1986 with the election of Tasso Jereissati from the 
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB).  Jereissati was the president of the Ceará 
Industrial Center (CIC); a non-partisan group of young business elite that sought to modernize 
the state’s economic and political environment.  During the electoral campaign, he garnered 
widespread support from a diverse coalition that included the business community as well as 
social movements and leftist parties (Chaves Vieira 2012).  These forces were seeking to break 
the cycle of coronelismo, whereby the conservative Liberal Front Party (PFL) maintained a 
stronghold on state politics through agreements with powerful political brokers from the interior 
of the state.28  Tasso easily won the election, garnering more than 61 percent of valid votes.  This 
began the “Tasso Era” in state politics that would last through 2002.   
 During the electoral campaign, he promised to modernize the state’s police forces and 
tackle the issue of pistolagem, whereby the rural elite would hire hitman to deal with labor and 
public security problems (Xavier 2016).  Upon taking office, he hired two outsiders from the 
Federal Police, Moroni Torgan and Renato Torrano, to lead the Secretary of Public Security.  
Both these men were originally from southern Brazil.  Their hiring led to widespread anger 
among the state’s police officers who argued that the governor overlooked many competent 
internal candidates (Barreira 2004).  The backlash it generated hindered his efforts to reform the 
public security apparatus and Tasso had minimal success in reducing contract killings despite 
widely publicizing these efforts (Brasil 2000).   
 Outside the realm of public security, Tasso faced other problems.  Following the 
elections, he abandoned campaign promises, such as agrarian reform, which had earned him the 
                                                     
28 The Liberal Front Party changed its name to Democrats (DEM) in 2007.  
116 
 
support of leftist groups.  He made this decision because these promises clashed with the CIC’s 
view of modernization that focused on defending private property, reducing state intervention in 
the economy, criticizing corporatism and condemning interregional economic imbalances 
(Chaves Vieira 2012).  He also lost support among public workers and the middle class in the 
capital city of Fortaleza due to his administration’s efforts to reduce clientelism and to modernize 
the state’s administrative apparatus, which resulted in the firing of many public employees 
(Queiroz Nobre 2008, 228-229).  Compounding these problem, Tasso began to feud with the 
PMDB’s national leadership and on January 15, 1990, he left the PMDB to become a founding 
member of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) (CPDOC 2018).   
 With the constitution prohibiting him from running for reelection, Tasso chose his 
political ally and the popular mayor of Fortaleza, Ciro Gomes, to be the PSDB’s candidate.  
Gomes came from an influential family that had been involved with state government and 
politics since the 18th century (Vasconcelos Monte 2016).  Tasso’s declining support among 
leftist supporters and urban dwellers forced Gomes and the PSDB to build new bases of electoral 
support.  They turned their attention to traditional political leaders from the interior of the state 
who they had previously shunned (Queiroz Nobre 2008, 153-154).  With their support, Gomes 
won the election defeating the conservative Liberal Front Party’s candidate, Paulo Lustosa, by 
more than 18 percentage points.   
 Having faced a conservative competitor who he easily defeated, Ciro Gomes did not 
make major modifications to the state’s security policies.  He chose Francisco Crisóstomo, a civil 
police delegate known as the “contract killer hunter” to be the Secretary of Public Security.  He 
also did not make major budgetary changes or create new public security programs.  As Figure 
3.9 shows, he maintained spending levels for all three types of crime prevention policies – 
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education, law enforcement and the court – although there were some spending increases prior to 
the 1994 elections.  Despite lacking a strong public security policy, violence declined 23 percent 
during his administration. 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Homicides and Per Capita Expenditures in Ceará 
  
 
 
 
 
Center-Right Center-Center Center-Center Center-Left Left-Center Left-Center0
50
100
150
200
P
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
 E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
s
1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015
Year
Education Spending Law Enforcement Spending
Judiciary Spending Homicide Rate per 100,000
Sources: National Treasury and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
118 
 
 In 1994, Tasso returned to the forefront of state politics defeating his former ally in the 
PMDB, Juraci Magalhães, who was running with strong support from the state’s conservative 
parties.29  He also won reelection in 1998, again defeating the PMDB.30  With the economy 
growing, the state government more than doubled per capita spending on education, law 
enforcement and the judiciary.  During his second stint as governor, Tasso’s law enforcement 
policies focused primarily on institutions.    
 To demonstrate his commitment to democratic policing, he abolished the Secretary of 
Public Security and created the Secretary of Public Security and Social Defense in 1997.  This 
change, however, came across as superficial to human rights groups when he made a military 
general, Cândido Vargas de Freire, the secretary of this new institution (Xavier 2008, 99).  The 
state also hired the Bratton Group, founded by former New York City Police Commissioner, 
William Bratton, to evaluate its public security system.  Bratton, who was well known for his 
“zero tolerance” policies in New York City, recommended that the government use a district 
policing model, whereby the government would assign individual military and civil police units 
to specific geographical areas and have them work together more cohesively (Brasil 2000, 230).  
He believed that this policy design would increase their effectiveness compared to the standard 
protocol, whereby the two police forces acted independently.  Tasso also created a variety of 
other state agencies to improve security, including the State Human Rights Council (CEDH), the 
State Public Security Council (CONSESP), the Program for the Protection of Witnesses and 
Family Members of Victims of Violence (PROVITA) and Community Defense Councils (Xavier 
2008).   
                                                     
29 Magalhães served as Fortaleza’s vice-mayor under Ciro Gomes.   
30 Gonzaga Mota, who was the state’s governor from 1983-1986 was his opponent. 
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 During this time, there was not a lot of focus on providing better training or salaries for 
military police personnel.  On July 29, 1997, the military police went on strike to demand better 
salaries.  The strike, which lasted two days, saw several acts of violence between strikers and the 
police sent to end the strike.  However, Tasso refused to budge on salary increases.  He also fired 
dozens of police officers who participated in the strike.31  During his eight years in office, the 
state’s homicide rate rose more than 60 percent. 
 Tasso’s emphasis on institution building is puzzling at first glance since there is 
widespread popular support for hiring and better equipping law enforcement officers.  Three 
aspects of the state’s electoral competition help explain his policy choices.  First, in both 
elections, he faced competition from the PMDB.  The PMDB is well-known for lacking coherent 
ideological positions, giving it flexibility to modify its position in response to the local political 
environment.  While the PSDB has more defined ideological positions, its place in the center 
also provides it flexibility, allowing it to counteract critiques from the PMDB. 
 Second, there is the issue of public security relative to other electoral issues.  In a 1994 
election survey, less than five percent of respondents identified crime it as one of the state’s top-
3 problems (CESOP-IBOPE 1994).  In 1998, security became an increasingly important issue 
with 20 percent of respondents identifying it as one of the state’s top-3 problems.  For voters in 
both elections, however, security remained a less important issue than unemployment, 
healthcare, the state’s drought situation and education (CESOP-IBOPE 1998).   
 Third, there was a lack of strong political competition in both elections.  Tasso won the 
1994 election by 17 percentage points and the 1998 election by more than 40 percentage points.  
                                                     
31 O Povo. 2017. “As Polemicas Sobre a Primeira Greve das Polícias no CE.” July 29. 
https://www.opovo.com.br/jornal/cotidiano/2017/07/as-polemicas-sobre-a-primeira-greve-das-policias-no-ce.html 
(May 8, 2018).  
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The relatively low importance of security as an electoral issue and the low levels of political 
competition gave Tasso flexibility to emphasize both prevention through education, as well as 
long-term policies designed to make law enforcement more effective, since his political survival 
was not at stake.   
 In 2002, Tasso’s handpicked successor, Lúcio Alcântara from the PSDB, won control of 
the governorship, defeating José Airton from the leftist Workers’ Party (PT).  Despite Tasso’s 
support, Alcântara made major modification to the state’s public security policy and 
implemented a new security program called “Ceará Public Security –Actions 2003/2006 and 
Strategic Vision 2007-2010.”  This program called for a wide range of public security policies, 
including better protection for the public, crime prevention, reducing public disorder, 
transparency and respect for human rights.  However, with the federal government reducing 
transfers to the state and facing a budgetary crisis, he could only implement a few select policies.  
During his tenure, the state hired 1981 new police officers, purchased 1246 vehicles, constructed 
new police forensic laboratories and police stations and expanded the state’s prison system 
(Xavier 2016). 
 The emphasis on short-term crime control policies represented a major departure from 
Tasso’s institutional building approach.  Alcântara’s choice, however, was strategic.  Although 
he won the 2002 election, he was the first candidate in the Tasso Era unable to win the 
gubernatorial election in the first round.  In the runoff election, he eked out a victory, defeating 
his opponent by only 3047 votes out of more than 3.5 million votes cast.  In this election, public 
security became an increasingly important issue with 50 percent of voters identifying it as one of 
the state’s top-3 problems, outranked only by unemployment and healthcare (CESOP-IBOPE 
2002).  Choosing popular public security policies was crucial to his reelection efforts. 
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 Second, there is the issue of political competition.  During the two previous elections, 
Tasso faced competition from other centrist parties where taking a tough-on-crime approach to 
security was unlikely to differentiate him from his opponents.  Alcântara, in contrast, faced 
competition from the leftist Workers’ Party (PT) that was benefiting from President Lula’s Bolsa 
Família social program, which drastically increased income among the state’s poorest voters.  
With the public viewing the left as less adept at addressing crime issues, emphasizing visible and 
popular policies provided a way for Alcântara to differentiate himself from his political 
competition. 
 While voters positively evaluated Alcântara’s management of the state government, there 
were concerns within the PSDB that the state’s economic and administrative advances were 
stalling.  Prior to the 2006 elections, the party’s two main leaders in the state, Tasso Jereissati 
and Ciro Gomes, tried to convince Alcântara to run for the state’s open senate seat, paving the 
way for a grand coalition behind Ciro’s brother, Cid Gomes, who was the Brazilian Socialist 
Party (PSB) candidate.  However, he refused the offer, leading both Tasso and Ciro to informally 
supported Cid’s election bid (Vasconcelos Monte 2016, 77).  In the interior region of the state, 
Alcântara also lost the support of allied mayors who were upset that he did not fulfill his 
investment promises due to the state’s economic problems.  These setbacks allowed Cid Gomes 
to win the 2006 elections by more than a million votes, running with a left-center coalition of 
eight parties that included the PT and the PMDB.   
 Soon after the election, Cid Gomes directly supervised the creation of a security program 
called Ronda do Quarteirão (Block Patrols) that included 24-hour patrols by police officers 
especially assigned to three-kilometer grids.  This program, which he widely publicized in the 
media, created tensions within the military police since the government gave these officers 
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additional bonuses, distinct uniforms and access to better equipment (Brasil and de Sousa 2010).  
He also invested heavily in expanding the security apparatus.  Between 2007 and 2010, the state 
hired nearly 2600 new military police officers, increasing its police force from 12,630 to 15,258 
(Ministry of Justice 2018).   
 During his first term in office, Gomes increased per capita spending on all three areas of 
the budget related to public security: education, law enforcement and the judiciary.  However, he 
gave the most money to law enforcement, which saw its budget increase by 44 percent.  In 
comparison, state spending on education and the judiciary rose by 31 and 14 percent, 
respectively.  With competition arising from centrist parties, more spending on law enforcement 
allowed Gomes to break away from the left’s reputation as being weak on crime.  In addition, he 
received strong support from the leading members of the PSDB, which is a centrist party.  
Despite these efforts, the state’s homicide rate rose 46 percent during his first term in office. 
 In the 2010 elections, there were major change in political alliances.  Although Tasso’s 
support was crucial for winning the 2006 elections, Gomes did not support his senatorial 
campaign.  He instead threw his support for the state’s two open senate seats behind Eunício 
Oliveira (PMDB) and José Pimentel (PT).  This decision led to a formal rupture between the 
allies and Tasso supported the PSDB’s gubernatorial candidate (Vasconcelos Monte 2016, 85).32  
Gomes’s decision to not support Tasso reflected the PSDB’s declining power in state politics.  
While the party won 70 of the state’s 183 mayoral elections in 2004, by 2008 it controlled only 
54 municipalities.33  During his reelection campaign, Gomes promised greater investment in 
public security, health and transportation.  With the economy continuing to grow, he won the 
election by more than 40 percentage points.   
                                                     
32 The PSDB candidate, Marcos Cals, served as Ciro Gomes’ Secretary of Justice and Citizenship.   
33 In 2012, they won only eight municipal elections. 
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 In 2011, the state managed to stabilize violence.  However, the government faced dissent 
within the state’s security forces.  The civil police launched two partial strikes that lasted five 
months.  On December 31, 2011, the state’s military police and firefighters also went on a 7-day 
strike, forcing the federal government to send the military and the National Force, a federal 
police force, to provide security.  Unlike the 1997 military police strike, which resulted in no 
changes in the state’s compensation policy, Gomes negotiated with police officers.  He agreed to 
a seven percent salary increase, a reduction in work hours from 44 to 40 hours per week, a 
monthly R$850 bonus for all police officers who worked the morning and afternoon shifts and 
amnesty for all strike participants.3435 While the state lost 800 military police officers between 
2011 and 2012, the strike agreement led the state’s per capita security to increase 37 percent 
while the percentage of the state’s total budget spent on security rose from 5.8 to 8.9 percent. 
 In 2013, Gomes brought new management to the Secretary of Public Security and Social 
Defense (SSPDS) to address the state’s growing security crisis.  Between 2011 and 2012, the 
state’ homicide rate rose more than 36 percent.  Looking for solutions to the security problem, 
his government followed the example of Pernambuco, which achieved major reductions in 
violence under the leadership of Eduardo Campos, who was also from the Brazilian Socialist 
Party.  The government divided the entire state into integrated Security Areas (AIS) and assigned 
military and civil police units to each area and required them to track monthly crime statistics.  
The government then held police commanders in each area accountable for achieving specified 
reductions in crime rates.    
 On April 10, 2014, the state also launched the “In Defense of Life Program,” which 
sought to motivate police production by providing financial incentives for reducing crime.  This 
                                                     
34 Police officers who worked the overnight shift already received this bonus. 
35 It is illegal for military police officers to strike since they are members of the armed forces.  
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program gives each AIS monthly goals for reducing violent crimes, theft and completion of 
arrest warrants based on past criminal activity in the area.  The government also gives overall 
crime reduction goals for its four territories and the overall state, which each count toward 20 
percent of the overall goal.  The police working in these areas then receive bonuses in proportion 
to the goals they achieve.  For example, if an AIS achieves 70 percent of the goal, its employees 
receive 70 percent of the bonus.  When all AISs does not fully achieve their goals, the leftover 
money goes to the top 15 AISs that achieved the highest absolute production (Dantas 2014).  
 During Gomes’ final two years in office, the state hired 1036 police officers, filling the 
gap in police officers that left in previous years (Ministry of Justice 2018).  Despite this increase 
in resources and the state’s new security program, a growing gang war between two large gangs, 
the First Command of the Capital and the Guardians of the State, caused crime rates to continue 
to rise.  The state’s homicide rate rose 72 percent over this four-year period.  Compared to his 
first four years in office when the state had 8802 homicides, during his second term there were 
15,729 homicides.   
 In 2014, ruptures emerged among allies in the PSB’s electoral coalition.  The PT made 
Camilo Santana, a state deputy, their candidate while the PMDB put forth Eunício Oliveira, who 
was one of the state’s senators.  Although the PSB had an official candidate, Eliane Novais, both 
Cid and Ciro Gomes supported and coordinated Santana’s campaign.  During the campaign, both 
Santana and Oliveira made public security a central issue (Vasconcelos Monte 2016, 94).  
Santana offered a new security program called Ceará Pacífico (Ceará Pacified).  This program 
called for a number of policies that including greater investment in police officers, strengthening 
law enforcement institutions, combating drugs, creating a public security research institute and 
increasing the police presence in the state’s rural areas.  These policies were similar to those of 
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Oliveira, who called for more investment in police officers and law enforcement institutions, 
combating drugs, increasing police mobility, reorganizing the police and better police 
intelligence. 
 Santana won a runoff election with 53 percent of the vote.  He had initially success in 
reducing violence with homicides declining in both 2015 and 2016.  However, with the 
continued gang war between the First Command of the Capital (PCC) and the Guardians of the 
State (GDE), violence continued to reach record levels with more than 5300 homicides in 2017 
and another 3863 homicides through October 2018.  
 In summary, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the country’s two strongest centrist 
parties, the PMDB and the PSDB, dominated Cearenese politics.  During their time in office, 
spending on security largely followed the patterns identified in the cross-state quantitative 
analysis.  These governors spent more on law enforcement and their spending was highest when 
they faced competition from centrist competitors.  Since 2006, when leftist parties wrestled 
control of the governorship, there has been an even greater increase in law enforcement spending 
and more comprehensive public security programs.    
 The left’s emphasis on law enforcement in Ceará further highlights the role of political 
competition in determining budgetary allocation.  While the chapter emphasizes how political 
competition influences the right’s spending on law enforcement, the greater emphasis that both 
Cid Gomes and Camilo Santana paid to public security, suggests that the left also recognizes that 
under certain situations it pays to make law enforcement an important electoral issue.  Facing 
competition from centrist parties, which lack clear ideological positions, both governors 
exploited the issue in a successful attempt to further their own electoral success.     
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 Finally, across all gubernatorial terms, there were not any patterns to suggest that 
ideological jockeying drove spending on education.  Across both centrist and leftist governors’ 
administrations, education spending increased.  This rise in spending should not be surprising 
given the evidence from the quantitative analysis, showing that there is no difference in 
education, regardless of the governor’s ideology.  Together, the evidence from both policy areas 
points to the importance of rules versus discretion.  Rules limited the politicization of education 
spending, while discretion in law enforcement spending led to budgetary shifts depending on 
political competition and the governor in power.   
 
3.5.2  Piauí: Familiar Politics 
To the west of Ceará lies Piauí.  Piauí is Brazil’s second poorest state with wealth that surpasses 
only the neighboring state of Maranhão.  Despite this poverty, the state allocated nine percent of 
its budget to law enforcement in 1991, making it the state with the fourth highest investment in 
public security.  By 2014, however, these numbers had reversed.  Although the state increased 
per capita spending by R$11 (about US$3), law enforcement spending accounted for less than 
five percent of the state’s budget and Piauí became the state that invested the least amount of 
resources in security.  This decline, however, was not linear.  As Figure 3.10 shows, spending on 
security rose steadily from 1991 to 2002, before declining slowly over the next 12 years.  In 
contrast, spending on education increased more linearly while spending on the judiciary 
increased suddenly between 1991 and 1994, before remaining steady from 1995 to 2003.  After 
this period, judiciary spending rises and falls unevenly. 
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 The seemingly uneven importance that Piauí’s governors have given to public security 
over the years is puzzling since security has become increasingly important to voters.  In 1998, 
only 22 percent of the state’s voters identified it as one of the top-3 problem, lagging behind the 
drought crisis, healthcare and unemployment (CESOP-IBOPE 1998b).  However, by 2002, this 
had increased to 31 percent (CESOP-IBOPE 2002b).  Only eight years later, more than 41 
percent of voters identified it as one of the state’s most important issues, surpassed only by 
healthcare and unemployment (CESOP-IBOPE 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Homicides and Per Capita Expenditures in Piauí 
 The state’s modern political history began in 1986 with a clash of political titans.  The 
election pitted a coalition platform consisting of two former governors, Alberto Silva (PMDB, 
1971-1975) and Lucídio Portela (PDS, 1979-1983), against Antônio Freitas Neto from the 
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Liberal Front Party (PFL) and Deoclécio Dantas from the Democratic Workers Party (PDT).  
Although they were electoral opponents, Portela and Freitas Neto came from powerful political 
families linked through marriage.  Between the 1950s and the 1990s, members of their extended 
family controlled the governorship eight times (Arraes Filho 2000, 78-80).  The PFL had only 
recently emerged in the state when Hugo Napoleão Neto, the state’s governor from 1983 to 
1986, left the PDS after it refused to nominate Antônio, who was his cousin, as the party’s 
candidate in the 1986 elections.  This split among the state’s conservative elite helped Alberto 
Silva win in a close election.      
 In 1990, the PFL and the PDS resolved their differences and Antônio Freitas Neto won 
the election, defeating a centrist coalition headed by Wall Ferraz from the Brazilian Social 
Democratic Party (PSDB).  Throughout his tenure, the state had the lowest homicide rate 
anywhere in Brazil, averaging less than four homicides for every 100 thousand residents.  With 
low levels of violence and political competition arising from the center, the government had 
minimal incentive to increase spending on security.  It was already devoting almost nine percent 
of the state budget to law enforcement and had managed to minimize the state’s security 
problems.  Any additional efforts would not allow the government to distinguish itself from its 
competitors and with family politics taking center stage in the state, the resources could be more 
efficiently utilized to benefit political allies.  During Freitas Neto’s tenure, state spending on 
public security remained stagnant while education spending increased slightly.   
 In 1994, the PFL chose Átila Freitas Lira, the cousin of former governor Hugo Napoleão 
Neto and current governor Antônio Freitas Neto, to be its candidate.  The PMDB’s candidate 
was Francisco Moraes Souza, more commonly known by his nickname, Mão Santa (Holy Hand), 
for his work as a doctor.  Sousa was the mayor of Parnaíba, the state’s second largest city, and 
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came from an important political family in northern Piauí.  With support from the center-right 
PSDB, which dominated politics in the capital city and surrounding areas, he defeated Lira in a 
runoff election.       
 Souza arrived at an opportune time.  The Real Plan, a national economic stabilization 
plan, had reduced the country’s inflation rate from more than 900 percent in 1994 to 22 percent 
in 1995.  The state’s budget also began to grow rapidly, with per capita spending increasing 77 
percent from R$250 to R$442.  Despite these economic advances, the government did not place 
strong priority on improving public security.  
 Although the state provided more overall resources for education, security and the 
judiciary, both security and education received a smaller portion of the state’s overall budget.  In 
contrast to Ceará, where governors regularly developed new security plans, Souza did not launch 
any major security policies or maintain direct control over policies that could reduce violence.  
He gave the Secretary of Public Security to his allies in the Liberal Party (PL) and the Secretary 
of Education to the PSDB (De Sandes Freitas 2015). 
 In July 1997, the state’s military police went on strike demanding better salaries and 
working conditions.36  After six days, they agreed to end in the strike in exchange for salary 
increases, construction of housing for military police officers and an agreement not to punish 
police officers who participated in the strike.37  This contrasted with the police strike occurring in 
Ceará at the same time, which resulted in no salary increases and the firing of dozens of police 
officers.  The difference in outcomes stems largely from the government in power.  Whereas 
Tasso came from Ceará’s business elite, which sought to improve government efficiency, Souza 
                                                     
36 Mota, Paulo. 1997. “Policiais do Piauí decidem manter greve.” July 8. Folha de São Paulo. 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cotidian/ff080735.htm  
37 It is illegal for the military police to go on strike since they are members of the Armed Forces. 
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won elections through negotiation and populist policies.  Taking a hardline approach to the 
police strike would reduce his reputation as a politician who was open to negotiation regardless 
of the circumstances. 
 During his tenure, the state’s homicide rate rose 22 percent.  At first glance, Souza’s lack 
of attention to this violence comes across as puzzling, especially since constitutional changes 
allowed him to run for reelection.  A closer examination, however, reveals that there were strong 
political reasons he did not address the problem.  While violence was rising, the state still had the 
lowest homicide rate in the country with 5.2 homicides per 100 thousand residents.  In addition, 
violence was less important for voters than unemployment, healthcare and the state’s drought 
problems (CESOP-IBOPE 1998).  For politician seeking to maintain their power, winning 
election requires addressing those problems that are most important to voters.  During his seven 
years in office (1995-2001), he invested heavily in popular policies, which addressed these 
concerns through projects such as a food program called Soup in the Hand (Sopa na Mão) and 
the Good Health (Boa Saúde) and the State Funeral Service (Funerária Estadual) medical 
programs (de Araújo and de Lima 2011).  Between 1995 and 2000, the state invested almost 
R$110 million in social project (Mendes 2003). 
  In 1998, Souza ran for reelection, facing competition from his old foe Hugo Napoleão 
Neto (PFL).  During this election, the PSDB, which was crucial to Souza’s 1994 victory, left his 
electoral coalition and joined forces with the Workers’ Party (PT).  According to the PSDB 
gubernatorial candidate, Francisco Gerardo, the goal was to “defeat the PMDB and the PFL, 
which have altered power for years.”38  The election was highly contested with the federal 
government deploying the military and the Federal Police to prevent candidates from providing 
                                                     
38 Folha de São Paulo. 1998. “No Acre, petista "light' fecha aliança com tucanos.” July 1. 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc01079825.htm. 
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transportation to the polls, using stolen cars for campaign efforts and providing food in exchange 
for votes.39  The Federal Police also investigated allegations that a mayor allied with Souza 
demanded that local government employees support him and tortured one man who could not 
guarantee that he would bring ten people to vote for Souza.40  Despite these allegations of 
corruption, Souza defeated Napoleão Neto after the PSDB supported him in the runoff election.  
 Violence remained steady during the first year of his second term but then rose sharply, 
almost doubling by 2001.  Responding to this increase, Souza took a balanced approach to 
reducing violence by increasing spending on both education and law enforcement.  During this 
time, a major scandal also rocked the state’s security apparatus.  Federal Deputy Wellington Dias 
(PT) gave the Ministry of Justice documents alleging that at least 500 of the state’s police 
officers were involved with crime.  In addition, a Federal Police wiretap recorded the 
commander of the state’s military police force threatening to kill the director of the Federal 
Police in the state.41  Despite these problems, Souza did not attempt any widespread institutional 
reforms in the state’s security apparatus.   
 On November 6, 2001, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) removed Souza from power 
for using government resources to produce campaign material, providing free medicine and 
giving amnesty for late payments on water bills during the 1998 campaign.42  As part of their 
decision, they declared Hugo Napoleão Neto to be the legitimate winner and allowed him to take 
power for the rest of the term.  With the election less than a year away and facing competition 
                                                     
39 De Oliveira, Eduardo. 2000. “Justiça pede tropa federal em mais de 10% do Piauí.” September 14. Folha de São 
Paulo. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u6326.shtml. 
40 Guedes, Gil. 1998. “Exército e PF tentam evitar violência e irregularidades na votação no Piauí.” October 24. O 
Estado de São Paulo.  
41 Leali, Francisco. 1999. “Violência/Piaui.” September 18. Agência Jornal do Brasil.  
42 Costa, Victor. 2017. “Santa comenta absolvição de Dilma-Temer.” June 11. Oito Meia. 
https://www.oitomeia.com.br/noticias/politica/2017/06/11/primeiro-governador-cassado-do-brasil-mao-santa-
comenta-absolvicao-de-dilma-temer/.   
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from the PT candidate, Wellington Dias, Napoleão Neto made rapid changes in the state budget.  
In 2002, he sought to address the state’s growing security problems by increasing education and 
law enforcement spending by five and ten percent, respectively.  The greater allocation of 
resources for law enforcement coalesces with the argument that right governors will spend more 
on security when they face competition from leftist parties that they can portray as weak on 
crime. 
 In the months leading up to the 2002 elections, Dias made a deal with Souza.  In 
exchange for supporting Souza’s 2002 senatorial campaign, Souza and the PMDB would support 
his gubernatorial campaign.  Dias defeated Napoleão Neto in an election that signaled the slow 
downfall of conservative oligarchic parties in the state.   
 During his first term in office, Dias did not make major modifications to the state’s public 
security policy.  In June 2004, the military police went on strike, demanding a 28 percent salary 
increase, changes in career plans and overdue 13th salary payments.43  He argued, however, that 
the state’s high expenditures on personnel and a decline in the state’s revenue from the State 
Participation Fund, a federal transfer which accounted for 60 percent of the state’s budget, 
prevented him from addressing these demands.44  Over his four-year term, per capita spending on 
education and law enforcement remained steady, although both areas saw their portion of the 
budget decline.    
 Despite these setbacks, the state began experiencing economic growth during the final 
years of his term and PT candidates nationwide experienced a surge in popularity due to the 
national social program Bolsa Família.  In Piauí, which had 1,548,121 valid votes cast in the 
                                                     
43 In Brazil, government employees receive an additional paycheck in December that is equivalent to their monthly 
salary.   
44 Coelho, Luciano. 2004. “Piauí pede dinheiro à União para negociar com polícia em greve.” June 14. O Estado de 
São Paulo. 
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2006 elections, the program reached 366,906 families (Ministry of Social Development 2018).  
In 2006, the PMDB left the government’s electoral coalition and Dias faced his former ally, 
Francisco Moraes Souza, who was crucial to his 2002 victory.  However, times had changed and 
dissent within the PMDB led many of its members to support other candidates.  Dias won the 
election defeating Souza by more than 35 percentage points.   
  With the state’s economic situation improving, Dias behaved as traditional partisan 
budgetary models would anticipate.  He increased spending on education until it reached levels 
similar to those that existed before the state’s financial crisis.  In addition, despite a continued 
rise a crime, he reduced state spending on law enforcement and the judiciary.  Throughout his 
second term, the government did not develop any new policies to address the state’s growing 
public security problems.   
   Unable to remain in office for a third term, Dias supported his vice-governor Wilson 
Martins from the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), which is another left-leaning party that has its 
electoral base in northeastern Brazil.  He chose Moraes Souza Filho, who is from the PMDB and 
the nephew of former governor Francisco Moraes Souza, to be the vice-governor candidate.  
Martins campaigned on the continued benefits that Bolsa Família brought to the state and his 
strong relationship with presidential candidate Dilma Rousseff.  He also promised to expand 
broadband Internet access throughout the state, place health units in schools and hire 4000 police 
officers.45  Martins won a runoff election, defeating Sílvio Mendes (PSDB), who was the ex-
mayor of Teresina, the capital city. 
                                                     
45 O Globo. 2010. “Wilson Martins é reeleito governador do Piauí.” October 31. 
http://g1.globo.com/especiais/eleicoes-2010/noticia/2010/10/wilson-martins-e-reeleito-governador-do-piaui.html 
(May 21, 2018).  
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 Although he cast himself as a candidate who was strong on security issues, Wilson took 
minimal action to implement law-enforcement based solutions to address the state’s security 
problems.  During his tenure, law enforcement spending declined to only R$32 per capita in 
2014, compared to R$56 in 2002.  The state also lost more than 1100 of its 6506 military police 
officers due to retirement and normal attrition (Ministry of Justice 2018).  Despite the declining 
level of law enforcement resources, he attempted to address security issues through a new 
program called Projeto Ronda Cidadão: A Polícia Militar Mais Perto de Você (Block Patrol: The 
Military Police Closer to You).  This program, which copied the Projeto Ronda do Quarteirão 
(Block Patrol Project) implemented by Governor Cid Gomes in Ceará, divided the capital city 
into 3-kilometer areas, and assigned special police officers to provide 24-hour patrols in these 
areas.  However, these efforts had minimal effect on crime with the state’s murder rate rising 
more than 44 percent during his tenure.   
 Wilson was unable to run for the governor’s office in the 2014 election, since he took 
control of the governorship in April 2010.46  In the 2014 elections, the PSB’s relationship with 
the PT broke down when the popular governor of Pernambuco, Eduardo Campos, launched his 
own presidential campaign in opposition to Dilma Rousseff’s reelection campaign.  In Piauí, 
Wilson and the PSB supported Moraes Souza Filho’s gubernatorial campaign.  However, he lost 
to Wellington Dias, who assumed his third mandate as governor.  Since taking office, Dias has 
had mixed success addressing security problems with violence declining in 2015 and 2017 but 
rising in 2016.    
 In summary, Piauí challenges the traditional view that conservative parties focus on law 
enforcement while leftist parties focus on education.  Despite having strong conservative parties 
                                                     
46 Vice-governors who take over the office of governor for six months before the election are only eligible to run for 
one additional term since the federal constitution classifies them as having already been governor for one term.    
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competing for the governorship and a growing budget throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
state only moderately increased per capita spending on law enforcement.  Moreover, most of the 
increase in the state’s law enforcement spending was due to a police strike during the tenure of 
centrist governor Francisco Moraes Souza, rather than a concerted effort by the government to 
address security problems.   
 The lack of spending on law enforcement supports the theory that right governors and 
centrist governors will not focus on these issues when they face each other, since it is more 
difficult to use the issue to distinguish themselves from their competitors.  Similarly, when the 
left took power, they faced strong competition from the right, also making it less politically 
useful to focus on law enforcement.  It is not surprising, therefore, that security spending 
dropped under the state’s leftist governors while in Ceará, where leftist governors faced 
competition from the center, it increased. 
3.6 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter focused on how political ideology, political competition and career interests 
influence spending on crime control policies.  Although governors from left and right political 
parties advocate different policies to reduce crime and violence during electoral campaigns, 
when they are in office, they implement these policies only under select circumstances.  While 
governors from right political parties have a reputation for being tough on crime, they do not 
spend more on the judiciary and only spend more than left parties do on law enforcement when 
they face competition from left parties.  I also do not find evidence that left parties focus on 
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addressing the underlying socioeconomic causes of crime by allocating more resources to 
education, despite popular belief that they take this differing approach to public security.    
 These findings are contrary to the extant research on crime and politics and have two 
important implications for the study of public security.  First, they show the benefit of testing 
broad theoretical arguments across different socioeconomic and political context.  Most research 
on politicians’ responses to public security problems focuses on Western democracies.  The 
majority of these countries, however, already have low and declining crime rates.  This situation 
may allow left and right parties to implement different policies to address public security 
problems since citizens have a lower probability of being a victim of crime or violence.  
However, in countries where there are high levels of violence and crime victimization, political 
necessity may force politicians from across the ideological spectrum to take a tough on crime 
stance, which primarily involves using law enforcement to make people feel safe. 
 Second, it shows the importance of taking a more comprehensive view of public security.  
The few studies that examine public security policy in developing countries rely primarily on 
qualitative evidence and survey data that cover only a short time period (Chevigny 2005; 
Holland 2013).  While they show that parties advocate different approaches to security in their 
discourse and even at times in their behavior, they do not allow us to see whether parties 
systematically differ in the policies the implement over long periods.  This chapter shows that 
there are discrepancies between discourse and practices.  Leftist parties often adopt tough-on-
crime policies to make citizens feel safer rather than addressing the underlying causes of crime 
and violence (Swimmer 1974; Fox 1979; Greenberg and Kessler 1982; Loftin and McDowall 
1982; Chamlin and Langworthy 1996; Pratt and Cullen 2005; Dammert 2012).  Right parties, in 
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contrast, seem to rely on their reputation for being tough on crime while only devoting more 
resources to law enforcement when it distinguishes them from their political competition.   
 In the next chapter, I address the logical question that arises from the study of state 
budgets.  How do states decide to distribute their limited law enforcement resources?  This 
question is central to my theory and addresses the key assertion made in this chapter that 
governors spend more on law enforcement because they can distribute these resources to their 
supporters.  Using a novel dataset gathered from local sources during my fieldwork in Brazil, I 
examine how states use political and technical factors to decide the number of police officers that 
cities will receive.   
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4. CHAPTER 4: POLITICS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POLICE OFFICERS  
How does politics influence the distribution of public security resources?  In the last chapter, I 
examined state budgets and showed that electoral competition influenced the resources 
governors allocate to law enforcement.  In this chapter, I turn to the issue of how governors 
utilize their existing public security resources.  Given the benefits of controlling the state 
executive, governors have an incentive to provide high levels of public security.  Like all 
politicians, however, governors face budgetary and constitutional constraints that limit the 
number of police officers they can hire (Jackson and Carroll 1981; McDowall and Loftin 1986). 
 A technical approach to public security suggests that governors should distribute police 
officers using criteria that minimize crime (Becker 1968).  However, research from both the 
United States (Smith 1933) and South Africa (Fourchard 2012) suggests that the provision of 
public security can be an important electoral tool for political parties.  In this chapter, I examine 
how governors’ electoral interests, as well as the interests of their allies in state and local 
government, affect the number of police officers that cities receive.   
 Using electoral and police distribution data from the state of Minas Gerais between 2007 
and 2015, I show that governors distribute police officers based on a municipality’s importance 
for their electoral success.  More specifically, the larger the portion of their statewide votes that 
come from the city, the more police officers the city receives.  I also demonstrate that governors 
support allied mayors and state deputies by providing more police officers in cities where they 
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do well.  This support, however, is conditional.  Governors provide more police officers to local 
political allies only in the largest cities where they also garner a large portion of their statewide 
votes.  Finally, contrary to expectations, there is no evidence that governors attempt to avoid 
crime spillover into neighboring municipalities by providing them with more police officers.    
 This chapter proceeds as follows.  In the first section, I examine the extant literature on 
resource distribution and the recent evidence examining how politics influence governments’ 
security policies.  I also discuss the importance of considering spatial spillover effects when 
analyzing how the government allocates law enforcement resources.  In the second section, I 
discuss why governors have incentives to provide more police officers to cities that support their 
political allies.  In the third section, I examine how local political dynamics influence the 
government’s decisions about how to allocate law enforcement resources.  The fourth section 
provides the empirical models and analysis.  The final section concludes with a discussion of the 
chapter’s broader significance for the study of public security and distributive politics. 
4.1 RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION 
The influence of politics on public security has long been an important issue.  Smith (1933) 
argues that beginning in the Colonial Era, the decentralization of law enforcement in the United 
States allowed local political actors to capture and use these agencies for personal and political 
gain.  Individuals would appeal to political parties to avoid prosecution for crimes while business 
owners deployed the police against competitors.  Fourchard’s (2012) recent analysis of public 
security in South Africa shows that providing security through neighborhood watch and vigilante 
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groups is an important electoral strategy for political parties.  In recent years, there has been 
growing interest in how politics influences the distribution of police resources.   
 A technical approach to policing involves the government distributing police officers 
based on criteria designed to minimize crime rates (Becker 1968).  Using this approach, high 
crime areas and those that are at risk for violence will receive the most resources.  A growing 
body of research suggests, however, that governments often deviate from this strategy and allow 
politics to play a central role in determining when and where the government provides security.  
Wilkinson’s (2004) seminal work examines the relationship between ethnic violence and 
electoral competition in India.  He shows that the government sends police and military forces to 
prevent violence toward ethnic minority groups when they support the ruling party or its allies 
and when electoral competition increases the possibility that they will have to negotiate with 
them later.  In contrast, when minority groups support opposition parties, the government allows 
the violence to go unchecked and even escalates it in an effort to bolster support among its core 
supporters.  Studies from across Latin America provide similar evidence.   
 Auyero (2006) examines supermarket looting in Argentina in 2001 and shows that 
implicit signals from local Justicialist Party leaders and the police influenced which stores the 
public looted.  The police provided security for large, foreign supermarkets while the party 
directed the public away from smaller stores owned by party supporters.  Acemoglu, Robinson 
and Santos (2013) analyze the relationship between politics and paramilitary groups in 
Colombia.  They find that the federal government did not confront these groups in areas where 
they helped the president and his congressional allies by coercing voters who otherwise would 
have supported leftist candidates.  Trejo and Ley (2016) scrutinize how partisan politics affected 
the distribution of federal police in the context of Mexico’s drug war.  They argue that the 
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federal government’s strategic actions explain differences in violence across states and 
municipalities.  In states and municipalities governed by copartisans, the government cooperated 
with subnational authorities on security policies, helping reduce crime rates.  In contrast, it 
unilaterally implemented security policies in areas dominates by leftist opposition parties in an 
effort to discredit them by increasing homicide rates.  
 Taken together, these studies show that governments foment or prevent violence in 
response to electoral interests although the causal mechanism varies.  In Argentina and India, 
politicians allowed violence and looting to go unchecked to bolster support and turnout among 
their core supporters.  Importantly, politicians in both countries ensured the safety of their own 
supporters and their financial interests while targeting opposition supporters.  In contrast, in 
Colombia and Mexico, the governments strategically allowed non-state actors to threaten or use 
violence to discredit opposition parties and coerce voters into supporting right parties.  
 Despite the argument that the federal government strategically allowed violence in an 
effort to influence vote choice in Mexico, it is unclear that voters actually blamed opposition 
governors and mayors for rising crime rates.  In 2012, the incumbent National Action Party 
(PAN) lost the presidency.  In addition, between 2007 and 2012, the PAN had a net loss of one 
governorship, thereby calling into question whether they were really attempting to discredit local 
opposition members by allowing violence to increase in these areas.  Meanwhile, in Colombia, 
paramilitary groups had a predisposition toward right candidates.  However, in countries not 
fighting political insurgencies, criminal groups and actors are less likely to have preexisting 
ideological positions.  Therefore, the extant literature still leaves unaddressed the issue of how 
political interests influence the distribution of police resources to address everyday crime. 
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4.1.1 The Politics of Resource Distribution 
The broad body of research on distributive politics suggests that electoral geography plays an 
important role in the distribution of government resources.  Cross-nationally, the spatial 
clustering of electoral support has been found to influence the location of infrastructure 
investment (Cadot et al. 2006), budgetary amendments (Lancaster 1986; Ames 2002; Samuels 
2003), disaster declarations (Reeves 2011; Gasper and Reeves 2011; Kriner and Reeves 2015) 
and federal spending (Berry, Burden and Howell 2010).  Put simply, politicians distribute 
resources to those areas that are important for their electoral success. 
 The literature, however, has largely overlooked the issue of whether law enforcement is 
another public good that politicians use to benefit their constituents.  The opaque nature of law 
enforcement data makes it especially vulnerable to political manipulation.  Across Brazil, most 
states do not have databases that track local crime rates.  When the data are available, the police 
are often unwilling to release it to the public or even to other law enforcement authorities.  In his 
autobiography, Rio de Janeiro’s former Secretary of Public Security, José Beltrame, said that he 
often had difficulty in obtaining basic information from local police commanders on the police 
battalion’s structure, the territory under their control, the population of low-income 
neighborhoods in their districts and crime rates (Beltrame 2014).  The lack of reliable crime data 
makes it easier for the government to use political factors when distributing law enforcement 
resources since critics will have greater difficulty demonstrating that the government is not 
following technical criteria. 
 State public security officials and politicians recognize that politics plays an important 
role in how the government distributes police officers across municipalities.  Beltrame put it as 
follows:  
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 Dialogue is important and I was always open to discussion. But I know that a 
 decision made only for politics has a great risk of being wrong. The criteria [used] for the 
 distribution of  military police battalions was essentially political. In the center of the city 
 [of Rio de Janeiro], there are five barracks. The ideal would be to reduce it to two units 
 and the neighborhood  would not be less secure (2014, 97).47 
 
Politicians and public security officials who I interviewed in Brazil echoed this statement.  In one 
state, the secretary of public security said that he regularly holds meetings with state deputies 
that include city council members and mayors.  During these meetings, they ask him to put more 
police officers in a particular area or to conduct an operation to reduce a particular type of crime.  
He said that this is not political interference but rather deputies representing their constituents’ 
interests and “the majority defend the interests of their electoral bases.”48 In another state in 
northeastern Brazil, high-level military police officials said that if the governor wanted 40 police 
officers in a small city, then the state would send 40 police officers there.49 
4.1.2 The Political Determinants of Resource Distribution 
While political considerations likely influence how governors distribute security resources, an 
important issue remains.  Which strategy do governors use to distribute these resources?  In this 
debate, two models loom large: the core constituency model and the swing voter model.  The 
core constituency model argues that politicians direct resources to loyal party voters.  As 
incumbents’ levels of risk aversion rise, they direct benefits to loyal coalition members to 
stabilize their support (Cox and McCubbins 1986).  Directing benefits to swing voters is a risky 
endeavor since these voters may not respond to these inducements.  As such, we would expect to 
find that governors will provide more resources to areas that give them more support.    
                                                     
47 Author’s translation from Portuguese text. I italicize the phrase for emphasis.   
48 Secretary of Public Security, Personal Interview, November 23, 2015.  
49 Military Police Officials, Personal Interview, February 27, 2016. 
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 The swing voter model of redistribution offers a competing strategy.  It argues that 
politicians should target undecided voters (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987).  When parties have 
loyal bases that are unlikely to defect to other parties, directing resources to those voters who 
they can persuade with particularistic benefits can help them to win the election.  This policy is 
most likely to be in place when voters are less ideological and more pragmatic (Dixit and 
Londregan 1996).   
 Scholars classify Brazil as a system where voters have low attachment to political parties 
(Ames 2002; Samuels 2003).  Although these scholars focus on legislative elections, there is no 
evidence that voters have high attachment to political parties in gubernatorial elections.  
Therefore, parties cannot count on continued voter support based only on their name.  Instead, 
they must provide particularistic benefits in exchange for electoral support.  Directing public 
security resources to those municipalities where they dominate the vote can help ensure that they 
will retain this electoral support.  This form of vote domination is most likely in less populous 
municipalities, making it seem likely that they will direct more law enforcement resources to 
these areas.      
 While governors may be able to dominate the vote in small municipalities, they must win 
a majority of vote statewide.  Although they may be unable to win an overwhelming majority of 
votes in more populous municipalities, these areas are more essential for their electoral success 
since they give the governor a large number of votes.  This suggests that governors have an 
incentive to provide more law enforcement resources to populous municipalities where they 
receive a large percentage of their total electoral support.  I expect, therefore, to find the 
following: 
H1: The larger the percentage of a governor’s total votes that comes from the municipality, the  
      more police officers the municipality will receive.  
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 Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provides visual support for this argument with data from 2007 in 
municipalities surrounding two of the state’s most important cities; Juiz de Fora and Belo 
Horizonte.  Both graphs show the number of police officers per 1000 residents using green 
circles, with larger circles indicating municipalities where there are fewer police officers per 
capita.  Governor Aécio Neves’ total statewide votes that came from each city is also shown 
using shades of red, with darker colors indicating that the city was more important for his 
electoral success.  The general pattern observed in both regions is that in municipalities where 
the governor receives more votes, there are fewer residents per police officer.  In Belo Horizonte, 
for example, there are approximately five police officers per 1000 residents, which is more than 
double the statewide average of 2.3 police officers for every 1000 residents.  
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Figure 4.1: Governor Support and Police Distribution in the Juiz de Fora region, 2007 
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Figure 4.2: Governor Support and Police Distribution in the Belo Horizonte region, 2007 
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 The expectation that governors provide more resources to areas that are more important 
for their electoral success must be understand in the context of the state’s fiscal environment.  As 
Table 4.1 shows, between 2007 and 2015, there were large changes in the number of military 
police officers in Minas Gerais.  In 2008, during Aécio Neves’s second administration (2007-
2010), the state lost more than 3500 police officers.  The following year, he reversed this trend 
hiring more than 4800 police officers.  Since then, however, the state has seen a slow decline in 
the number of police officers despite continued population growth.  By 2015, the state had 2774 
fewer police officers than it did in 2007, while also adding nearly 1.8 million residents.  Taking 
into account population growth and the decline in police officers, each police officer had 
responsibility for 506 people in 2015 but only 433 people in 2007.   
 
Table 4.1: Changes in Military Police Officers and Growth in State Debt, 2007-2015 
             
Year 
 
Police Officers 
 
Population 
 
Residents per Police 
Officer 
State Debt & Interest 
Payments 
     
2007 44,035 19,069,172 433 R$2,539,289,699 
2008 41,595 19,243,616 463 R$3,015,842,285 
2009 46,411 19,419,664 418 R$3,245,843,426 
2010 46,214 19,597,330 424 R$3,379,343,847 
2011 45,848 19,821,516 432 R$3,960,957,826 
2012 43,444 20,107,836 463 R$6,118,298,051 
2013 43,198 20,456,154 474 R$7,582,815,803 
2014 43,440 20,763,000 478 R$5,625,464,384 
2015 41,261 20,869,100 506 R$6,066,287,725 
     
  
 The exact reason for the decline in police officers is unknown.  It is likely, however, that 
the state’s debt problem is partially to blame.  In 2007, the state had approximately R$2.5 billion 
(US$758 million) in debt and interest payments.  By 2012, when the state experienced a large 
decline in police officers, these payments had increased to more than R$6 billion (US$1.8 
billion).  These debt and interests payments were largely beyond the governor’s control.  Out of 
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the R$6 billion in debt, R$5.8 billion came from loans that had been taken out in the 1990s.  
Forced to fulfill these debt payments, Governor Antônio Anastasia had fewer resources to devote 
to public security even if he wanted to address the problem. 
 The widespread loss of police officers in some years suggests that there are times when 
governors will have difficulty in providing more resources to their electoral bases, even though it 
would benefit them politically.  Put another way, while governors will try to take care of their 
supporters, their behavior will depend on available resources.  In years when the state sees a net 
gain in police officers, I expect more politically important municipalities to see an increase in 
police officers.  In contrast, in years when there is a decline in policing resources, I would expect 
these municipalities to have a net loss in police officers that is less extensive than it is in less 
politically important municipalities.   
4.1.3 The Spillover Effects of Law Enforcement Policies 
While politicians can benefit from distributing resources to politically important municipalities, 
the distributive politics literature has largely ignored the role of spillover effects.50  For 
politicians seeking to distribute resources for political gain, however, this is an important issue 
since many government resources have positive or negative influences on geographically 
adjacent areas as well.  For example, U.S. presidents use federal disaster declarations to bolster 
electoral support for themselves and members of their party in Congress (Gasper and Reeves 
2011; Reeves 2011; Kriner and Reeves 2015).  However, when the president declares a disaster 
                                                     
50 The exception to this rule is Ames (2002) who implicitly recognizes the role of spillover effects during elections 
for federal deputies in Brazil.  He argues that federal deputies whose support is concentrated in specific 
municipalities will file more budgetary amendments in an effort to stave off electoral competitors.  However, he 
does not show the impact that amendments directed to specific municipalities have on their electoral support in 
surrounding areas. 
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and provides funds to a particular county, workers in surrounding areas can also participate in the 
rebuilding efforts.  The positive economic benefits these funds generate for businesses and 
individuals in surrounding areas can lead to an increase in support for the president in these areas 
as well.  Failure to consider these spillover effects can lead to an underestimation of the true 
electoral benefits that these resources provide.      
 There are competing views on how law enforcement policies directed toward a specific 
geographical area will have on crime in surrounding areas.  Crime displacement theory argues 
that criminals are rational actors who migrate to surrounding areas when the area they are in 
receives more law enforcement resources (Teichman 2005).  The police’s main effect, therefore, 
is not to reduce crime but rather to move it to locations in other political jurisdictions and/or 
relocate crime to areas that are less visible to the public.  Crime diffusion theory, in contrast, 
argues that when an area receives more law enforcement resources, it causes a decline in crime.  
Moreover, since individuals are not fully rational, crime in surrounding areas will also decline 
since people overestimate the extent of the police’s presence.  There is mixed evidence to 
support both these theories.    
 The first effort at systematically analyzing spillover effects came in Hesseling’s (1994) 
review of 55 studies on crime prevention policies.  He finds that these policies led to crime 
displacement in 60 percent of the cases and diffusion in only 11 percent.  Guerette and Bowers’ 
(2009) more recent review of 102 studies provides contradictory results.  They show that crime 
displacement occurs only 23 percent of the time while crime diffusion occurs in 37 percent of the 
cases.  Other studies find that crime prevention efforts lead to similar levels of crime 
displacement and diffusion (Bowers et. al 2011; Johnson, Guerette and Bowers 2014).  However, 
many of these policy interventions focused on small areas such as districts, blocks and 
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neighborhoods.  Studies on aggregate level interventions at the city and state level find that 
rather than reducing crime, many crime prevention policies simply push crime into surrounding 
areas (Worrall and Gaines 2006; Gonzalez-Navarro 2013).   
 For politicians, the importance of these spillover effects depends on the structure of 
public security institutions.  In countries where authority over police agencies primarily rests 
with local government, politicians may implement public security policies without concern for 
the effect it will have on crime in surrounding areas.  Since these areas are outside their electoral 
district, a rise in crime will not reduce their electoral support.  Moreover, if voters benchmark 
and measure security in relation to neighboring areas, a rise in crime rates in surrounding areas 
may actually increase their electoral support since it shows that they are more competent in 
reducing crime than neighboring politicians.   
 In Brazil, however, there are no local police forces and governors control security 
throughout the state.51  This makes it more difficult for them to export the negative externalities 
that their public security policies generate.52  Therefore, when distributing public security 
resources for political gain, governors must take into account both how providing more law 
enforcement resources to a specific area will affect their electoral support in that area as well as 
the impact it will have on their support in surrounding areas.     
 If governors expect that providing more police officers to a municipality will reduce 
crime in surrounding areas, then there is unlikely to be a relationship between the number of 
police officers in a municipality and its neighbors.  Since security is improving in surrounding 
areas, they need not analyze whether they should provide more resources to surrounding cities.  
                                                     
51 Governors also control public security in other countries including Argentina and India.  
52 One way that they can avoid dealing with spillover effects is by increased policing on state borders.  A state 
deputy from Sergipe said that death squads regularly traverse state borders to avoid law enforcement (Personal 
Interview, Sergipe, May 18, 2016). 
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However, if they expect that crime will diffuse to surrounding locations, then they may seek to 
prevent this negative spillover by providing more police officers to surrounding areas as well.  
Given the uncertainty of whether crime displacement occurs, I expect that governors will err on 
the side of caution and try to avoid the movement of crime across municipal borders by also 
providing more police officers to surrounding areas.   
H2: The higher the percentage of a governor’s total votes that comes from the municipality, the  
      more police officers that surrounding municipalities will receive. 
4.2 STATE POLITICAL ALLIES AND PARTISANSHIP 
While governors in Brazil seek reelection, they must work with allies in the state and municipal 
governments to achieve career and political goals.  There are strong links between local 
politicians and the governor who controls the resources they need to survive (Abrucio 1998; 
Samuels 2003).  While most research focuses on local politicians’ efforts to obtain state financial 
resources for specific municipalities, public security resources are also a valuable asset.  Brazil 
elects mayors to control the municipal government.  Given the importance of public security for 
voters, governors can use law enforcement as a tool to influence municipal elections (Trejo and 
Ley 2016).  By providing more police officers to municipalities governed by mayors from the 
same or allied parties, governors may be able to reduce crime and increase support for local 
electoral allies.  These allies, in turn, can help support the governor’s political agenda and 
reelection efforts.  In contrast, providing fewer police officers to cities controlled by opposition 
parties can lead to higher crime rates and make it more likely that gubernatorial allies will be 
able to win control of local government.       
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 Each state also elects state deputies using an open-list proportional representation system 
with the entire state serving as a district.  For many state deputies, public security is an important 
issue.  Between July 2015 and June 2016, I interviewed 121 state deputies from 25 political 
parties in six states across Brazil.53 During these interviews, I asked them whether security was 
an important electoral issue and what policies voters demanded to address public security 
problems.  As Table 4.2 shows, more than 80 percent of deputies said that it was an important 
electoral issue.  In addition, 83 percent said that voters asked for law enforcement resources or a 
combination of law enforcement resources and social policies to reduce crime.  These demands 
from voters have led deputies from across the ideological spectrum to take an interest in public 
security even though they do not directly control it.   
Table 4.2: Public Security as an Electoral Issue and Voters’ Policy Demands  
 
State                                                               Important Issue                                         Policy Wanted 
 
 Yes No 
Law  
Enforcement 
Social 
Policies Both 
      
Bahia 16 5 15 2 1 
Paraná 25 5 17 2 7 
Pernambuco 19 4 10 6 0 
Rio de Janeiro 15 6 9 2 4 
Rio Grande do Norte 9 0 4 1 2 
Sergipe 5 0 3 1 0 
      
Total 82% 18% 67% 16% 16% 
Source: Author’s Interviews, August 2015-July 2016 
  
 With voters regularly requesting more police officers to deal with crime, I also asked 
deputies what factors influence how the government distribute law enforcement resources.  As 
Table 4.3 shows, almost 40 percent of deputies thought that politics or a combination of politics 
                                                     
53 Bahia, Paraná, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Norte and Sergipe. 
154 
 
and other factors influenced how the government distributes resources.  In Paraná, one deputy 
said that the governor helps those who help him the most.  However, she admitted that this is a 
common strategy for all politicians, saying that if she received 5000 votes from a city but not its 
sister city, she would direct more police officers to the city that supported her.54  Another deputy 
in Paraná said that deputies with links to the governor receive more support than areas that have 
deputies from other parties.55    
 
Table 4.3: Factors State Deputies Believe Influence the Distribution of Police Officers 
              
 
Bahia 
 
Paraná 
 
Pernambuco 
 
Rio de Janeiro 
 
Rio Grande do 
Norte 
Sergipe 
 
       
Politics 2 2 2 1 0 0 
Politics/Other Factors 4 12 4 5 2 2 
Technical Criteria 3 7 0 2 1 2 
Lack of Resources/Planning 11 7 7 0 5 1 
Wealth/Media Visibility 1 0 1 11 0 0 
Source: Authors’ Interviews, August 2015-July 2016 
 
 Given the research from Colombia (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos 2013) and Mexico 
(Trejo and Leyes 2016), as well as my qualitative research in Brazil, I expect to find the 
following. 
H3: The greater support a municipality gives to state deputies allied with the governor, the more  
      police officers it will receive.    
 
H4: Municipalities with allied mayors will receive more police officers than municipalities  
      with mayors from opposition parties.      
                                                     
54 State Deputy, Personal Interview, Paraná, November 9, 2015 
55 State Deputy, Personal Interview, Paraná, November 24, 2015 
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4.3 DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
To test the strategies that governors may use to distribute law enforcement resources, I requested 
data on the number of police officers from all 26 states and the Federal District.  Twenty-five 
states and the Federal District either ignored the requests or denied access to the data based on 
provisions within the country’s open access law that allows them to withhold data that pose a 
risk to the lives or security of the state’s population or its institutions.56  In Minas Gerais, 
however, the government released a web portal containing information on the distribution of 
police officers between 2007 and 2015.  With 853 municipalities and more than 20 million 
residents, the state provides ample variation in political and electoral dynamics to test the 
arguments. 
 Minas Gerais is a tough case for the theory.  Given the ready availability of data on 
policing, distortions from technical criteria are more readily transparent, making it easier for 
critics to attack the government.  This transparency reduces the government’s incentives to 
manipulate policing for political purposes.  The state also has a reputation for having the 
country’s most efficient bureaucracy, one that is likely to be more vigilant at minimizing 
political distortions in the distribution of police officers.  Table 4.4 includes summary statistics 
for all model covariates.   
 
 
 
                                                     
56 During fieldwork in Brazil, I made contact with officials in the secretary of public security in Paraná and 
Pernambuco who indicated that they would provide me with the data.  However, when I emailed them reminders, 
one official ignored my emails and the second one told me that the secretary of public security does not have the 
data.  Instead, it rests with the military police who are unwilling to provide it.   
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics, 2007-2015 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
Police Officers 51.92 448 0 13,688 
Governor Vote Dominance 70.18 14.22 14.06 95.83 
Governor Personal Share 0.12 0.53 0.005 15.09 
Deputy Vote Dominance 55.09 22.17 1.74 97.87 
Coalition Party Mayor 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Homicide Rate 10.99 15.17 0 121.83 
Homicides 4.9 36.02 0 1201 
Population Density 66 319 1 7578 
Population 23,224 94,758 814 2,493,906 
Infant Mortality Rate 13.9 14.1 0 176.5 
Bolsa Família 1315 3061 31 72,849 
N=7677         
     
  
  
 I measure the dependent variable, the distribution of security resources, using the total 
quantity of military police officers in the municipality.  In Figure 4.1, I map the number of 
people that each municipality requires to have a single police officer.  While Minas Gerais has an 
average of one officer for every 478 residents in 2014, the city of Marliéria, which is located in 
the center of the state, has 26 police officers for only 4,128 residents.  In contrast, in Carmo de 
Rio Claro, which is located in the state’s south region, there are only four police officers to 
provide security for 21,293 residents.  These differences suggest that the government is 
distributing police officers based on other factors besides population size. 
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 _____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 4.3: Residents per Military Police Officer, 2014 
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4.3.1 Primary Independent Variables 
I measure the governor’s vote dominance using the percentage of the municipality’s valid votes 
that the governor received in the first round of the last election.57 Meanwhile, deputy vote 
dominance indicates the percentage of valid votes received by state deputies and political parties 
that supported the governor during the last election.  I calculate both variables using Ames’s 
(2002) formula:   
 Vote Dominance = (Votes Received in Municipality/Total Valid Votes Cast in   
           Municipality) x 100   
 
Across the three elections, governors won an average of 72 percent of the valid votes in all 
municipalities while their political allies in the state legislature won 59 percent.     
 Personal vote share measures the importance of the municipality for the governor’s 
electoral success.  I calculate it using the following formula:   
 Personal Share = (Winning Governor’s Votes Received in Municipality/Total Votes  
        Received by the Winning Governor) x 100.  
 
The average personal vote share received from each municipality is only .05 percent while the 
maximum amount is 14.2.  Finally, mayor is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
mayor is from a party in the governor’s electoral coalition.58   
4.3.2  Technical Determinants of Policing 
Minas Gerais does not provide the technical criteria it uses to distribute police officers.  
However, in 1983 the country’s military government issued a decree that lists the following 
                                                     
57 Gubernatorial elections in Brazil require that the winning candidate receive at least 50 percent of valid votes cast. 
If no candidate reaches this threshold during the first round of voting, then there is a runoff election between the top 
two candidates. 
58 I also tested my models using only mayors from the governor’s party and obtained similar results. 
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factors as determinants of the distribution of police: socioeconomic conditions, crime rates, 
demographic changes, territorial size, the recruitment and formation capacity of military police 
cadets and “other” factors established by the military government.59  Similarly, in 2009, Rio de 
Janeiro listed territorial size, violent crime rates, demographic factors and “peculiar situations” as 
factors influencing the distribution of military police forces in the state.60  Based on these 
documents, I include four technical factors that are likely to influence the distribution of public 
security resources. 
 The first factor is crime rates.  If the government is seeking to reduce crime to its minimal 
possible level, then it should target those municipalities with the highest crime rate.  In Brazil, 
many crimes, apart from homicides, either go unreported or suffer from a reporting bias where 
wealthier victims are more likely to report crime victimization than poorer victims (Caldeira 
2000, 112).  However, if public security officials are distributing police officers based on crime 
rates, then they may use these data even though they do not represent the true distribution of 
crime in the state.  I measure crime rates using the homicide rate per 10,000 residents along with 
the total number of homicides.  Homicide rates are the most reliable measure of crime and are 
highly correlated with other types of crime.  Meanwhile, regardless of population size, more 
homicides in an area lead to an increase in paperwork and other resources needed to investigate 
crime (Chamlin and Langworthy 1996).  To control for differences in the size of municipalities, I 
use the log value of both homicide rates and total homicides.61  
                                                     
59 Decree nº 88,777 from September 30, 1983.   
60 Annex II of Decree Nº 43,624 of May 31, 2012.  The annex specifically notes that the military police should not 
include management, support staff and specialized units when making these calculations.  The decree indicates that 
three factors should be weighted as follow: population size (73%), violent crime rate (15%) and territorial size 
(12%).  
61 Note: Since some municipalities have zero homicides or violent crimes, I add 1 to the log value to avoid losing 
these observations.    
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 The second factor is population size.  Studies show that cities with larger populations 
tend to have higher crime rates due to factors including lower social capital and larger transient 
populations (see Rotolo and Tittle [2006] for an overview).  Meanwhile, the influence of 
population density on crime rates is highly debated (Harries 2006).  Some research finds that 
higher population density increases crime rates while others find that it has either no or a 
negative effect on them.  While I am agnostic about the impact that population growth and a 
higher population density will have on crime rates, I expect that both factors will influence the 
distribution of police officers in the state.  Therefore, I include population density as well as the 
log of population size in the model. 
 The final technical factor is poverty rates.  Sociological theories of crime argue that 
income inequality is a key factor influencing spending on public security (Liska et al. 1985; 
Stucky 2005, 24).  Rising levels of low-income individuals lead wealthier segments of society to 
feel more insecure.  In turn, these individuals demand that the government provide a greater 
police presence to assuage these fears.  Alternatively, rational-choice theory suggests that 
individuals living in poverty have stronger incentive to engage in crime since it provides them 
with higher economic benefits relative to other opportunities (Becker 1968).  I include two 
proxies for poverty.  The first is the infant death rate per thousand live births, and the second, 
Bolsa Familía, is the total number of families that receive Bolsa Familía.  The latter is a national 
social program that provides monthly stipends to low-income families.  The expectation is that 
increases in both the number of infant deaths and the number of families receiving assistance 
from social programs will lead the municipality to gain more police officers.  I use the log value 
of both variables to control for differences in municipal size.    
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4.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 
To test these arguments, I begin with a yearly analysis of the data, using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression.  In this initial analysis, I examine how yearly changes in technical covariates 
along with the level of the political covariates affects the changes in the number of police 
officers assigned to each municipality.62  Examining the data year by year, helps identify patterns 
in the distribution of police that pooling the data together may miss.  It also highlights how 
governors may alter their resource distribution strategies throughout their four year term.    
 As Table 4.5 shows, governors do not reward those municipalities that are more 
important for their electoral success in every year.63  In some years, these municipalities actually 
see a decrease in the number of police officers that they receive compared to municipalities that 
gave less support for the governor.  However, an important pattern emerges.  In both 2009 and 
2013, which are pre-election years, municipalities that were more important for the governor’s 
electoral success received more police officers.  The increase in 2013 is especially interesting 
since there was a statewide decline of 246 police officers that year, suggesting that Governor 
Antônio Anastasia shifted police officers from other municipalities to reward his supporters.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
62 I measure changes using the following formula: covariatet-covariatet-1. I do not include the technical covariates in 
the subsequent table but full models are available in the chapter appendix.  
63 I do not show the technical covariates in the table although I do include them in all models.  
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Table 4.5: Impact of Politics on Municipal Police Officers, Yearly Analysis 
           
Year 
 
Police Officer 
Change 
Personal Vote  
Share 
Governor Vote  
Dominance 
Allied Mayor 
 
State Deputy 
Dominance 
 
 
    
2008 -2440 -135.16*** -0.03 0.02 -0.03 
2009 +4816 251.52*** 0.11 4.12* 0.01 
2010 -197 -20.55*** 0.02 -2.22 0.06 
2011 -366 -2.75 -0.02 1.54+ 0.01 
2012 -2404 -142.90*** 0.16*** -3.01*** -0.05** 
2013 -246 132.0*** -0.11*** 0.39 0.04** 
2014 +242 4.36 0.01 0.07 -0.002 
2015 -2179 -146.87*** 0.21*** 0.53 0.04+ 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
  
 Among the other political variables, the results differ depending on the year.  In some 
years, municipalities with allied mayors and those where the governor and his state political 
allies more strongly dominate voting, receive more police officers.  In other years, however, 
there is no effect or a small decline in police officers.  Further investigation reveals that 
governors are willing to give more police officers to municipalities that have allied mayors and 
give more support to their state political allies.  However, their largesse depends on the 
municipality’s importance for their personal electoral success.  
 Tables 4.6 and 4.7 highlight the average change in the number of police officers present 
in each municipality, dividing municipalities based on whether they gave the governor a low, 
average and high share of his total statewide votes.64  Table 4.6 compares changes in police 
                                                     
64 On average, governors received 0.12 percent of their total votes from a municipality with a standard deviation of 
0.52.  Therefore, I classified a municipality as giving the governor a low vote share if it contributed less than 0.6 
percent and high vote share as a standard deviation above the mean personal share (0.64 percent).   
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officers in municipalities controlled by allied and opposition mayors, while Table 4.7 compares 
municipalities with low, average and high levels of vote dominance by allied state deputies.65  In 
areas with low or average electoral importance for the governor, there are minimal differences in 
the number of police officers that municipalities with allied mayors received, compared to those 
municipalities controlled by opposition party mayors.  Similarly, greater municipal support for 
allied deputies does not appear to influence the number of police officers these cities receive.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
65 I classify municipal vote dominance as follows: low (more than a standard deviation below the mean), average 
(within a standard deviation of the mean) and high (more than a standard deviation above the mean). 
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Table 4.6: Governor Support, Mayors and Changes in Police Officers 
            
Year Mayor Status State Police Officer Change Governor Personal Share (%) 
   Low Votes Average Votes High Votes 
   <0.06  >0.64 
      
      
2008 Overall -2440 -0.5 -0.60 -115.1 
 Allied Mayor  -0.5 -0.90  -1.5 
 Opposition Mayor  -0.4  +0.09 -410.4 
      
2009 Overall +4816 -0.02 +2.6 +226.4 
 Allied Mayor  +0.04 +2.3 +380 
 Opposition Mayor  -0.07 +2.9 +34.4 
      
2010 Overall -197 +0.9 +1.1 -57.7 
 Allied Mayor  +1.0 +0.5 -98.5 
 Opposition Mayor  +0.9 +1.7 -6.8 
      
2011 Overall -366 +0.5 +0.3 -36.2 
 Allied Mayor  +0.5 +0.7 -19.4 
 Opposition Mayor  +0.5 -0.4 -56.8 
      
2012 Overall -2404 -0.4 -1.7 -84.5 
 Allied Mayor  -0.4 -2.0 -151.6 
 Opposition Mayor  -0.5 -1.2 -2.3 
      
2013 Overall -246 -0.7 -2.3 +39.1 
 Allied Mayor  -0.6 -2.3 +134.9 
 Opposition Mayor  -0.7 -2.5 -12.5 
      
2014 Overall +242 +0.3 +0.1 +2.1 
 Allied Mayor  +0.3 +0.2 +8.1 
 Opposition Mayor  +0.4 -0.1 -1.2 
      
2015 Overall -2179 -0.2 -0.3 -104.2 
 Allied Mayor   -0.2 +2.3 -50.1 
  Opposition Mayor  -0.2 -1.3 -152.3 
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Table 4.7: Governor Support, Allied State Deputy Support, and Changes in Police Officers 
           
Year Deputy Dominance Police Officer Change Governor Personal Share 
   Low Votes Average Votes High 
      
2008 Low Dominance -2440 -0.6 -0.5 -43.0 
 Average Dominance  -0.4 -0.5 -132.3 
 High Dominance  -0.6 -0.7 -1.0 
      
2009 Low Dominance 4816 -0.3 +9.3 +81.0 
 Average Dominance  0 +2.3 +261.1 
 High Dominance  +0.09 -1.7 -15.5 
      
2010 Low Dominance -197 +0.9 -4.7 -115 
 Average Dominance  +1.0 +1.6 -54.3 
 High Dominance  +0.8 +4.2 +6.0 
      
2011 Low Dominance -366 +0.3 +2.3 -57.8 
 Average Dominance  +0.6 -0.3 -29.0 
 High Dominance  +0.4 0.7 -- 
      
2012 Low Dominance -2404 -0.5 -2.7 -15.2 
 Average Dominance  -0.5 -1.2 -107.5 
 High Dominance  -0.4 -2.7 -- 
      
2013 Low Dominance -246 -0.6 -1.9 +3.0 
 Average Dominance  -0.7 -2.2 +51.1 
 High Dominance  -0.6 -3.5 -- 
      
2014 Low Dominance 242 +0.3 +1.0 -1.6 
 Average Dominance  +0.3 -0.2 +3.3 
 High Dominance  +0.4 +0.6 -- 
      
2015 Low Dominance -2179 -0.2 -1.1 -161.3 
 Average Dominance  -0.3 +1.0 -40.8 
 High Dominance  -0.5 --- -- 
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 The results differ greatly in large municipalities where the governor receives a high share 
of total statewide votes.  This group contains between 18 and 20 municipalities, or about 2 
percent of all municipalities statewide, across the three election cycles.  However, they 
collectively account for between 36 and 40 percent of governors’ statewide votes.  Among these 
municipalities, those that gave more support to the governor’s allies in the state legislature or had 
a mayor from the governor’s electoral coalition received more police officers in most years when 
the state increased the size of its police force.  Meanwhile, in most years when the police force 
shrank, municipalities that gave less support to allied state deputies, as well as those controlled 
by opposition mayors, saw a greater loss in police officers.    
 Taken together, the initial evidence suggests that the distribution of law enforcement 
officers across the state follows a two-stage logic.  Governors first seek to take care of their 
electoral bases.  As a result, they distribute police officers to municipalities based on their 
importance for their electoral success.  In distributing resources, however, they also recognize 
that building bases of support for future electoral cycles or their state policy proposals, requires 
helping their allies.  This, in turn, leads them to try to maximize the political effectiveness of 
their resources, by focusing more strongly on large municipalities that are important for both 
their electoral success as well as the electoral success of their local political allies.   
4.4.1 A Panel Analysis of Police Distribution 
Since I have data across multiple years, I more systematically test these arguments using both 
fixed effects panel models and Arellano-Bond models.  The fixed effects panel models show 
how changes in political and technical factors influence changes in the number of police officers 
that a municipality receives while controlling for unobservable fixed factors that cause it to have, 
on average, more or fewer police officers.  Meanwhile, the Arellano-Bond model controls for 
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temporal dependences in the model by using lags of the difference term as an instrument for the 
lagged dependent variable.  Put more simply, it accounts for the fact that the number of police 
officers a city has in year t is likely to be highly dependent on the number of officers it had in 
year t-1.  
 In Model 1, I look only at how political and technical factors influence changes in the 
number of municipal polices officers across all year using the fixed effects method.  In Model 2, 
I interact the political covariates with dichotomous variables indicating whether it is the year 
prior to a mayoral or gubernatorial election, when we would expect the manipulation of policing 
for political purposes to occur most strongly.  Model 3 is the same as Model 2, except that I use 
the Arellano-Bond estimation method.  Finally, in Model 4, I test whether the governors 
systematically target the largest cities where they receive widespread support and allied mayors 
are in power.  In all models, I include time dummies to control for unobservable factors in each 
year.  In some models, I exclude the capital city of Belo Horizonte since it has more than seven 
times the number of police officers than the next largest city.   
    As Table 4.8 shows, the results largely conform to expectations.  In all models that 
include the capital city of Belo Horizonte, municipalities that are more important for the 
governor’s electoral success receive more police officers.  The larger the share of the governor’s 
statewide votes that comes from a municipality, the more police officers the city receives.  
Moreover, the politicized distribution of law enforcement resources is even stronger in the year 
prior to the election.  Delving deeper into the data, the evidence suggests that one group of 
municipalities is driving these results: large municipalities with coalition party mayors.    
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Table 4.8: Politics and Changes in Municipal Police Officers, 2007-2015 
              
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
w/capital 
city  
w/capital 
city 
w/capital 
city 
w/capital 
city 
w/o capital 
city 
w/o capital 
city 
w/o capital 
city 
w/o capital 
city 
   
  
  
  
Police Officers (t-1)   0.27    0.52***  
   (0.21)    (0.11)  
Governor Personal Share 280.0*** 240.0*** 235.1*** -57.98 0.837 5.852 -33.38 8.06 
 (71.12) (55.36) (19.62) (71.67) (45.34) (44.79) (18.56) (51.33) 
Governor Personal Share  53.61*** 85.71**   22.35** 19.34  
x Pre-Election Year  (3.438) (31.86)   (8.492) (12.50)  
Governor Dominance -0.35*** -0.31*** -.248*** 0.040 0.00553 -0.00551 0.0444* -0.002 
 (0.0910) (0.0692) (0.0265) (0.08) (0.0536) (0.0534) (0.0197) (0.58) 
Governor Dominance   0.0434 0.0082   0.0127 -0.180  
x Pre-Election Year  (0.0301) (0.0352)   (0.0275) (0.0264)  
Deputy Dominance -0.0444* -0.0351* -0.0126  -0.0374* -0.0288* -0.0051 -0.04* 
 (0.0212) (0.0174) (0.0143)  (0.0157) (0.0135) (0.0107) (0.02) 
Deputy Dominance  0.00622 0.0383 -0.03  -0.0274 0.0457  
x Pre-Election Year  (0.0214) (0.0385) (0.02)  (0.0190) (0.0236)  
Allied Mayor 1.420 2.102 0.502 -9.32*** -0.0652 0.223 0.243 0.44 
 (1.761) (1.996) (0.478) (2.09) (0.513) (0.735) (0.324) (1.07) 
Allied Mayor x  -2.369 -0.504   -0.635 0.0195  
Pre-Mayor Election Year  (1.830) (0.630)   (0.826) (0.450)  
Pre-Election Year   -9.94***    -1.775   
  (2.222)    (1.880)   
Pre-Mayor Election Year  -5.79***    -1.326   
  (1.047)    (0.900)   
Allied Mayor x Governor    88.10***    -4.71 
Personal Share    (20.14)    (13.85) 
Homicide Rate (log) -0.0576 -0.0541 0.0442 -0.18 -0.0498 -0.0568 -0.0331 -0.05 
 (0.0778) (0.0838) (0.120) (0.12) (0.0746) (0.0749) (0.0783) (0.07) 
Homicides (log) 0.262 0.193 -0.0812 0.62 0.0629 0.0690 0.0943 0.06 
 (0.533) (0.553) (0.588) (0.63) (0.516) (0.510) (0.373) (0.52) 
Population Density -0.341** -0.368** -0.368*** -0.71 -0.274 -0.276 -0.130 -0.27 
 (0.116) (0.114) (0.107) (0.40) (0.162) (0.162) (0.194) (0.16) 
Population Growth (log) 15.20 19.89 20.83 93.62 21.45 21.00 11.92 20.25 
 (16.98) (15.90) (14.35) (54.46) (19.83) (19.82) (15.96) (17.69) 
Infant Mort. Rate (log) 0.0478 0.0216 0.0306 0.05 0.0440 0.0293 0.0144 0.04 
 (0.0468) (0.0458) (0.0495) (0.05) (0.0319) (0.0300) (0.0277) (0.03) 
Bolsa Família (log) 1.457 0.478 -3.815 -1.14 2.034 1.754 -0.633 2.12 
 (1.642) (1.618) (2.532) (2.32) (1.787) (1.722) (1.675) (1.70) 
Constant -90.82 -117.2 -142.2 -754.27 -158.8 -151.3 -95.81 -148.56 
  (145.9) (138.0) (121.8) (464.55) (169.5) (169.7) (135.8) (151.15) 
N 7677 7677 5971 7677 7668 7668 5971 7668 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-Squared 0.1334 0.2548  0.3912 0.0527 0.0807  0.0538 
Between R-Squared 0.5196 0.2966  0.5431 0.0592 0.0472  0.0574 
Overall R-Squared 0.5116 0.2897  0.5273 0.0580 0.0458  0.0562 
* p<0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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 Model 4 highlights how changes in the governor’s personal vote shares influence the 
number of police officers a municipality receives when the mayor is from a coalition party or 
part of the opposition.  When an opposition mayor is in power, the share of the governor’s total 
votes coming from the municipality has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on the 
number of police officers that the city receives.  In contrast, when an allied mayor is in power, 
the municipality sees an increase in police officers but only in highly populous municipalities.  
 Figure 4.2 plots the expected change in police officers when increasing the governor’s 
vote share from its minimum (0.04) to its maximum (15) percentage.  In cities where an allied 
mayor is in power but the governor receives less than 0.2 percent of total statewide support 
(around 90 percent of all cities), support for the governor has no effect on the number of police 
officers that the city receives.  In the other 10 percent of cities, which hold approximately a third 
of the state’s total residents, greater support for the governor leads the city to receive more police 
officers.   
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Figure 4.4: Changes in Police Officers, Coalition Mayor in Power 
 When we exclude Belo Horizonte from the analysis, a more complex picture emerges.  In 
the models that take into account the number of policers officers present in the city in the prior 
year, the municipality’s voting behavior has no effect on the number of police officers the city 
receives.  In the fixed effects models, however, municipalities where the governor receives more 
support continue to receive more police officers but only in the year prior to the gubernatorial 
election.  In all other years, the municipality’s voting behavior in the last election has no impact 
on the number of police officers it receives.  Although the effect is more muted compared to the 
models including Belo Horizonte, it is still quite large.   
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 Consider the following example from the 2010 election.  That year, Antonio Anastasia 
won a decisive victory in the first round, receiving more than 62 percent of the popular vote, or 
6,275,520 total votes.  On average, we would expect a city to receive one police officer for each 
additional 2225 votes that Anastasia received above the votes received by his predecessor, Aécio 
Neves.  Abre Campo is a small city situated in western Minas Gerais that has approximately 14 
thousand residents.  During the 2010 elections, Anastasia received 1176 fewer votes from the 
municipality than his predecessor did.  In 2013, with the next election cycle closing in, the city 
lost one of its 18 police officers.   
 As I noted earlier, it is important to emphasize that when a municipality gives more 
support to the governor, it does not always lead it to obtain more security resources.  Between 
2009 and 2013, the state lost 2434 police officers outside the capital city and there was a decline 
in police officers in cities where the governor’s support both increased and decreased.  However, 
the decline in the number of police officers occurred at more than twice the rate in cities where 
Anastasia’s support declined compared to his predecessor, Aécio Neves.  The cities where his 
supported declined lost, on average, one police officer for every 5112 residents.  In contrast, 
cities where his support increased lost only one police officer for every 12,480 residents. 
 Table 4.9 highlights these effects in the six largest cities outside the capital that together 
have more than 2.91 million residents.  It shows changes in technical factors (homicides and 
municipal population) and the governor’s personal vote in 2013 compared to 2009, and their 
relationship with changes in the number of police officers assigned to these municipalities.  All 
six municipalities experienced population growth and five out of the six cities saw an increase in 
homicides.  By 2013, the three cities where support for the governor declined had 839 fewer 
police officers despite having almost 200 more homicides.  In contrast, among the three 
172 
 
municipalities where support for the governor increased, only Betim lost police officers.  
Interestingly, this is the only city where support for the governor increased while homicides 
declined.  In Montes Claros and Ribeirão das Neves, a rise in violence coincided with an increase 
in the number of police officers assigned to these cities.     
 
Table 4.9: Changes in Support for the Governor and Police Officers, 2009 & 2013 
          
 
Homicide  
Change 
Population  
Change 
Police Officers 
Change 
Personal Vote 
Share Change 
     
Uberlândia +33 +49,334 -263 -0.169 
Contagem +63 +36,973 -194 -0.107 
Juiz de Fora +100 +32,186 -382 -0.227 
Betim -13 +33,391 -90 +0.021 
Montes Claros +47 +27,219 +14 +0.044 
Ribeirão das Neves +72 +22,685 +15 +0.002 
     
 
 The other political factors conform to the theoretical expectations given the earlier 
evidence showing that governor’s focus their resources on the largest municipalities.  Cities that 
have mayors from allied parties and give more support for allied state deputies also do not 
receive more police officers even during election years.  This is unsurprising, given my earlier 
evidence that governors support these allies only in a small number of politically important 
cities.  Contrary to expectation, however, the stronger the governor’s electoral dominance in a 
municipality, the fewer police officers it receives.  I suspect that higher vote dominance reduces 
the number of police officers a city receives since governors most strongly dominate voting in 
smaller cities.  Although these areas more strongly support the governor, they have less electoral 
importance for the governor than large cities.  There is less evidence that governors distribute 
police forces using technical criteria.  Increasing population density leads to fewer police officers 
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in some models.  I also find higher homicide higher homicide rates lead municipalities to gain 
more officers while municipalities with a higher total number of homicides receive fewer 
officers.    
 Taken together, these findings suggest that when deciding which locations will receive 
more public security resources, the primary factor is the municipality’s importance for the 
governor’s electoral success.  Needing to win a majority of votes, governors send more resources 
to populous areas that support them.  Highlighting this bias in the distribution of law 
enforcement resources toward large areas, in 2010 there was an average of one military police 
officer for every 891 residents in Minas Gerais.  However, municipalities with more than 50 
thousand residents had an average of one officer for every 530 residents while those with less 
than 50 thousand residents had one officer for every 922 residents.   
 The emphasis on municipalities where large quantities of votes are available has 
important implications for public security.  In recent years, violence has begun to increasingly 
move away from large cities and into the interior of Brazilian states (Waiselfisz 2011; Steeves, 
Petterini and Moura 2015).  While some scholars have attributed this geographical shift to a 
growing market for illicit drugs, the lack of police officers in small towns may also play a role.  
If criminal groups know that they will face minimal interference from law enforcement in small 
and medium size municipalities, they will have a stronger incentive to operate there rather than 
in large cities.   
4.4.2 Voting Behavior and Resource Provision in Surrounding Areas 
I next test whether municipal voting behavior influences the number of police officers 
neighboring municipalities receive.  Traditional panel data models have the underlying 
assumption that units are independent.  That is, changes in the number of police officers and 
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covariates in one municipality do not affect changes in the number of police officers in 
neighboring municipalities and vice versa.  To test whether this assumption is violated and there 
is spatial autocorrelation in the distribution of police officers, I first calculate the Global Moran’s 
I score.   
 The Global Moran’s I score is a diagnostic test that shows the level of correlation 
between model covariates in neighboring units.  It ranges from -1, indicating perfect negative 
autocorrelation, to 1 which indicates perfect positive autocorrelation.  The closer to 0, the less 
spatial autocorrelation that exists.  Most studies of crime spillover that study areas larger than a 
street or census tract, focus on crime spillover into geographically contiguous political units such 
as counties or states (Worrall and Gaines 2006; Gonzalez-Navarro 2013).  Following this pattern, 
I use a first-order row-standardized queen spatial weight matrix.  This weight matrix defines a 
neighbor as any municipality sharing a boundary point with the municipality.     
 To calculate the spatial lag variable, each municipality lists every other municipality 
using a 0 to indicate that the municipality is not a neighbor or a 1 to indicate that it is a neighbor.  
Then, we add up the total number of neighbors and divide it by 1.  In each neighboring 
municipality, we then multiply this fraction by the variable value in each neighboring 
municipalities and sum their values.  The Moran’s I score then provides the correlation between 
that variable and the average value for its neighbors.  It ranges from -1, indicating perfect 
negative autocorrelation, to 1 which indicates perfect positive autocorrelation.  As Table 4.10 
shows, there is significant and positive spatial autocorrelation between the number of police 
officers in a municipality and its neighbors in every year.   
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Table 4.10: Quantity of Police Officers, Spatial Autocorrelation 
     
Year Moran's I P value 
   
2007 0.078 0.004 
2008 0.095 0.002 
2009 0.072 0.004 
2010 0.074 0.001 
2011 0.075 0.004 
2012 0.087 0.001 
2013 0.075 0.004 
2014 0.074 0.002 
2015 0.082 0.001 
   
 
 So in what areas is this spatial autocorrelation occurring?  In Figure 4.5, I use the local 
Moran’s I score to identify patterns of spatial autocorrelation in the distribution of police 
throughout the state.  The local Moran’s I score identifies municipalities that have fewer 
residents per police officer surrounded by municipalities that also have fewer residents per police 
officer (low-low spatial autocorrelation), as well as municipalities where there are fewer police 
officers per capita surrounded by municipalities where there are also fewer police officers per 
capita (high-high spatial autocorrelation).  In the northwestern region and the center region 
where the state capital, Belo Horizonte, is located, there are several clusters of low-low spatial 
autocorrelation, indicating an overabundance of police officers.  These areas were also, 
unsurprisingly, important for Governor Aécio Neves’ reelection in 2006.  In contrast, in the 
northeast region, where he received minimal electoral support, there is widespread high-high 
autocorrelation, indicating clusters of municipalities that had fewer police officers, surrounded 
by municipalities that also had fewer police officers.   
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Figure 4.5: Distribution of Police Officers and Personal Vote Share, 2007 
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 Given the apparent presence of spatial autocorrelation, I formally test the theoretical 
arguments using spatial panel models.  There are a several models to analyze spatial data and 
model choice depends on substantive and theoretical concerns.  Since I am interested in whether 
support for the governor and state political allies influences the number of police officers that 
surrounding municipalities receive, I use the spatial Durbin model (SDM).  This model estimates 
both the direct and indirect impact of all independent variables in the model as well as the overall 
correlation between dependent variables in neighboring municipalities.  The direct effect shows 
the impact that a unit change in the independent variables has on the dependent variable in our 
unit including any feedback effects.66  Meanwhile, the indirect effect shows the impact that 
changes in the independent variable in the municipality have on the number of police officers in 
neighboring municipalities including any feedback effects (Pace 2014).   
 In the spatial models, I could not remove the capital city of Belo Horizonte from the 
analysis in some models since spatial panel regression requires perfectly balanced data.  To 
address this issue, I included an interaction term between the governor’s personal vote share and 
a dummy variable for the capital city.  This strategy allows me to show the impact that increasing 
the governor’s personal vote share has on support both inside and outside the capital city.   
  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
66 Feedback effects occur when changes in the municipality’s independent variables affect its neighbors, which in 
turn has an effect on the original unit. 
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 As Table 4.11 shows, even controlling for spatial spillovers, the direct effect that state 
politics has on the number of police officers in the municipality remains largely the same 
compared to the fixed effects model.  Municipalities where governors receive a larger number of 
votes receive more police officers.  In contrast, increasing the governor or allied state deputies’ 
electoral domination in the municipality leads to a slight decline in the number of police officers 
that the municipality receives.67   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
67 Note: due to limitations in computing power, my models looking at the effect of voting for the governor outside of 
Bahia, only look at the governor’s personal vote share rather than simultaneously looking at how it affects support 
for allied deputies, coalition party mayors and the governor’s vote dominance.  
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Table 4.11: Politics and Changes in Police Officers in Neighboring Cities, 2007-2015 
 
          
 Regular Model Regular Model Pre-Election Pre-Election 
  w/o capital city Overall w/o capital city 
Spatially Lagged      
Dependent Variable     
Rho -0.0018 -0.0039 0.0054  
 (0.0074) (0.00639) (0.0108) 
 
Direct Effect     
Governor Personal Share 276.55*** -1.69 239.7*** 7.25 
 (68.60) (43.92) (51.29) (44.47) 
Governor Personal Share (in capital)  73.22***  59.82*** 
  (9.044)  (8.964) 
Governor Personal Share (in capital)   53.87*** 6.489*** 
x Pre-Election Year   (3.396) (1.490) 
Governor Personal Share (outside    23.76** 
capital) x Pre-Election Year    (7.455) 
Governor Vote Dominance  -0.3139 0.0114 -0.277*** 0.00764 
 (-0.0913) (0.049) (0.0691) (0.0528) 
Governor Vote Dominance   0.0582* 
 
x Pre-Election Year   (0.0254) 
 
Deputy Vote Dominance -0.0596 -0.0533* -0.0530* -0.0505** 
 (0.0276) (0.0225) (0.0232) (0.0180) 
Deputy Vote Dominance   0.00208 
 
x Pre-Election Year   (0.0318) 
 
Coalition Party Mayor 1.2786 1.309 2.130  
 (1.836) (1.830) (2.077) 
 
Coalition Party Mayor   -2.675 1.344 
x Pre-Election Year   (1.972) (1.566) 
Homicide Rate (log) -0.0905 -0.0411 -0.0782 -0.0521 
 (0.0880) (0.0707) (0.0798) (0.0754) 
Homicides 0.4251 -0.105 0.221 -0.0818 
 (0.5787) (0.469) (0.511) (0.527) 
Population Density -0.3528** -0.278* -0.389*** -0.314** 
 (0.1173) (0.114) (0.114) (0.116) 
Population (log) 11.096 17.40 16.44 20.31 
 (19.801) (18.67) (19.14) (17.95) 
Infant Mortality Rate (log) 0.0205 0.0433 0.00106 0.0312 
 (0.0398) (0.0353) (0.0410) (0.0354) 
Bolsa Familía (log) 0.9253 2.154 0.00493 0.976 
 (1.8884) (2.059) (1.832) (1.801) 
Indirect Effect    
 
Governor Personal Share -17.878 -10.38 -9.696  
 (13.574) (12.79) (10.79) 
 
Governor Personal Share   -5.431 
 
 x Pre-Election Year   (2.789) 
 
Governor Vote Dominance -0.1061 -0.0251 -0.110* -0.0389 
 (0.0619) (0.0428) (0.0506) (0.0414) 
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Table 4.11 (Continued)     
Governor Personal Share (in capital)  2.29  2.466 
 
 (2.748)  (2.304) 
Governor Personal Share (outside capital)  -9.208  -8.204 
 
 (13.551)  (11.29) 
Governor Personal Share x Pre-Election    -7.228* 
Year (outside Capital)    (3.432) 
Governor Personal Share    1.308 
x Pre-Election Year (in capital)    (0.681) 
Governor Vote Dominance   -0.0834 
 
x Pre-Election Year   (0.0501) 
 
Deputy Vote Dominance 0.0808* 0.0514 0.0735* 0.0496 
 (0.0382) (0.0362) (0.0336) (0.0342) 
Deputy Vote Dominance   0.0416 
 
x Pre-Election Year   (0.0660) 
 
Coalition Party Mayor -2.018 -1.147 0.424 -1.832 
 (1.9608) (2.016) (1.079) (2.441) 
Coalition Party Mayor   -6.881 
 
x Pre-Election Year   (4.861) 
 
Homicide Rate (log) -1.5899 -0.943 -1.947 -1.442 
 (1.0388) (0.914) (1.197) (1.223) 
Homicides 1.4003 1.10 1.851 1.744 
 (1.6469) (1.746) (1.844) (2.025) 
Population Density 0.1067 0.0988 0.141 0.133 
 (0.1070) (0.0976) (0.120) (0.101) 
Population (log) -12.7684 -7.424 -14.82 -8.628 
 (25.4152) (25.157) (27.84) (26.66) 
Infant Mortality Rate (log) 1.0215 0.877 0.706 0.633 
 (1.0285) (1.023) (0.620) (0.655) 
Bolsa Familía (log) 6.0947 3.381 5.991 4.106 
  (4.8987) (4.363) (4.709) (4.066) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Spatial Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 7677 7677 7677 7677 
Variance 1017 977 874 841 
Within R-Squared 0.1187 0.1660 0.2350 0.2815 
Between R-Squared 0.4817 0.7178 0.2343 0.5465 
Overall R-Squared 0.4731 0.7105 0.2281 0.5355 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001  
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 Turning attention to spillover effects, the municipality’s importance for the governor’s 
electoral success is the one factor that matters.  Its effect on the number of police officers that 
surrounding communities receive, however, is contrary to expectations.  The final model shows 
that in municipalities outside the capital city of Belo Horizonte, municipalities receive fewer 
police officers when their neighbors receive more police officers.  This affect is quite large.  For 
each additional 0.50 percent of the governor’s total votes that come from the municipality, 
neighboring municipalities collective lose around three police officers.   Put more simply, when 
governors use political criteria to send more police officers to a city, they do so at the expense of 
the municipality’s neighbors.  Rather than trying to reduce the negative impact of sending more 
police officers to a municipality for political purpose, the evidence suggests that the fight for 
police officers is a winner-takes-all battle.   
4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Public security is an important issue in Brazilian politics.  Between 1989 and 2015, the country 
lost more than 1.2 million people to criminal violence.  Despite the importance of security as an 
electoral issue, both in Brazil and cross-nationally, the role that politics plays in the distribution 
of public security resources has been largely unexplored.  My analysis used both traditional 
quantitative methods and spatial techniques to analyze how state politics influences the 
distribution of security resources.  I showed that governors provide more police officers to 
municipalities that are most important for their electoral success.  The extra resources these 
municipalities receive, however, come at the expense of their neighbors.  I also showed that 
governors reward municipalities that vote for their allies in state and municipal government with 
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more law enforcement resources.  However, these additional resources go only to the largest 
cities that governors with large quantities of votes that make them crucial for their electoral 
success.  
 From a thematic standpoint, this chapter contributes to our understanding of distributive 
politics at the subnational level in Brazil.  While there is broad evidence that Brazilian governors 
have vast power and governorships are a key prize for ambitious politicians, we know much less 
about the strategies they use to reward their supporters (Abrucio 1998; Samuels 2003).  This 
chapter shows that politics play a role in determining government resource allocation beyond the 
traditional financial resources typically analyzed in the literature.  For municipalities seeking 
more law enforcement resources, the answer is clear.  If you want more police officers, you 
should vote for the governor.   
 This chapter also furthers our understanding of public security policies in Latin America 
more generally.  There is widespread agreement that politicians respond to security problems 
using tough-on-crime measures that emphasize increased law enforcement spending and longer 
prison sentences, among other policies (Garland 2000; Dammert 2012).  However, the analysis 
often stops at this point.  This is problematic since analyzing the effectiveness (or lack thereof) 
of these policies, requires knowing how governments actually implement them.  My analysis of 
the distribution of police officers in Minas Gerais tackle this task using a direct measure rather 
than proxies that are common in most research. 
 From a theoretical standpoint, this chapter advances our knowledge of pork-barrel 
politics by highlighting how politicians deal with the spillover effects that their policies generate.  
Distributive politics research has traditionally focused on how governments distribute economic 
resources that have the potential to generate positive benefits for surrounding areas (Lancaster 
183 
 
1986; Ames 2002; Samuels 2003; Reeves 2011; Gasper and Reeves 2011; Kriner and Reeves 
2015).  However, these studies have often failed to address the role of negative spillover effects.  
My research shows that when politicians make policy decisions that have a negative impact on 
surrounding areas that they cannot export, they do not try to mitigate these effects by providing 
more resources to surrounding areas.  Rather, they actually take away resources from these areas 
to reward those municipalities that are important for their electoral success. 
 In the next chapter, I examine the final stage in the four-part cycle between crime and 
politics.  This stage addresses the key question that has driven the research project.  How do 
municipal and state politics influence violence?  I answer this question using a novel dataset on 
homicides from Brazil’s more than 5500 municipalities between 1997 and 2014.       
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5. CHAPTER 5: POLITICS AND MUNICIPAL VIOLENCE, 1997-2014 
In the first three empirical chapters of this project, I examined how violence influences state 
gubernatorial elections and the impact that politics has on the amount of resources that governors 
devote to law enforcement and other crime prevention policies.  I also analyzed the distribution 
of law enforcement personnel and found that governors give more resources to municipalities 
that are important for their electoral success.  This chapter looks at the other side of the coin.  In 
it, I examine the various tools that governors can use to address security problems and the effect 
that they have on violence. 
 Since 1991, Brazil has lost more than 1.2 million people to violence and the national 
homicide rate has increased more than 32 percent.  Despite the dramatic increase in the 
nationwide homicide rate since the early 1990s, there is wide variation in violence throughout 
the country.  Table 5.1 shows average state homicide rates per 100 thousand residents during two 
periods: 1991-2002 and 2003-2015.  Homicide rates increased more than 50 percent in 13 states 
while they declined more than 25 percent in three states.  The most drastic increases in violence 
occurred in the northeast where seven states saw their homicide rates more than double.  These 
spatial differences in violence are also present at the local level.  Each year, 78 percent of the 
country’s 5570 municipalities have less than four homicides while 49 percent of municipalities 
did not have a single murder.   
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Table 5.1: State Homicide Rates, 1991-2015 
 
Region State      Homicide Rate Homicide Rate Change (%) 
     
  1991-2002 2003-2015  
North     
 Acre 21.5 23.4 8.8 
 Amapá 33.7 33.4 -1.0 
 Amazonas  18.4 27.2 48.0 
 Pará 13.9 36.0 259.0 
 Rondônia 34.7 33.6 -3.0 
 Roraima 39.4 29.0 -26.3 
 Tocantins 11.5 21.5 86.8 
Northeast     
 Alagoas 25.7 55.9 217.5 
 Bahia 11.1 31.2 281.1 
 Ceará 13.4 31.9 238.1 
 Maranhão 7.4 22.6 305.4 
 Paraíba 13.8 31.0 224.6 
 Pernambuco 46.7 45.1 -3.5 
 Piauí 5.6 14.5 258.9 
 Rio Grande do Norte 9.3 26.9 289.2 
 Sergipe  20.6 34.6 65.0 
Center-West     
 Distrito Federal 32.3 30.8 -4.6 
 Goiás 19.3 34.3 77.7 
 Mato Grosso 28.6 33.7 17.8 
 Mato Grosso do Sul 30.0 28.1 -6.3 
Southeast     
 Espírito Santo 45.0 48.5 7.8 
 Minas Gerais 9.3 21.3 229.0 
 Rio de Janeiro 51.0 36.8 -27.8 
 São Paulo 35.8 17.8 -50.3 
South     
 Paraná 16.9 29.7 75.7 
 Rio Grande do Sul 16.1 20.6 28.0 
  Santa Catarina 8.2 12.2 48.8 
Sources: The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and the Ministry of Health 
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 The rise in violence in many areas is puzzling given Brazil’s success in addressing 
widespread social problems.  Between 1991 and 2010, nationwide illiteracy rates declined 51 
percent while the percentage of the population living on less than half the minimum wage fell 48 
percent.  However, as Table 5.2 shows, there is not a clear relationship between states’ successes 
in reducing poverty and homicide rates.  In Bahia, which reduced the percentage of the 
population living on less than half the minimum wage by 37 percent, homicide rates increased 
182 percent.  Meanwhile, in São Paulo, a 53 percent reduction in poverty coincided with a 53 
percent decline in violence.   
 This chapter moves beyond traditional arguments that focus on the relationship between 
social factors, such as poverty and inequality, and violence.  I identify four mechanisms that 
governors can use to influence homicide rates: resource allocation, resource distribution, policy 
coordination and policy choice.  Using municipal homicide data and case studies from the states 
of Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco, I show that in isolation, more spending on law enforcement 
does not lower municipal homicide rates.  What matters is how important the city is for the 
governor’s electoral success.  In cities that give the governor large numbers of votes, violence 
declines when states spend more on law enforcement.  I attribute these differing effects to the 
governor rewarding politically important locales with more security resources in an effort to 
reduce violence.  Meanwhile, I find mixed evidence that policy coordination and policy choices, 
which extend beyond provision and distribution of resources, affect violence.   
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Table 5.2: Homicide Rates and % of the Population living Below 1/2 the Minimum Wage 
 
State Homicide Rate Change (%) Inequality Inequality Change (%)  
  1991 2010  
North     
Acre +8.8 79.5 53.0 -33.3 
Amapá -1.0 69.8 47.3 -32.3 
Amazonas  +48.0 72.9 54.4 -25.3 
Pará +159.6 81.4 57.6 -29.3 
Rondônia -3.0 76.5 35.4 -53.7 
Roraima -26.3 63.0 47.8 -24.2 
Tocantins +86.8 84.1 46.1 -45.2 
Northeast    
Alagoas +117.6 86.8 60.8 -29.9 
Bahia +182.3 85.6 54.3 -36.6 
Ceará +138.4 86.6 56.2 -35.1 
Maranhão +203.7 91.5 64.7 -29.3 
Paraíba +124.3 87.9 54.8 -37.7 
Pernambuco -3.5 82.2 53.5 -34.9 
Piauí +157.7 89.7 59.0 -34.3 
Rio Grande do Norte +189.4 83.5 48.9 -41.4 
Sergipe  +68.1 83.4 53.7 -35.6 
Center-West    
Distrito Federal -4.7 43.3 18.3 -57.7 
Goiás +77.6 69.0 26.5 -61.7 
Mato Grosso +17.8 70.0 29.5 -57.8 
Mato Grosso do Sul -6.2 69.0 28.1 -59.3 
Southeast    
Espírito Santo +7.6 70.9 28.9 -59.3 
Minas Gerais +128.8 72.5 30.3 -58.2 
Rio de Janeiro -27.9 56.1 25.9 -53.9 
São Paulo -50.2 40.9 19.4 -52.6 
South     
Paraná +75.9 66.2 21.3 -67.8 
Rio Grande do Sul +28.1 59.4 20.2 -65.9 
Santa Catarina +49.2 60.0 13.9 -76.9 
Sources: The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and the Ministry of Health 
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 This chapter proceeds as follows.  In the first section, I review the extant literature on 
crime and violence in Brazil.  I argue that while scholars have focused on the criminal justice 
system as being a key determinant of crime rates in Brazil, they fail to take into account how 
politics influences criminal justice policies.  I then discuss four mechanisms through which 
politics can influence crime and illustrate these mechanisms using case studies from Pernambuco 
and Rio de Janeiro.  In the next section, I test these arguments systematically using homicide 
data from more than 5500 municipalities between 1997 and 2014.  The final section discusses the 
importance of these findings for the study of violence.    
5.1 Crime and Violence in Brazil 
Violence has long been an important issue in Brazil.  In recent years, surveys have shown that 
individuals rank violence as one of the most pressing national issues and are more willing to 
support a military coup under high levels of crime (Pérez 2003).  Other research suggests that 
support for and satisfaction with democracy decline as crime levels rise (Fernandez and Kuenzi 
2010; Bateson 2012; Carreras 2013).  In addition to causing widespread political problems, 
violence has a negative impact on the economy.  In 2004, crime had a total direct and indirect 
cost of US$92.2 billion or approximately 5 percent of the country’s GDP (Cerqueira et al. 
2007).68  A more recent study (Sachsida and Mendonça 2013) found that in 2012, homicides 
alone cost Brazil’s economy an estimated R$17.73 billion (approximately US$7.53 billion) and 
2.15 million years of life.   
                                                     
68 Direct and indirect costs include factors such as lost wages due to mental or physical problems, paying police 
officers and building more prisons.   
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 In the 1980s, Brazilian scholars began studying the country’s rapidly rising crime rates.  
From this research, emerged two broad strands of literature that continue to guide debates about 
public security (Rodrigues 2011).  The first strand focuses on the relationship between resource 
deprivation and crime.  Brazilian scholars originally took the opposite approach from U.S.-based 
researchers, who viewed poverty as a major cause of crime.  They argued that the wealthy and 
the poor engage in criminal activity at similar rates.  However, the government focuses its 
attention on crimes committed by the poor and punishes them more harshly (Coelho 1978; 
Zaluar 1999).  By decoupling the link between poverty and crime, they hoped to destigmatize 
poverty (Rodrigues 2011).   
 In recent years, there has been an emphasis on understanding the more nuanced 
relationship between poverty and crime since while most violent areas are poor, not all poor 
areas are violent.  This observation has led to studies examining how poverty and inequality 
influence crime rates due to greater economic benefits (Liska, Chamlin and Reed 1985; Sever 
2003; Stucky 2005, 24; Beato, da Silva and Tavares 2008), frustration with one’s relative 
economic situation (Brush 1996; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997) and fewer social controls (Pare 
and Felson 2014).  In Brazil, Resende and Andrade (2011) find that reducing inequality leads to 
a reduction in property crimes but does not affect crimes against people.  Chioda, de Mello and 
Soares (2016), in contrast, find that Bolsa Família, a federal cash transfer program for low-
income families, reduces violent crimes, crimes against minors and theft.    
 The second strand of crime research in Brazil focuses on the criminal justice system.  In 
the 2014 LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project) survey, 55 percent of Brazilian 
respondents expressed dissatisfaction with policing in their neighborhood while more than 68 
percent thought that police would take at least half an hour to arrive if someone was burglarizing 
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their home.  There is, however, a paradox.  The police are more effective when the public has 
confidence in them.  However, the public is more likely to cooperate with the police when they 
trust them (Silva and Beato 2013).   
 For law enforcement, reducing crime rates is one of the central ways to gain the public’s 
trust.  Studies in Brazil have focused on how changes in police strategies affect crime rates.  
Beato, da Silva and Tavares (2008) use a quasi-experimental change in the deployment of police 
in Minas Gerais, a large state in southeast Brazil, to examine the impact of law enforcement on 
crime.  They show that between January 2001 and October 2002, the state’s Police of Results 
Program, which emphasized working with local community leaders and deploying police using 
georeferenced crime data, reduced violent crime by 10 percent.  However, crime rapidly 
increased when a new police commander disbanded the program.  Macedo (2012) analyzes 
Pernambuco’s Pact for Life program and shows that the state government was able to reduce 
crime using a combination of repressive and preventative policies.  Macaulay (2012), 
meanwhile, provides an overview of efforts by the federal government to increase coordination 
between state and national law enforcement agencies to make them more effective.   
 Other scholars (Caldeira 2000; Ahnen 2007) have focused on police effectiveness by 
examining police violence and the impact it has on public trust in the police.  Between 2009 and 
2015, Brazilian police killed 17,688 people (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública 2016).  
However, the police are also regularly victims of violence.  Between 1995 and August 2017, the 
state of Rio de Janeiro alone had more than 3,155 police officers killed.69  Skogan (2013) finds 
that almost two-thirds of police officers believe they work in a high-risk environment and as risk 
levels rise, they are more willing to use force.  Conversely, officers are less willing to use force 
                                                     
69 Rouvenat, Fernanda and Gabriel Barreira. 2017. “PM é baleado e morre no RJ; é o 100º no ano.” O Globo. 
http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/pm-e-baleado-e-morre-no-rj-e-o-100-no-ano.ghtml (August 26, 2017). 
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when they are better equipped, trained and managed.  While crime research focuses on reducing 
police violence, the country’s weak criminal justice system and the low likelihood of punishment 
for committing crimes has led to strong public support for “mano duro” policies, including 
extrajudicial killings by the police.  Even though people from poor and lower middle class 
neighborhoods are most likely to be victims of police violence, they are also its strongest 
supporters (Paixão and Beato 1997; Caldeira 2000).   
5.1.1 Political Incentives and Crime Fighting Policies 
Despite the rich body of research examining how the criminal justice system, poverty and 
inequality influence crime rates, the role that politics play in determining how the government 
responds to rising crime rates has been largely unaddressed.  This oversight is puzzling since 
governors have wide latitude over what policies the government will take to address public 
security problems.  There is, therefore, the possibility that security policies may see large shifts 
depending on who is in power.  Career interests may also disincentivize governors from tackling 
crime by addressing long-term social problems and deficiencies in the criminal justice system 
that have been the primary focus in recent research. 
 While governors can focus on violence prevention through policies that reduce poverty 
and inequality, these efforts are likely to reduce crime only in the long term.  Consider the issue 
of education.  There is widespread agreement that providing educational opportunities can help 
reduce crime rates by better preparing children for the job market (Ehrlich 1975; Machin, Marie 
and Vujić 2011).  However, a better education only effects children’s economic situation in 
several years when they enter the labor market.  This is problematic for governors who must 
demonstrate the success of their crime control policies within the four-year electoral cycle.   
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 Similar problems are likely to affect efforts to reform police agencies.  Reforming 
institutions is often a slow process that requires changing patterns of behavior and long-existing 
bureaucratic structures.  Moreover, whereas there is often strong support for more spending on 
education, reforms to address problems with law enforcement agencies may actually hurt the 
governor’s electoral interests.  Law enforcement reforms often result in backlash from the police, 
who can threaten public order by being less proactive in confronting crime or, more gravely, 
committing massacres and other crimes that will discredit the governor’s policies (Maranhão 
Costa 2004).  Even if the police agree to reforms, governors may not have political incentives to 
implement them.  Ahnen (2007) finds that police violence is an effective electoral strategy for 
governors from right and center-right parties that allows them to demonstrate their commitment 
to tough-on-crime policies.  More recently, a 2016 survey showed that 57 percent of Brazilians 
agree with the phrase “a good criminal is a dead criminal.”70  
5.1.2 Gubernatorial Crime Fighting Tools 
Taken together, career interests provide governors with minimal incentives to enact policies that 
will only show success in the long-term.  Beyond not benefitting from reductions in crime that 
these policies provide, any long-term successes they achieve may actually help their successors 
claim credit for reducing crime, making them more powerful political opponents.  Given, these 
issues, I expect governors to focus on crime fighting policies that they can rapidly implement and 
strategically use to bolster electoral support.  I propose that governors have four crime fighting 
tools.  Figure 5.1 shows these tools and the pathways through which they can reduce violence.   
                                                     
70 O Globo. 2016. “Para 57% dos brasileiros, 'bandido bom é bandido morto', diz Datafolha,” November 2. 
http://g1.globo.com/sao-paulo/noticia/2016/11/para-57-dos-brasileiros-bandido-bom-e-bandido-morto-diz-
datafolha.html (October 12, 2017).  
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 The first tool is resource provision.  Providing more resources for law enforcement 
strengthens the government’s deterrence capacity (Becker 1968).  Governors can use these 
resources for policies such as building more prisons, providing better training for police officers, 
hiring more police officers and constructing more police stations.  Assessing the impact that 
police have on crime rates is a difficult and controversial endeavor, with some people claiming 
that police officers do not reduce crime rates.  The endogeneity problem plays a strong role in 
this debate.  Governments often hire more police officers when crime rate are rising, making it 
appear that having more police officers has no effect on crime or even increases it.  Recent 
studies have tackled this problem using an instrumental variable approach that focuses on events 
unrelated to changing crime rates that modify the police presence in specific geographical areas.   
 
                            
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
 
Figure 5.1: Gubernatorial Crime Fighting Tools 
 Levitt (1997) finds that violent crime rates decline in mayoral and gubernatorial election 
years when politicians hire more police officers to bolster their crime-fighting image.  However, 
Policy Change 
Resource Distribution 
Resource Provision 
Homicide Rates 
Policy Coordination 
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McCrary (2002) reanalyzes Levitt’s data and shows that this effect is largely due to an estimation 
error.  More recently, scholars have used exogenous changes in police presence during terror 
alerts and terrorist attacks to examine the impact that policing has on crime rates.  Studies 
following terrorist attacks against Jewish centers in Argentina (Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004) 
and terrorist threats in Washington, D.C. (Klick and Tabarrok 2005) find that the increased 
police presence in target areas reduces car thefts and thefts from cars but not violent crime.  
However, Draca, Machin and Witt (2011) challenge these findings using a more precise measure 
that utilizes internal law enforcement data on the number of hours and locations where police 
officers worked following the 2005 terrorist attacks in London.  They show that in central 
London, a ten percent increase in police presence led to a three percent decline in both theft and 
violent crime rates.  Taken together, therefore, we should expect the following. 
H1: More state spending on law enforcement will lead to lower homicide rates.  
 Providing more resources for law enforcement is an attractive tool for governors.  These 
policies are popular among the public and help politicians develop a reputation for being tough-
on-crime (Campbell 1999; Tonry 1999; Roberts, Stalans and Hough 2002, 5-7; Dammert 2012, 
22).  During interviews with 88 state deputies in six states, I asked them what requests they 
received from voters to increase public security.  As Table 5.3 shows, two-thirds said that voters 
primarily asked them to send more law enforcement resources to their neighborhood while an 
additional 16 percent wanted both law enforcement and social programs. This policy is also 
popular among law enforcement officials who regularly highlight the need for more resources.  
One military police officer in charge of a popular tourist beach community said that his police 
company had only one vehicle to patrol an area with 40,000 residents.71  In another state, the 
                                                     
71 Military Police Officer, Personal Interview, Rio Grande do Norte, February 27, 2016. 
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secretary of public security, the state’s top law enforcement official, said that the police 
sometimes conduct fewer patrols at the end of the year due to a lack of funds for fuel and 
vehicles.72  
Table 5.3: Voters’ Security Demands for State Deputies during Political Campaigns 
 
State Law Enforcement Social Policies Both Other 
     
Bahia 15 (79%) 2 (11%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 
Paraná 17 (63%) 2 (7%) 7 (26%) 1 (4%) 
Pernambuco 10 (63%) 6 (38%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Rio de Janeiro 9 (60%) 2 (13%) 4 (27%) 0 (0%) 
Rio Grande do Norte 4 (57%) 1 (14%) 2 (29%) 0 (0%) 
Sergipe 3(75%) 1(25%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
     
Total 58 (66%) 14 (16%) 14 (16%) 2 (2%) 
Source: Author’s Interviews, July 2015-June 2016 
  
 The second tool that governors have is resource distribution. While providing more 
resources for law enforcement enables states to develop a more effective deterrence capacity, the 
impact these resources have on local crime rates should depend on how governors distribute 
them.  A rational-choice approach to crime control suggests that the government should 
distribute these resources, using technical criteria designed to minimize crime throughout the 
state.  However, as I showed in Chapter 4, governors are strategic actors who distribute police 
officers based on political considerations.  They send more police to large municipalities that are 
important for their electoral success rather than ones with higher crime rates.   
 Given that governments consistently distribute police based on political interests, the 
common wisdom would lead us to expect that the effect of more spending on law enforcement 
will vary depending on the municipality’s population and the candidate that residents support 
                                                     
72 Secretary of Public Security, Personal Interview, Brazil, November 23, 2015. 
196 
 
during gubernatorial elections.  More specifically, security resources will reduce crime the most 
in municipalities that are more important for the governor’s electoral success.  That is, those 
municipalities that are large and strongly support the governor.   
 Governors may send more law enforcement resources to large municipalities that are 
important for their electoral success.  Across states, however, the impact that the political 
distribution of security resources will have on crime rates is likely to vary depending on how 
much states investment in law enforcement.  If the state is poor or the governor does not 
prioritize law enforcement, then even though they may politicize the distribution of security 
resources, they will have fewer resources to send to politically important municipalities.  If state 
spending on law enforcement is low enough, it is likely that giving more support for the 
governor will have minimal to no impact on the municipality’s homicide rate.   
 Imagine the following scenario.  There are two municipalities in different states.  In each 
state, the governor receives 100,000 votes from the municipality that gives her five percent of 
her total votes statewide.  In State A, however, the governor investments $50 per capita on law 
enforcement while the governor in State B investment $100 per capita.  If both governors give 
their respective municipalities five percent of all law enforcement spending, the municipality in 
State A will have only $2.5 per capita for law enforcement while the municipality in State B will 
have $5.  The higher level of resources available to the municipality in State B makes it likely 
that it will be more successful at reducing homicide rates since the city will be receiving more 
overall security resources than .  Taken together, we have competing hypotheses.   
H2: More state spending on law enforcement will reduce crime rates most strongly in large 
      municipalities that give the governor a large number of votes (regardless of the total amount  
     of resources spent on security).  
 
H2a: In states with low levels of spending on law enforcement, changes in municipal support for  
       the governor will have no effect on homicide rates. 
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 Policy coordination is the third tool that governors have to reduce violence.  Better 
coordination between the local and state government can bolster security by allowing both actors 
to more effectively use their resources.  While Brazilian cities do not have their own police 
forces, mayors may work with the state government to implement policies such as paying 
overtime for police officers in their city, constructing police stations when the governor agrees to 
provide more police officers to work there and paying for gasoline so that the police can conduct 
additional patrols.  Recent research suggests that policy coordination can reduce crime rates.  
 Hoelscher (2015) shows that homicide rates in Brazilian municipalities are lower when 
the governor and the mayor are from the same party.  He is, however, unable to identify whether 
this decline in crime rates is due to an increase in resources or better coordination between the 
state and municipal government.  Trejo and Ley (2016) provide a more sinister side of this policy 
coordination.  They examine drug violence in Mexico and find that homicide rates are lower 
when local political actors are from allied parties due to better coordination between state and 
local officials.  In contrast, when an opposition party is in power, the federal government will 
unilaterally implement public security operations in an effort to increase violence to discredit 
opposition politicians.     
 Policy coordination has two potential benefits for governors.  First, if policy coordination 
reduces violence, then governors will obtain greater electoral support when running for 
reelection or seeking other political offices.  Second, reducing crime in specific municipalities 
can help governors gain the support of local political allies.  Although governors control security, 
violence is also an important political issue for mayors.  During interviews with state deputies, 
many of whom have been mayors, I asked them which group of politicians voters blame for 
public security problems.  As Table 5.4 shows, more than 60 percent said that they blame all 
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politicians including mayors.  For mayors, policy coordination can help bolster their political 
support and provide them with more opportunities to advance their political careers by reducing 
crime.   
Table 5.4: Politicians whom Voters Blame for Security Problems 
   
  
Governor 12 
State Deputies 2 
Mayors 2 
Governor and Deputies 2 
All Politicians 32 
  
N 50 
Source: Author Interviews, July 2015-June 2016  
 
  
 
 There is some evidence that mayors and governors coordinate security policies in Brazil.  
Table 5.5 shows how average homicide rates vary in cities with more and less than 20,000 
residents when the governor and the mayor are from the same party or an opposition party.  In 
both small and large municipalities, average homicide rates are more than five percent lower 
when the governor and the mayor are from the same party.  Together with the evidence from 
Chapter 4, which showed that governors provide more police officers to allied mayors in large 
cities, I expect the following.   
H3: Crime rates will be lower when the governor and the mayor are from the same party.  
Table 5.5: Average Homicide Rates per 100 Thousand Residents, 1997-2014 
      
 Allied Mayor Opposition Mayor 
   
Small Cities 9.2 10.0 
   
Large Cities 18.4 19.4 
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 Policy change is the final mechanism that governors have to reduce violence.  
Newspapers regularly provide anecdotes about changes in public security policies when a new 
governor enters office.  However, there is scant research on why some governors, such as 
Eduardo Campos in Pernambuco and Sérgio Cabral in Rio de Janeiro, highlight public security 
during their campaign and when they are in office, while other governors focus on other policy 
issues. Instead, most studies examine public security policies in individual states during one 
governor’s administration, such as the Pact for Life in Pernambuco (Macêdo 2012) and Bahia 
(Freitas 2015) or Rio de Janeiro’s Pacifying Police Program (Misse 2014).  These studies 
typically describe the program’s emergence and evolution over time.  However, they ignore the 
many cases where governors do not develop clear plans to better public security, and they do not 
explain why some governors implement elaborate public security policies that fail.  
 One study attempts to address this issue by focusing on how politics influence public 
security policies.  Goertzel and Kahn (2009) argue that in the 1990s, voters in São Paulo 
expressed outrage over the state’s high homicide rate that led to more than 15,000 homicides 
each year.  This outrage, in turn, forced the police to implement a number of new policies, 
including GIS mapping of crime, more community police stations, and specialized units to deal 
with homicides and sexual assaults.  By 2007, these policies, in conjunction with a more 
aggressive approach to firearm seizures, led to a 62 percent decline in the murder rate, making 
São Paulo one of the country’s safest states.   
 Outrage over violence, however, is not unique to São Paulo.  Throughout the country, 
voters regularly identify public security as a major problem.  If outrage is the causal mechanism 
leading governors to address security problems, then we should find declining levels of crime 
and violence throughout the country.  However, crime and violence continue to rise in most 
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cities and states.  This does not indicate that outrage does not play a role in determining public 
security policies.  Rather, it depends on how this outrage affects electoral support for politicians 
across the ideological spectrum.   
 In Chapter 2, I showed that voters punish right parties more strongly for rising crime rates 
than they punish centrist and leftist parties.  I argue that this difference in punishment occurs 
since voters believe that right parties emphasize tough-on-crime policies while left and centrist 
parties use a more balanced approach to security that emphasizes crime prevention along with 
repression.  Part of these differences in how parties approach public security relate to the 
provision and distribution of public security resources.  States that have more resources are able 
to provide better security and to distribute these resources to areas that are important for the 
governor’s electoral success.  However, policy approaches go beyond the provision and 
distribution of resources.  Even if governors do not provide more resources for law enforcement, 
they can prioritize security as an issue that they will focus on during their time in office.  One 
way to view the priority that governors are giving to security is by examining their electoral 
platforms.   
 Federal law requires each gubernatorial candidate to submit a document outlining policy 
proposals for their time in office.  Table 5.6 shows the percentage of each governor’s electoral 
platform that was devoted to security in 2010 and 2014.  In 2010, governors from right parties 
spent, on average, 6.4 percent of their platform discussing security issues while governors from 
leftist parties spent slightly more at 6.7 percent.  However, these numbers changed drastically 
during the 2014 elections when governors from right parties spent more than 11 percent of their 
platform on security issues compared to only 6 percent by left parties. 
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Table 5.6: Percent of Party Platform Devoted to Public Security, 2010 and 2014 
 
State Party Ideology Security % Party Ideology Security % 
 2010 2010 2010 2014 2014 2014 
       
Acre PT Left 3.3 PT Left 7.9 
Alagoas PSDB Center 4.7 PMDB Center 5.0 
Amapá PSB Left 2.0 PDT Left 5.2 
Amazonas PMN Left 12.5 PROS Center 0.6 
Bahia PT Left 3.8 PT Left 5.5 
Ceará PSB Left 7.0 PT Left 6.3 
Distrito Federal PT Left 4.4 PSB Left 4.2 
Espírito Santo PSB Left 14.4 PMDB Center 4.3 
Goiás PSDB Center 0.9 PSDB Center 4.1 
Maranhão PMDB Center 7.5 PC do B Left 7.7 
Mato Grosso  PMDB Center 11.2 PDT Left 5.7 
Mato Grosso do Sul PMDB Center 5.0 PSDB Center 3.7 
Minas Gerais PSDB Center 0.0 PT Left 10.0 
Pará PSDB Center 7.7 PSDB Center 5.1 
Paraíba PSB Left 5.2 PSB Left 11.5 
Paraná PSDB Center 2.4 PSDB Center 2.0 
Pernambuco PSB Left 3.0 PSB Left 2.5 
Piauí PSB Left 5.0 PT Left 6.7 
Rio de Janeiro PMDB Center 8.5 PMDB Center 13.0 
Rio Grande do Norte DEM Right 10.6 PSD Right 7.5 
Rio Grande do Sul PT Left 5.0 PMDB Center 13.7 
Rondônia PMDB Center 6.1 PMDB Center 4.5 
Roraima PSDB Center 2.4 PP Right 13.0 
Santa Catarina DEM Right 2.1 PSD Right 13.9 
São Paulo PSDB Center 0.6 PSDB Center 6.4 
Sergipe PT Left 6.7 PMDB Center 4.9 
Tocantins PSDB Center 4.5 PMDB Center 3.6 
       
Left Parties   6.7   6.0 
Center Parties   5.4   4.7 
Right Parties     6.4     11.5 
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 While voters may not read these platforms, the country’s press and governors’ political 
opponents regularly highlight failures to achieve these goals, making them a costly signal for all 
governors.  However, the electoral ramifications for rising crime rates are strongest for right 
parties, which receive widespread punishment/rewards for increasing (decreasing) crime rates.  
This stronger electoral punishment, gives governors from right parties greater incentive to 
prioritize public security among the myriad of policies they must address during their time in 
office.  They also have greater incentive to focus on policies that provide short-term reductions 
in crime, such as more aggressive policing with an emphasis on incarceration.  In contrast, 
governors from left parties and centrist parties, which receive minimal to no punishment for 
rising crime rates, have more flexibility to focus on long-term crime prevention efforts, which 
may have less of an effect on violence in the short term.  Given these differences in electoral 
punishment for rising crime rates, I expect that homicide rates will be lower when the governor 
is from a right party.    
H4: Municipalities in states with governors from right parties will have lower homicide rates   
      than municipalities in states with governors from left parties. 
5.2 CRIME CONTROL POLICIES IN RIO DE JANEIRO AND PERNAMBUCO 
I illustrate the four mechanisms outlined above using case studies from Rio de Janeiro and 
Pernambuco between 1991 and 2014.  I chose these states using the “diverse-case” strategy 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008).  This strategy seeks cases that have maximum variation in both 
the indicators and outcomes that allow the researcher to explore how changes in each of the 
causal factors, either independently or interactively, explain variation in the outcome of interest.  
In this case, how variation in security spending, the distribution of security resources and 
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cooperation between state and local officials, along with policy changes, influence violence.  
Focusing on two states over an extended period allows me to naturally control for other factors, 
such as the states’ histories and political cultures.  From a broader standpoint, these are also two 
of Brazil’s most populous states, and they have experienced wide-ranging changes in public 
security policies and crime over the past three decades.  
5.2.1 Rio de Janeiro: The Marvelous City 
Crime has been a longstanding political issue in Rio de Janeiro’s politics stretching back to the 
state’s first direct elections as the military dictatorship drew to a close.  In 1982, Leonel Brizola, 
from the left-leaning Democratic Labour Party (PDT), won the election and began the first 
attempts at modifying the state’s public security policy.7374  He eliminated the secretary of public 
security position, which the military controlled, and elevated civilian heads of the military and 
civil police forces to the role of state secretaries.75  He also prohibited police operations in 
favelas without judicial orders, created the Council of Justice, Public Security and Human Rights 
to prevent human rights abuses and attempted to create better policing in lower and middle class 
communities through the neighborhood-policing program and the creation of a center for 
community policing (Maranhão Costa 2004).  Despite Brizola’s efforts, crime and police 
violence continued to increase.  During his tenure, the state’s homicide rate rose seven percent, 
although the 2454 homicides during his final year in office would be less than a third of the 
state’s 8216 homicides just nine years later.76      
                                                     
73 Brizola portrayed himself as a man of the people often wearing half-buttoned dress shirt with sleeves rolled up to 
his elbows even during gubernatorial debates. A video of Brizola during a campaign debate can be seen at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iqEGWJBwbtQ  
74 As a reminder, I classify parties using Power and Zucco’s (2009) index of party ideology in Brazil, which 
measures ideology by looking at parties’ voting behavior in the national Congress. 
75 The state did not recreate the Secretary of Public Security position until 1995.  
76 The state homicide rate increased from 20.2 to 61.8 victims per 100 thousand residents during this time.  
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 In 1986, voters elected Wellington Moreira Franco from the centrist Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB).  Franco campaigned on a promise to wipe out crime in 
100 days.  His plan included placing 2500 additional police officers on the streets and an 
equipment modernization program that led the government to purchase 280 vehicles along with 
other equipment for the police (Mamede 2010).  However, crime and violence continued to rise 
with critics arguing that his security plan merely centered on giving police a blank check to 
engage in indiscriminate killing.  Moreira blamed his security failures on Brizola, whom he 
accused of severely weakening the police.  In 1990, the PMDB’s successor candidate, Nelson 
Carneiro, lost to Brizola, who returned for a second term in office and continued to emphasize 
crime prevention through social programs rather than violent repression (Aziz Filho 2003). 
 Without an opportunity to run for reelection, Brizola left office in 1994 to run for the 
presidency.77 Although multiple parties disputed the governorship, the elections turned into a 
runoff between the center-right coalition Rio Unido (PSDB, PFL, PP and PL) led by Marcello 
Alencar from the PSDB and the center-left Força do Povo (PDT, PMN and PTB) led by 
Anthony Garotinho.  Alencar won the runoff election and immediately took a tough stance on 
public security.  He hired General Nilton Cerqueira, who headed Rio de Janeiro’s military police 
during the final years of the country’s dictatorship in the 1980s, to be the state’s secretary of 
public security.  The strategy was simple.  The best way to defeat crime was confronting it head 
on.   
 General Cerqueira instituted a bravery bonus that rewarded police officers with bonuses 
and permanent salary increases for engaging in firefights with suspected criminals.  This policy 
led to a large increase in police killings that came with the governor’s tacit approval (Cavallaro 
                                                     
77 In 1997, the country passed a law permitting one consecutive term for all executive offices. 
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and Manuel 1997, 39-41).  During the first 19 months of his administration, police killed 647 
people and wounded 336, compared to 547 killed and 383 wounded in the previous two years 
(Cano 1997, 26).  One incident, in particular, highlights this growing police violence.  In May 
1995, the police entered the Nova Brasília favela and killed 13 suspected drug traffickers.78  
Governor Alencar addressed the controversy surrounding these killing by telling local 
newspapers:  
 These violent criminals have become animals…They are animals. They can’t be 
 understood any other way. That’s why encounters with them can’t be civilized. These 
 people don’t have to be treated in a civilized way. They have to be treated like animals 
 (Cavallaro and Manuel 1997, 1). 
 
 Governor Alencar did not seek reelection in 1998, following a rupture between the PSDB 
and the powerful Liberal Front Party (PFL).  This dispute left the governorship wide open.  
Anthony Garotinho, the former radio talk host, mayor and state deputy from the left-leaning 
PDT, who placed second in the 1994 elections, emerged as a leading candidate.  In 1998, he 
wrote a 158-page book, Violência e Criminalidade no Estado do Rio de Janeiro, with leading 
academics, including Luíz Eduardo Soares.  The book diagnosed and provided solutions to the 
state’s public security problems.  It advocated crime prevention through social programs and 
tough-on-crime policies that included: police occupation of favelas and poor communities, 
creating a public security council to coordinate state, local and federal agencies, investing in 
police intelligence, reducing police violence and investing in schools and social programs to 
protect children and adolescents from becoming involved in crime.  Although Garotinho was 
from the PDT, he sought to differentiate himself from Brizola by emphasizing a strong role for 
both prevention and repression.   
                                                     
78 Favela is the term used for Brazil’s urban slums.  
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 After winning the election, Garotinho immediately increased law enforcement and 
education spending by 47 and 32 percent, respectively.  He also hired General José Siqueira to be 
the state’s Secretary of Security and Luíz Eduardo Soares to be the Subsecretary of Research and 
Citizenship.  The divided civilian-military control of the Secretary of Public Security, along with 
regular confrontations between military police officials and Soares, led to widespread tensions 
within the agency, and efforts to reform the police failed (Maranhão Costa 2004).  Despite these 
problems, homicide rates declined 10 percent overall during his administration.   
 The drop in crime suggests that in line with my theoretical expectations, crime rates will 
decline when governors spend more on law enforcement.  However, it is important to highlight 
that while crime declined overall during Garatinho’s tenure, it increased 12 percent during his 
final year in office.  This sudden increase in violence is puzzling until we examine his career 
path.  In 2002, he did not seek reelection, choosing instead to focus on the presidency.  During 
this time, his focus was outside the state and he had less time to devote to public security.        
 In 2002, Rosângela Matheus de Oliveira, Garotinho’s spouse, became the PDT candidate 
and won the governorship.  Her administration gave continuity to Garotinho’s public security 
policies and homicide rates declined another nine percent.79 The decline in violence during 
Governor Rosângela Matheus de Oliveira’s administration helps us distinguish the effects of 
education and law enforcement spending.  During her time in office, spending on law 
enforcement rose nine percent while education spending declined 16 percent.  If education was 
the only tool for reducing crime, we would expect there to have been a sudden increase in 
violence during her tenure.  This does not mean that providing more resources for education is 
                                                     
79 Brazil’s electoral rules allow incumbent governors to run for only one consecutive reelection and does not allow 
direct family members to run in subsequent election.  The electoral court ruled, however, that she could serve one 
term in office based on the argument that her term in office was Anthony Garotinho’s second term.      
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unimportant for reducing crime rates.  The spike in education spending during Garotinho’s 
administration may have had delayed effects that were now paying dividends, which coalesces 
with the theory that education is a long-term crime reduction policy.  However, it does suggest 
that more spending on law enforcement can be an effective policy for governors to tackle 
violence in the short term.   
 Her administration also gives credence to the argument that governors can reduce 
violence by coordinating policies with local political allies.  When she entered office in 2003, 
municipalities with PDT mayors had an average homicide rate of 39 victims per 100 thousand 
residents, compared to 32 victims per 100 thousand residents in municipalities controlled by 
opposition parties.  By the end of her tenure, violence had decline across all municipalities.  
However, this decline was steepest in cities with allied mayors, which saw their homicide rates 
decline 54 percent, compared to only eight percent in cities controlled by opposition parties.    
 Although security was improving, violence remained an important issue during the 2006 
elections, with the state continuing to have the country’s fourth highest homicide rate and more 
than 7000 homicides annually.  The PMDB candidate, Sérgio Cabral Filho, made public security 
a central campaign issue.  After winning the election, his government began forming a new 
policy, the Pacifying Police Program.  This strategy emphasized fighting crime through social 
programs in conjunction with a stronger police presence through Pacifying Police Units (UPPs).  
In December 2008, Secretary of Public Security José Beltrame launched the first UPP in the 
Santa Marta Community in Rio de Janeiro’s South Zone, the zone that contains the world famous 
Copacabana beach and the Christ the Redeemer statue.  The government inaugurated the Santa 
Marta UPP just one month prior to the arrival of the city’s new mayor; Eduardo Paes from the 
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PMDB.  Paes was the first mayor from the PMDB in Rio de Janeiro since César Maia in 1996 
and the party controlled the mayor’s office until 2016 when crime rates began to rise steadily.  
The Pacifying Police strategy involves several steps.  First, military police from the 
Special Operations Police Battalion (BOPE) enter low-income communities (favelas) to expel 
criminal groups operating there.80  Afterwards, the state constructs permanent police posts in the 
community to prevent the return of criminal groups and reduce violence.  This security, in turn, 
allows other government agencies to enter the communities to provide education and social 
services to community residents.   
 This public security strategy uses a rational-choice approach to crime control that 
emphasizes making crime less attractive by providing alternative opportunities for community 
residents while also increasing the costs for committing crime.  However, while the policy 
emphasizes crime prevention as well as repression, critics argue that it focuses primarily on 
repression through a stronger police presence in low-income communities.  One of its strongest 
critics has been the program’s architect; José Beltrame.  In a May 2016 interview, he publically 
criticized the state government for focusing only on policing, asking, “Where is the money for 
social programs?”81    
       
 
 
                                                     
80 Before occupying a favela, the military police release pamphlets letting the residents the exact day when they will 
be entering the community.  This strategy has led reduced violence between drug trafficking organizations and the 
police since many drug traffickers flee the favela prior to the police entering the community.    
81 Thomé, Clarissa. 2016. “A UPP fez sua parte. Para onde foi a verba de assistência social?” O Estado de São 
Paulo. May 25. (October 10, 2017). http://brasil.estadao.com.br/noticias/rio-de-janeiro,a-upp-fez-sua-parte-para-
onde-foi-a-verba-de-assistencia-social,10000053273  
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 Despite the lack of funding for social programs in these communities, the strategy had 
great success in reducing violence in the city of Rio de Janeiro.  Between 2008 and 2014, the 
city’s homicide rate fell 26 percent and it had 524 fewer homicides.  However, it did not lead to 
an overall reduction in violence.  Homicide rates outside the capital city increased 10 percent, 
and the total number of homicides statewide remained steady at around 5600 annually. 
 These seemingly contradictory differences in violence statewide have their roots in the 
state’s public security strategy.  Between 2008 and 2014, the state hired 8,000 military police 
officers, increasing the size of its police force by 20 percent (Forúm Brasileiro de Segurança 
Pública 2016).  However, it assigned most of these new officers to work in Pacifying Police 
Units.  With 37 out of 38 UPPs located in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the capital has been the 
primary beneficiary of the government’s security strategy to the detriment of security in the rest 
of the state.82  Violence alone cannot explain the government’s overemphasis on the capital city.  
Despite receiving the bulk of the state’s additional security resources, the capital has only a third 
of the state’s homicides.  
  Figure 5.2 shows the number of police officers per 1000 residents in each Integrated 
Security Area (AISP) in 2015.  AISPs are the organizational unit that the government uses to 
divide responsibility for policing in the state.  In less populated areas, AISPs cover multiple 
municipalities, while in large cities, such as Rio de Janeiro, they cover a small section of the city.  
The state has an average of one police officer for every 545 people.  However, the city of Rio de 
Janeiro has one officer for every 375 residents while the rest of the state has only one police 
officer for every 774 residents.  In some areas, the distribution is even worse.  Belford Roxo, a 
city governed by a mayor from the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), which opposed Cabral’s 
                                                     
82 http://www.upprj.com/index.php/historico  
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handpicked successor during the 2014 gubernatorial elections, has only one police officer for 
every 1643 residents, although its homicide rate exceeds 50 victims per 100 thousand residents.  
 
 
  
Figure 5.2: Police Officers per 1000 Residents in Each Integrated Security Area 
 Economic factors provide one explanation for the government’s emphasis on the capital 
city.  In areas where there is higher level of inequality, wealthier citizens demands more security 
(Liska, Chamlin and Reed 1985; Stucky 2005).  Many individuals also travel from surrounding 
areas to work in the capital city and the city is the state’s tourism hub.  As a result, the capital 
may need more police officers than we would expect by just looking at the residential 
population, since criminal groups might more strongly target these areas.  There is some 
evidence to support these theories.  In the districts of Leblon and Copacabana, there is one police 
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officer for every 235 residents, despite the area having the highest levels of wealth and the 
lowest level of violence anywhere in the state.  The government, however, has sent most of the 
state’s new police officers work in Pacifying Police Units that are located in the city’s favelas.       
 A stronger explanation lies in electoral politics.  The city of Rio de Janeiro contains 
almost 40 percent of the state’s voters and during the 2006 election, Cabral received 32 percent 
of all his votes from the city.  Given the city’s importance for his electoral success, Cabral 
needed to focus his administration’s public security efforts on the capital.  The capital is also 
visible in the public eye with even minor crimes making the national news.  One state deputy that 
I interviewed said that a bike robbery in Rio de Janeiro’s touristic south zone receives more 
media attention than homicides elsewhere.83  This strategy appears to have worked.  In 2006, 
Governor Cabral participated in a runoff election after receiving only 41 percent of the popular 
vote in the first round.  In contrast, with crime declining rapidly, he won the 2010 election with 
more than 68 percent of the first round votes. 
 Many state deputies have expressed concern over the role that politics plays in the 
distribution of law enforcement resources.  One deputy from the conservative Progressive Party 
(PP) said that the governor creates new Pacifying Police Units in locations where there are many 
votes.  In addition, outside the capital, the government is not replacing officers who are quitting 
or injured on the job.84  Another deputy from the state’s mountain region said that this area of the 
state has fewer police officers because “There, there are few votes.”85  Deputies from political 
parties across the ideological spectrum including the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), 
the Workers’ Party (PT), the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) and the Social Democratic 
                                                     
83 83 State Deputy, Personal Interview, Rio de Janeiro, October 6, 2015.  
84 Personal Interview, State Deputy, September 23, 2015.  
85 “Lá tem poucos votos.” Personal Interview, State Deputy, October 6, 2015.  
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Party (PSD) also argued that the UPPs have exacerbated security problems outside the capital as 
criminals migrate to these regions with a smaller law enforcement presence.  There is some 
evidence to support this assertion that the UPP program is simply displacing crime.  Prior to the 
implementation of the UPP program, violence was falling steadily outside the capital with the 
total number of homicides declining from 3854 in 2001, to 3350 in 2008.  In contrast, after the 
government implemented the UPP program, the number of homicides declined at a much slower 
rate, with an average of 3257 homicides annually between 2009 and 2016.      
 In recent years, the government has responded to these concerns by placing more police 
officers in cities outside the capital.  However, most of these new police officers have also gone 
to areas where the governor received a large number of votes.  In the four Integrated Security 
Areas (AISPs) outside the capital where the governor received 20 percent of his total votes 
during the 2014 elections, the number of police officers per capita increased around 23 percent 
between 2013 and 2015.  In contrast, in the four AISPs where he received the smallest 
percentage of his total votes, around five percent, the number of officers per capita increased 
only 2.9 percent.   
 While both areas have similar crime rates, they have vastly different pool of voters.  In 
the four AISPs where the governor received 20 percent of his support, around 1.75 million 
people voted in the elections.  In contrast, in the four smaller AISPs, there were only 348 
thousand voters.  For governors seeking to maximize their political support, the winning strategy 
is to target large cities where there are many voters.   
 Moving forward, the state’s public security strategy is confronting an uncertain future.  In 
2015, the state began to suffer financial problems due to the Operation Carwash corruption 
scandal and declining oil prices.  These financial problems led to cutbacks in the state’s plans to 
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hire more police officers and reduced its ability to pay officers for overtime work.  In addition, 
with the state’s homicide rate seeing an unprecedented 22 percent increase in 2016 along with 
146 police officers murdered, the architect of the Pacifying Police Program, Secretary of Public 
Security José Beltrame, resigned.  His trusted assistant, Roberto Sá, took control of the Secretary 
of Public Security but violence continued to rise.  In 2017, homicide rates increased six percent 
and violence claimed the life of 134 additional police officers.   
 The rising violence in Rio de Janeiro, which regularly made headlines in national and 
international news, led the federal government to take an unprecedented step.  In February 2018, 
President Michele Temer issued a decree placing the federal government in charge of Rio de 
Janeiro’s security through the end of the year.86  This intervention allows the federal government 
to use of the armed forces for public security.  As part of this process, the government ousted 
Roberto Sá from the Secretary of Public Security and the commander of the military’s eastern 
forces, General Walter Brago Netto, took control of the state’s security forces with no oversight 
by the governor or other state political actors.   
 The results have not been encouraging so far.  Between January to August 15, security 
forces killed 895 people, representing an 89 percent increase compared to the same period in 
2016 and almost a fourfold increase over 2013 when they killed 236 people.87  During this 
period, criminals killed 65 police officers, along with three members of the military, and 
homicide rates have risen eight percent.8889 
                                                     
86 Decree 9.288/2018 
87 Grandin, Felipe and Marco Antonio Martins. 2018. “Número de mortes por intervenção policial no RJ mais que 
dobra em cinco anos.” August 15. https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2018/08/15/numero-de-mortes-por-
intervencao-policial-no-rj-chega-a-895-em-2018.ghtml  
88 O Dia. 2018. “Policial militar morto em São Gonçalo é enterrado.” August 26. https://odia.ig.com.br/rio-de-
janeiro/2018/08/5569717-policial-militar-morto-em-sao-goncalo-e-enterrado.html#foto=1  
89 Nascimento, Karina. 2018. Homicídios e crimes contra o patrimônio registram queda em junho 2018.” July 17. 
State of Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Segurança Pública. http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/Noticias.asp?ident=406  
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5.2.2 Pernambuco: The Pact for Life 
Pernambuco is northeastern Brazil’s second most populous state, with just over 9.2 million 
residents.  Throughout the 1990s, the northeast was one of the country’s safest regions.  In the 
2000s, however, violence increased dramatically, with the regional homicide rate more than 
doubling between 2000 and 2015.  Pernambuco went against this trend.  The state’s homicide 
rate rose throughout the 1990s before declining more than 27 percent in the 2000s.  Despite the 
high level of violence in the 1990s, public security only became an important political issue in 
the early 2000s.  
 Pernambuco’s post-dictatorial political history began in 1986 with the election of Miguel 
Arraes (PMDB), who won with the support of a center-left coalition.90  During Arraes’ four 
years in office, public security was not a major priority.  Instead, his focus fell along two lines.  
In the interior of the state, he emphasized the distribution of seeds, providing credit to rural areas 
and preserving jobs in the sugar cane industry, while he focused on housing, health, education 
and transportation in Recife and other cities in the capital region (CPDOC 2017).91   
 In 1990, Joaquim Francisco from the conservative Liberal Front Party (PFL) won the 
gubernatorial election.  During this period, governors did not develop multifaceted public 
security programs but instead continued with the repression-based policies implemented during 
the military dictatorship (Zaverucha 2003).  While Francisco was in office, Arraes’ relationship 
with the PMDB began to deteriorate, and in 1992, he officially left the party to join the leftist 
Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB).  In 1994, he won his third term as the state’s governor with a 
                                                     
90 He was also governor from 1963 until 1964 when the government exiled him to Europe following the country’s 
military coup. 
91 Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação História Contemporânea do Brasil Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação 
História Contemporânea do Brasil 
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coalition that joined several leftist parties (PDT, PPS, PCdoB, PCB, PT, PMN and the PT) and 
conservative owners of sugar cane plantations who were important for garnering support in the 
interior of the state (CPDOC 2017).  
 During his time in office, Arraes did not initially establish any new programs for public 
security, and the percentage of the budget devoted to security remained stable.  Instead, his 
administration focused on other issues, including the state’s growing debt problems, developing 
the sugarcane industry and regional development.  However, public security forced its way to the 
forefront of state politics.  In October 1995, military police and firefighters held a small protest 
in in Recife to highlight precarious working conditions and low salaries.92  The protests quickly 
ended, but discontent continued to grow.  
 In 1997, Colonel Menezes, an Arraes ally, took control of the military police.  During his 
first few days in office, he released a document outlining his vision for the police that 
emphasized improving police-society relations, investing in technology, creating better working 
conditions for the police and increasing productivity.93  Specific strategies he supported included 
having a police captain and lieutenant in every municipality, increasing police patrols, creating a 
center for citizens to file police reports in each area, treating citizens with respect and reducing 
police violence.       
 Although the police supported his policies, the state was facing a major economic crisis 
and there were no immediate changes in police officers’ salaries and benefits.  The lack of 
changes led to widespread discontent.  In a survey of more than 1300 police officers, 86 percent 
indicated that the government did not have any policies to address the wage concerns or that it 
had very bad policies (Braz Miranda 2006, 42).  In July 1997, the military police, the civil police 
                                                     
92 Soldier, which is the designation for rank-and-file police officers, were earning R$300 (about US$267) per month. 
93 Normative Supplement N° G 1.0.00.0 03, of 1/15/1997 released on January 1, 1997.  
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and the military firefighting units went on strike for twelve days, leading to a sudden surge in 
violence in the capital city of Recife.  The government responded by calling in the military to 
police the state and jailing the strike leaders.94  However, as violence continued to climb, the 
government began to negotiate, agreeing to a 14 percent salary increase for police officials and a 
45.7 percent salary increase for rank-and-file police officers.95 The following year, per capita 
spending on public security rose 24 percent.96  Still, with the increase in resources directed 
toward better salaries rather than hiring new police officers or purchasing new equipment, 
violence continued to climb. 
 While in office, Arraes sought to expand his political power by persuading politicians 
from other states, including Ciro Gomes from an influential family in Cearense politics, to join 
the PSB.97  In the days leading up to the 1998 elections, these efforts created tensions within the 
leftist coalition that brought him into power.  At the same time, Jarbas Vasconcelos, the former 
mayor of Recife and the PMDB’s most experienced political operator in the state, formed an 
alliance with the Liberal Front Party, the PMDB’s traditional adversaries in Pernambucan 
politics.  Vasconcelos won the 1998 election with more than 64 percent of the vote.  
 Vasconcelos’ arrival brought about the first real changes in Pernambuco’s public security 
policies.  In 2000, the state disbanded the Secretary of Public Security, which only controlled the 
civil police, and formed the Secretary of Social Defense (SDS) with power over the civil police, 
military police and firefighters.98  Although Vasconcelos focused primarily on security, making 
                                                     
94 It is illegal for members of the military police and firefighters to go on strike since they are members of the 
Armed Forces. 
95 Folha de Sao Paulo. 2000. “PM de Pernambuco fez greve em 97.” October 20. 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u12678.shtml (November 9, 2017).  
96 Although it grew in absolute terms, it declined in relative terms as the state’s overall budget grew.  While the 
government spent 8.6 percent of its budget on security in 1997, this percentage declined to 6.2 in 1998.    
97 Ciro Gomes was governor of Ceará from 1991-1994 and is a leading political candidate in the 2018 presidential 
election.  His brother, Cid Gomes was the state’s governor from 2007to 2014. 
98 Law Nº 11,629 of January 28, 1999.  
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General Adalberto Bueno da Cruz, the first secretary of social defense, he also created a Social 
Defense Council to establish a policy to protect the public and coordinate the state’s public 
security agencies (Zaverucha 2003, 25).  In addition, the state released its Integrated Citizen 
Security Plan of the State of Pernambuco with three broad focus areas: (1) social defense, justice 
and citizenship, (2) social policies and (3) community actions.  These policies and new 
instituations achieved some success.  Between 1999 and 2006, the state’s five percent increase in 
security spending coincided with a five percent decline in the homicide rate.    
 So why did Arraes, a politically astute politician who served three terms as Pernambuco’s 
governor, give minimal attention to public security, while Vasconcelos created several programs 
to address security problems?  A key component lies in their bases of electoral support.  In 
Pernambuco, violence is concentrated in large urban areas, especially the state capital, Recife, 
and the metropolitan region surrounding it.  The 13 cities that make up this region have more 
than 50 percent of the state’s homicides.   
 For Vasconcelos, tackling violence in this region was crucial to his political future, since 
it was his base of electoral support.  In the 1998 and 2002 elections, he received around 50 
percent of all his votes from this region.  In addition, during his first term in office, five cities in 
this region had mayors from the PMDB and its electoral partners.  In contrast, Arraes received 
only 37 percent of his total electoral support from this area and only three small cities in the 
region had mayors from the PSB and its electoral partners.  Vasconcelos was also the mayor of 
Recife while Arraes was governor.  Thus, any efforts Arraes made to better security in the capital 
would reflect positively on his political rival.  Although the region was important for his 
electoral success, his electoral base was concentrated in the interior of the state, where 
agricultural problems, rather than violence, were the most important political issue.  
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 The 2006 elections brought about major changes in the state’s public security policies.  
With term limits forcing Vasconcelos from office, his vice-governor, José Mendonça Filho 
(PFL) ran for office and lost in a surprising defeat to Eduardo Campos from the PSB.  Campos 
was part of a political dynasty in Pernambuco.  His grandfather was Miguel Arraes de Alencar 
and his mother served one term as federal deputy.  Prior to running for governor, he was a state 
and federal deputy and served as the state’s Secretary of Treasury during his grandfather’s 
administration as well as federal minister of Science and Technology under Luíz “Lula” Inácio 
da Silva.   
 Campos made public security an important part of his electoral platform.  Working with 
José Luiz Ratton, a sociologist and leading expert on violence at the Federal University of 
Pernambuco, the state government created the Pact for Life: State Plan for Public Security to 
address the persistently high levels of violence.  Despite Vasconcelos’ security successes, in 
2006, Pernambuco still had the country’s highest second homicide rate with more than 52 
victims per 100 thousand residents.  The Pact for Life identified patterns of violence in different 
groups of people and regions in the state and provided tailored policies to address them.  As 
Table 5.7 shows, the plan lists dozens of projects that focus on crime repression, social 
prevention and institutional improvement, among others.  Specific projects include generating 
better data to allocate police resources more efficiently, providing more career security for law 
enforcement officers and hiring more police officers.  It also includes crime prevention through 
social programs such as Youth in Movement (Juventude em Movimento) that guarantees young 
people the right to access education, work, employment and income.   
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Table 5.7: Pact for Life, Total Projects by Thematic Area 
   
Repression 38 
Institutional Improvement 29 
Information and Knowledge Management 17 
Training 1 
Social Prevention 41 
Democratic Management 4 
Source: Pact for Life: State Plan for Public Security  
  
  
 During his tenure, Campos actively directed the state’s public security policy and 
regularly participated in the Pact for Life’s weekly meetings.  These meetings typically last three 
hours and have 80 to 90 people from different branches of government involved in public 
security, including the military and civil police, judges, public prosecutors and a variety of 
people from the state’s Secretary of Social Defense and other state agencies.  In March 2016, I 
attended one of these meetings.   
 The meeting begins with a review of the progress made on tasks that the director assigned 
to specific individuals in previous meetings.  Afterwards, attendees bring up important pressing 
issues that range from prison overcrowding to building a new DNA database.  Each group has 5 
to 10 minutes to discuss its issue.  The meeting director then assigns an individual to fix these 
issues by an agreed-upon date. This first part of the meeting lasts one hour. 
 The next two hours involve a review of crime and police productivity at the municipal 
level and in integrated security areas (AIS) that cover multiple small municipalities or part of a 
large municipality.  Each municipality and all 26 AISs have set goals for crime reduction in 
several areas, including homicides and robberies.  They also have goals for firearm seizures, 
drug seizures, arrest warrants issued and arrest warrants carried out.  Since 2004, the government 
has given bonuses for firearm seizures.  In 2004, police officers received between R$100 and 
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R$500 for each weapon, depending on its lethality and how it was seized.  In 2015, the 
government increased this bonus to R$700-R$2000.99  With new police officers earning R$2320 
per month, this bonus can be a significant source of income.   
 In 2011, the government also began providing financial incentives for meeting goals in 
the following areas: arrest warrants issued, arrest warrants carried out and cocaine products 
seized.100  Each month, the top five AISs and operational groups receive R$10,000 
(approximately US$3300) that they divide among the top ten productive officers in the unit. 101  
In 2015, the state legislature modified the program to include arrests for low-level offenders.  
However, as part of the bargaining with the public security unions, it also added individual 
bonuses for achieving goals in these policy areas.  Each month, the 150 police officers who seize 
the most cocaine receive bonuses of up to R$1000 (about US$330).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
99 Law Nº 12.719, of December 2, 2004, Law Nº 13.355, of December 13, 2007, Law nº 15.457, of February 12, 
2015. 
100 Law Nº 14.320, of May 27, 2011.   
101 Operational groups are police units dedicated to specific themes such as the Women’s Police Department 
(DPMUL) and the Department for Drug Suppression (DENARC).  
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 Although the government motivates police productivity, it also has a strong 
accountability mechanism.  At the meeting, commanders from areas where crime is increasing 
are required to stand before the group, justify the increase and explain the policies that they are 
taking to tackle the problem.  During the meeting I attended, the commander in a rural part of the 
state said that violence in the area he managed was increasing because there was more family 
violence, rural violence and a reduction in the number of police officers he had under his 
command.  The meeting leader became irritated and began yelling at the police officer.  He said 
that this area only lost three out of 113 police officers.  Therefore, there needs to be a real answer 
to the question and the officer needed to stop making excuses for the problem.  “If we do not fix 
the problem, the population will fix us” (Pact for Life Meeting, Pernambuco, 2016).   
 As Figure 5.3 shows, the Pact for Life’s multidimensional approach to security coincided 
with a large increase in resources for security.  Since 2006, the state has increased per capita 
spending on security more than 42 percent.  This change in resources was a result of the state’s 
growing budget rather than the government placing a stronger emphasis on providing more 
security resources.  Between 2006 and 2014, the state’s per capita budget grew from R$657 to 
R$928.  However, the percentage of the state’s total budget devoted to security has remained flat 
at 8.50 percent since 2006 and has declined 36 percent since 1991, when the government spent 
11.4 percent of its budget to security.   
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Figure 5.3: Pernambuco Homicide Rates and Public Security Spending 
 Figure 5.3 reveals other important patterns.  While more money for law enforcement 
coincided with declining homicide rates when Governor Campos was in power, it coincided with 
more violence during previous administrations.  The highest increase in violence came when his 
grandfather was governor between 1995 and 1998.  This finding suggests that simply giving 
more resources to law enforcement is not sufficient to reduce crime rates.  Rather, reducing 
violence requires politically astute governors to prioritize public security among the many 
policies they must manage. 
 In Table 5.8, I measure the bivariate correlation between homicide rates and the 
governor’s personal vote share that came from a municipality, and homicide rates and having a 
mayor from the same party as the governor.  In all years, there is a positive correlation the 
governor’s personal vote share and violence, suggesting that simply giving more support to the 
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governor does not guarantee lower crime rates.  Meanwhile, the effects of having a mayor from 
the same party are more mixed.  During the governorships of Arraes and his grandson, Eduardo 
Campos, there is a moderate negative correlation between violence and having a PSB mayor.  In 
contrast, when Jarbas Vasconcelos controlled the governorship between 1999 and 2006, there is 
a positive correlation between violence and the mayor’s party.   
Table 5.8: Correlation Coefficients, Homicide Rates and Politics 
  
 
    
Term 
 
Governor Governor's Personal Vote Share 
 
Same Party Mayor 
 
1997-1998  Miguel Arraes 0.2418 -0.0673 
1999-2002  Jarbas Vasconcelos 0.2373 0.0918 
2003-2006 Jarbas Vasconcelos 0.2742 0.0453 
2007-2010 Eduardo Campos 0.1907 -0.0906 
2011-2014 Eduardo Campos 0.1122 -0.0458 
 
 
  
  
 The Pact for Life had a strong impact on Campos’s electoral success.  In 2006, he won 
only 34 percent of the popular vote in the first round, forcing him to participate in a runoff 
election.  Following the large drop in crime that occurred during his first four years in office, he 
won the 2010 election with an unprecedented 83 percent of the popular vote, making him the 
most successful governor elected that year.  In 2014, Campos resigned the governorship and 
began a presidential run promising to bring the Pact for Life’s violence reducing policies to all of 
Brazil.  However, he died in a plane crash in São Paulo on August 13, 2014.   
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 In 2014, Campos’s Secretary of the Treasury, Paulo Câmara, won the state’s 
gubernatorial election.  Although he continued with the Pact for Life, the state’s public security 
successes have begun to falter.  Between 2014 and 2016 the state’s homicide rate increased 32 
percent while violent property crimes rose almost 76 percent (Secretaria de Defensa Social 
2017).  In 2017, the security situation has continued to deteriorate with 5427 murders, making it 
the most violent year in Pernambuco since Brazil’s return to democracy. 
 The exact reasons behind Câmara’s public security failures are not apparent.  However, 
two factors stand out.  First, he took control of the state just as its economy was beginning to 
falter.  While the unemployment rate was around 11 percent during Campos’ second election, by 
2017 it had increased to 17.6 percent.  When there are fewer economic opportunities, people 
have greater incentives to commit crimes.  Second, while Câmara had served in various cabinet 
level position under Campos, he had minimal political experience.  Prior to becoming the state’s 
governor, he had never held an elected office.  This is uncommon among governors who 
typically hold multiple political offices before running in gubernatorial elections.   The lack of 
political experience may have made it more difficult for him to negotiate with various elements 
of the public security apparatus, thus reducing their overall effectiveness.   
5.3 MODELS OF CRIME CONTROL 
While these case studies illustrate the different mechanisms that governors use to influence 
security, I more systematically test their effect on violence using data from more than 5500 
municipalities across Brazil between 1997 and 2014.  Table 5.9 contains summary statistics for 
all model covariates.  I measure violence using homicide data from the Ministry of Health’s 
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Death Information System (SIM).  This is the most comprehensive database on the causes of 
intentional deaths in Brazil.  To control for differences in municipal size, I use the log of the 
homicide rate per 100 thousand residents.102 
Table 5.9: Summary Statistics 
        
 Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
Homicide Rate  13.41 18.13 0 270.18 
Personal Vote Share 0.49 2.63 0.0009 100 
Right Governor 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Center Governor 0.61 0.35 0 1 
Same Party, Governor and Mayor 0.22 0.49 0 1 
Security Spending (per capita) 78.30 31.73 8.59 491.58 
Education Spending (per capita) 154.37 57.56 51.87 512.85 
Infant Death Rate (per 1000 live births) 17.05 15.10 0 100 
Population 32,765 195,503 697 11,900,000 
Population Density (km2) 106 563 0.08 13,341 
State Unemployment Rate 8.57 2.63 3.1 20.5 
Reelection Run  0.48 0.50 0 1 
     
N=96,576     
     
  
5.3.1 The Political Determinants of Crime Control 
I use per capita spending on law enforcement to test the resource allocation mechanism, which 
argues that states that spend more on law enforcement will have lower crime rates, since they can 
develop a more effective deterrence capacity by hiring more police officers, creating bonus 
programs and investing in law enforcement infrastructure.  During the period under 
investigation, the security budget data exhibit problems in select years with pension data missing 
                                                     
102 I use the following formula: log(Homicide Rate +1).   
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from the expenditures.  They also occasionally move spending on law enforcement to other 
budgetary categories, such as general expenditures, for unknown reasons.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, I corrected for this problem by reviewing states’ transparency websites.  Using this 
strategy led to the loss of only 1.7 percent of all observations.   
 Since data on how the government distributes law enforcement resources to individual 
municipalities is unavailable for this period, I test the resource distribution mechanism, which 
posits that cities with more security resources will have lower crime rates, using the percentage 
of the governor’s total votes throughout the state that came from the municipality.  In Chapter 4, 
I showed that state governors sent more police officers to large municipalities that were 
important for their electoral success.  I calculate this variable using Ames’ (2002) formula:   
Personal Share = (Votes Governor Received in Municipality/Total Votes   
 Received by Candidate in the State) x 100 
 
 I test the policy coordination mechanism using the mayor and the governor’s party 
affiliation.  This is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1, when the mayor and the governor 
are from the same party, and a 0 otherwise.  In line with previous scholarship (Hoelscher 2015; 
Trejo and Ley 2016), I expect to find that homicide rates will be lower in municipalities where 
the governor and mayor are from the same party.  As Table 5.10 shows, as the number of 
political parties has increased in recent years, the percentage of municipalities throughout the 
country where the mayor is from the same party as the governor has declined.  While 28 percent 
of mayors were from the governor’s party in 1997, by 2013 only 19 percent of mayors were from 
the governor's party.         
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Table 5.10: Municipalities with Governor and Mayor from the Same Party 
 
 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 
      
Same Party Mayor 1,538 1,460 1,444 1,219 1,063 
Different Party Mayor 3,864 4,044 4,058 4,329 4,495 
      
  
 I measure the final mechanism, policy change, which argues that governors from right 
parties will focus more on security since voters punish them more harshly for rising crime rates, 
using the governor’s ideological affiliation.  I classify the governor’s ideological group using the 
same measure I used in previous chapters; historical documents and official party information 
along with Power and Zucco’s (2009) party classification index, which measures ideology based 
on parties’ voting behavior in the national Congress.  This measure classifies parties similar to 
other studies that have used elite questionnaires and expert opinions (Tarouco and Madeira 
2013).   
5.3.2 Additional Determinants of Crime Rates 
I also control for a variety of socioeconomic factors that scholarship has previously been 
associated with crime and violence.  The first factor is population size.  Rapid population growth 
may strain the government’s ability to provide an adequate law enforcement presence to deter 
crime.  As municipalities grow, there may be a lag between the presence of more people and the 
state’s ability to hire more police officers.  A large body of research (see Nolan [2004] for an 
overview) suggests that there is a strong relationship between population size and crime rates.  
Therefore, I include the log of the municipal population along with the population density per 
square kilometer.   
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 Rational choice theories of crime control argue that people commit crimes for economic 
benefits (Becker 1968).  Increasing municipal wealth has the potential to reduce crime since it 
may make alternative work opportunities available.  However, as the economy grows, the city 
may be more attractive to offenders since there are more potential targets.  Meanwhile, 
sociological theories of crime argue that inequality rather than overall wealth affects crime rates 
(Brush 1996; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Pare and Felson 2014).  I control for both wealth and 
inequality using the infant death rate per 1000 live births. Although the infant mortality rate is 
not a direct measure of inequality, it is available for all years and correlates with the more widely 
used GINI index of income inequality, which is available only during census years.103       
 I also include four state level factors related to crime and violence.  While education has 
primarily long-term effects on crime, it may also provide some short-term crime prevention 
benefits by occupying children’s time.  A phenomenon that Tauchen, Witte and Griesinger 
(1994) refer to as the ‘self-incapacitation’ effect.  I measure the impact that education has on 
crime using per capita education spending.   
 As the economy worsens the incentive to engage in criminal activity increases.  I measure 
the state’s economic health using the unemployment rate.  Finally, I expect that governors’ 
responses to crime may also depend on their career path.  More specifically, governors who are 
running for reelection have a stronger incentive to focus on public security than those who 
choose not to run or are unable to run due to term limits.  Therefore, I expect to find that 
homicide rates will be lower in municipalities located in states where governors are running for 
reelection.   
                                                     
103 I did not measure wealth using municipal GDP per capita since municipal GDP data are only available until 
2010.  
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5.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 
To test the mechanisms, I use three models: the Arellano-Bond model, the fixed effects model 
and the multilevel model.  The Arellano-Bond model allows me to include violence in prior 
years, as a covariate that influences violence in the current year.  Since violence within cities 
often exhibits trends within units, failure to control for previous levels of violence can 
erroneously show that politics is reducing violence when it is in fact, an artifact of the model.  
The Arellano-Bond model, however, has its shortcomings.  Most importantly, it rests on the 
assumption that municipalities are independent.  However, the data violate this assumption since 
municipalities within states share a common governor and other state level covariates, including 
spending on security and education, which are central to my argument.  Therefore, there is likely 
to be correlation in levels of violence across municipalities in the same state.  I address this 
problem using by also testing my theory using multilevel and fixed effects panel models.   
   The multilevel model consists of level 1 and level 2 components.  Level 1 contains those 
municipal factors that account for changes in the municipality’s homicide rate.  In addition, when 
there are higher-level covariates that change over time, such as the governor’s ideology and state 
security spending, we include these features at level 1 (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012).  Level 
2 contains state level covariates that remain stable over time and cause municipalities located 
within states to have, on average, higher or lower levels of violence.  My theoretical models do 
not include any level 2 factors that remain stable over time.  Therefore, I only include a random 
intercept term at level 2 and there are no cross-level interactions.   
 Finally, the fixed effects model assumes that observations within municipalities will be 
similar since cities have unchanging features that cause them to have, on average, higher or 
lower levels of violence.  It corrects this problem by using deviations from the mean values of 
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the covariates in each municipality, to measure how they affect violence.  When using this 
model, I also cluster standard errors at the state level to account for clustering of observations 
within states.    
 I divide municipalities into two groups; those that have more than 20,000 residents and 
those with fewer than 20,000 residents.  Although I measure violence using the log of the 
homicide rate, small municipalities will continue to show high homicide rates even though a city 
may be relative peaceful.  For example, a double homicide during a bar fight in a city with 2000 
residents will results in astronomically high homicide rate of 100 victims per 100 thousand 
residents.  However, this is qualitatively different from a city with 100 thousand residents that 
has 100 homicides.  Since more than 90 percent of homicides occur in cities with at least 20,000 
residents, I focus on these municipalities to understand how politics influences local violence.  I 
include the statistical results for cities with fewer than 20,000 residents in Appendix D.    
 Table 5.11 shows how state and local politics affect violence in large municipalities.  The 
results provided mixed evidence that governors use the four popular crime-fighting tools that are 
at their disposal.  Across all models, there is a moderate decline in municipal homicide rates 
when a right governor is in power.  On average, cities have 23 homicides annually.  We would 
expect there to be one less homicide when a right governor is in power compared to the same 
city had a left governor been in power.   
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Table 5.11: Effects of Politics on Municipal Violence, 1997-2014 
 
 Fixed Effect Models Multi-Level Models Arellano-Bond Models 
       
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Level 1        
  Homicide Rate (t-1)     0.242*** 0.240*** 
     (0.016) (0.016) 
  Homicide Rate (t-2)     0.134*** 0.133*** 
     (0.013) (0.013) 
  Homicide Rate (t-3)     0.095*** 0.094*** 
     (0.011) (0.011) 
  Right Governor -0.31** -0.312** -0.334*** -0.334*** -0.088* -0.086* 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.036) (0.036) 
  Center Governor -0.12* -0.12* -0.117* -0.117* -0.039+ -0.038+ 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.059) (0.023) (0.023) 
  Same Party -0.017 -0.017 -0.02 -0.02 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
  Security Spending 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001+ 0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Personal Share 0.001 0.012 -0.014* -0.0004 -0.003 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) 
  Personal Share x   -0.00016*  -0.0001+  -0.0001 
  Per Capita Security  (0.00006)  (.00008)  (0.0002) 
  Reelection  -0.038 -0.038 -0.044 -0.044 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.016) (0.016) 
  Education Spending -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.0005+ -0.0005+ 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
  Infant Death Rate 0.004 0.004 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Population (log) -0.034 -0.012 0.356*** 0.356*** -0.430* -0.439* 
 (0.103) (0.101) (0.039) (0.038) (0.203) (0.202) 
  Population Density -0.0008*** -0.0008*** 0.00004** 0.00004 -0.001* -0.0008* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
  State Unemployment Rate 0.096 0.097** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.007) (0.007) 
  Constant 1.804 1.506 -1.338** -1.338** 6.360** 6.438** 
 (1.195) (1.163) (0.478) (0.478) (2.208) (2.198) 
N 27,176 27,176 27,176 27,176 25,627 25,627 
Within R-Squared 0.1730 0.1730     
Pseudo Level 1 R-Squared   0.1890 0.1898     
Robust standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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  There is less evidence that governors are utilizing other popular crime fighting tools, and 
if they are, they do not appear to be effective.  Homicide rates do not decline when the mayor 
and the governor are from the same party or when the governor runs for reelection.  Similarly, 
the provision of more law enforcement resources is actually associated with a slight increase in 
violence, although these results are not robust across all models.  The former finding contradicts 
my expectations that better coordination between the two levels of government reduces violence 
and may indicate that what really matter is how the government distributes resources.  As I 
showed in Chapter 4, governors send more police officers to large cities governed by allied 
mayors.  Therefore, the effect of having an allied mayor may be due to more resources rather 
than better coordinate.  The latter finding is most likely due to reverse causality problem.  More 
specifically, governors are likely to increase their spending on security when crime increased in 
the previous period.   
 In Model 2, I test the hypotheses that the effect of security resources on crime depends on 
both a) how the government distributes these resources and b) how much the government invests 
in public security.  First, if governors are giving more law enforcement resources to politically 
important cities, then more spending on security should reduce violence most sharply in those 
cities where the governor receives more support.  To test this argument, I interact state law 
enforcement spending and the percentage of the governor’s total statewide support that came 
from the municipality.  The interaction term is negative but insignificant in both the multilevel 
and Arellano-Bond models.  Interaction terms, however, can be insignificant overall but 
significant at specific levels.   
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 In Figure 5.4, I use the results from the multi-level model to graph the average effect of 
security spending as the personal share of the governor’s votes that comes from the municipality 
increases from 0 to 10 percent.  This range covers more than 98 percent of observations.  
Contrary to expectations, the results continue to show that, on average, security spending does 
not reduce municipal violence even as the municipality becomes more important for the 
governor’s electoral success.   
 
 
Figure 5.4: The Effect of Security Spending as Support for the Governor Increases 
 I next test whether the impact that giving more support for the governor is contingent 
upon the amount of resources that the state spends on law enforcement.  In Figure 5.5, I plot the 
interaction between gubernatorial support and security spending.  This graph shows the average 
effect that a unit increase in support for the governor has on municipal violence when states 
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invest different levels of resources in law enforcement.  In states that spend less than R$100 
(about US$33) per capita on security, homicide rates do not decline in municipalities when the 
governor receives more electoral support from a municipality.  However, in states that spend 
more than R$100 per capita on law enforcement, support for the governor is associated with a 
decline in municipal violence and this effect grows stronger the more that the state spends on law 
enforcement.  Consider the following cases.  In a city with an average homicide rate that gives 
the governor one percent of her total electoral support, increasing per capita spending on law 
enforcement from R$100 to R$300 leads to a one percent decline in the homicide rate.  In 
contrast, a city that gives the governor five percent of her total support would see a five percent 
decline in violence from this same increase.    
  
 
Figure 5.5: Gubernatorial Support, Security Spending and Violence  
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5.4.1 Model Summary 
Taken together, the empirical evidence provides two important insights about the politics of 
public security.  First, it suggests that governors from left and right parties take different 
approaches to public security that extend beyond the provision and distribute of security 
resources.  Violence is lower when right governors are in power.  This finding coalesces with 
evidence from Chapter 2 where I show that voters more strongly punish governors from right 
parties for rising crime rates.  For governors from right parties, reducing crime is more vital for 
their electoral success.  Focusing more on security is also be an effective electoral strategy that 
allows them to differentiate themselves from political opponents who they can paint as being soft 
on crime.   
 Second, it shows that across the ideological spectrum, governors can reduce violence 
through the effective provision and allocation of security resources.  However, there is a floor on 
the amount of resources that governors need before they are able to reduce violence.  If the state 
is poor or the government does not prioritize law enforcement by allocating more money for law 
enforcement, then any efforts governors make to reward supporters with more security will fail.  
These findings shed light on the puzzling increase in violence in northern and northeastern states 
in Brazil, which I highlighted at the beginning of the chapter.  Although these states have had 
great success in reducing inequality in recent years, they remain poor and have minimal 
resources for law enforcement.  Nine out of the ten states that have never spent R$100 on law 
enforcement, the threshold needed for local politics to influence violence, are located in the north 
and northeast.  It should not be surprising, therefore, that states in these regions have seen some 
of the country’s largest increases in violence. 
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 Beyond law enforcement, other state measures to reduce violence also show promising 
results.  In line with expectations, violence declines when spending on education rises.  A 
standard deviation increase in education spending (about R$60 or US$20), leads to a 10 percent 
decline in the homicide rate across all models.  This finding suggests that while critics argue that 
education is primarily a long-term solution to violence, it can also be an effective policy for 
reducing crime in the short term through the ‘self-incapacitation effect’, whereby it occupies 
children’s time and prevents them from being crime victims or perpetrators (Tauchen et al. 
1994).  The crime reducing impact of education is even more interesting when we consider that 
the analysis of state budgets in Chapter 3 showed no evidence that governors from left parties 
spend more on education than governors from right parties.   
 While we do not directly have information on how the state government distributes these 
resources, the evidence suggests that governors have more difficulty giving additional 
educational resources to municipalities that are more important for their electoral success.  In 
Figure 5.6, I graph the average effect of security spending at different levels of support for the 
governor.  As the graph shows, regardless of how much support the municipality gives the 
governor, education spending reduces violence.  Moreover, its violence reducing effects are 
slightly smaller in municipalities that give the governor more electoral support.  The lack of a 
strong ability to direct education resources to politically important municipalities may help 
explain why we do not find differences in education spending among governors from different 
ends of the ideological spectrum.    
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Figure 5.6: Education Spending, Support for the Governor and Violence  
 Other factors largely conform to expectations.  Higher infant mortality and 
unemployment rates lead to higher rates of violence suggesting that economic problems and 
poverty plays an important role in shaping crime rates.  Meanwhile, homicide rates decline as 
population growth and density increases.  This finding is in line with recent studies (Waiselfisz 
2011; Steeves, Petterini and Moura 2015) showing that violence in Brazil has begun to move 
away from large cities and into smaller cities in the interior of states.   
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined four important mechanisms through which local and state politics can 
influence homicide rates; resource provision, resource distribution, policy coordination and 
policy change.  In previous chapters, I showed that the amount of resources governors allocate to 
law enforcement depends on the governor’s ideology and the main political opponent in the last 
election.  In addition, governors across the ideological spectrum send more police officers to 
large municipalities that are important for their electoral success. 
 This chapter showed that providing more resources for law enforcement helps reduce 
violence in large cities when states spend at least R$100 on law enforcement.  Governors provide 
resources based on the city’s importance for their own electoral success but they do not 
coordinate efforts with local political allies.  At first glance, this may be puzzling.  However, 
while politicians within the same party are part of the same team, there are often strong 
interparty rivalries.  Thus, greater policy coordinate could potentially be harmful for the 
governors’ political careers.     
 There is also evidence that governors’ choices for public security policies affect crime 
rates.  When a conservative governor is in power, homicide rates decline around 5 percent.  The 
difference in homicide rates depending on the governor’s ideology are in line with the evidence 
from Chapter 1, where I show that voters punish right parties more harshly than they punish left 
parties for rising homicide rates.  For governors from right parties, this stronger punishment 
provides them with greater incentives to focus on security while they are in office.   
 This chapter also shows the importance of taking into account the local political 
environment when examining human security.  While modifying structural factors, such as 
poverty and inequality often require long-term concerted efforts, state governments still have the 
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power to implement policies that can help achieve moderation reductions in violence by 
increasing spending on education and other policies that reduce unemployment.  For both the 
national government and international organizations seeking to reduce violence, this finding 
suggests that working with governors may be an important strategy to reduce violence.       
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6. CHAPTER 6: THE LONG ROAD AHEAD 
Brazil reached a new milestone in 2017.  For the first time in its history, the country passed the 
psychologically important mark of 60,000 homicides.  It now has the most homicides of any 
country in the world, surpassing the combined totals for India and China.  With the economy in 
shambles and gang violence growing at alarming rates, 2018 looks to be an even bloodier year.  
Raul Jungmann, the Minister of Defense, put it simply, saying, “The current system is failing.”104  
 In this dissertation, I examined the intertwined relationship between local politics, state 
policies and violence in Brazilian states.  My argument was simple.  Politicians are rational 
actors who tackle violence based on how it affects their electoral interests.  Using this approach, 
I argued that we should understand this relationship as a continuous four-stage cycle that 
includes elections, provision of security resources, distribution of security resources and 
violence.  In the four chapters that followed, I then examined each stage of this cycle.     
 In Chapter 2, I examined how violence influences political parties’ electoral success.  My 
findings challenged the common wisdom that public security problems benefit right-wing parties 
that advocate tough-on-crime policies.  Using municipal crime and voting data from 135 
gubernatorial elections in Brazil between 1994 and 2010, I showed that parties across the 
ideological spectrum benefit from rising crime rates when the incumbent party is from a different 
                                                     
104 Folha de São Paulo. 2018. “Sistema de segurança no país está ‘falido’, diz ministro Raul Jungmann.” January 31. 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2018/01/1954844-sistema-de-seguranca-no-pais-esta-falido-diz-ministro-
raul-jungmann.shtml  
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ideological group.  However, their electoral gains depend on the incumbent party’s ideology.  
Non-incumbent left parties see the largest electoral gains from increasing violence when a right 
party is in power and vice-versa.  I also show voters punish political parties unequally for rising 
crime rates.  More specifically, voters punish incumbent right-wing parties more harshly for 
rising levels of crime and violence than they punish center and left parties.  I attributed these 
differences in punishment to right-wing parties emphasizing crime prevention through law 
enforcement that focuses on short-term results.  
 In Chapter 3, I then turned to the issue of how ideology and state electoral politics 
influences the resources that governors allocate for public security.  I argued that governors 
allocate resources based on political competition and ideology rather than ideology alone.  Using 
state budget data, I demonstrated that governors from right parties do not spend more on the 
judiciary, which is more difficult to distribute to their supporters.  In addition, they only spend 
more on law enforcement when they face competition from left parties, which they can paint as 
being soft on security.  When right governors are in a state where their primary political 
competition comes from a centrist or another right party, they spend less on security than 
governors from left parties do.  I also showed that while leftist parties advocate education as a 
long-term solution to crime, they do not allocate more resources for education when they are in 
power.  I attributed the lack of partisan differences for spending on education to the 
constitutional requirement that state governments must spend 25 percent of their tax revenues on 
education.   
 Chapter 4 then focused on how governors allocate law enforcement resources throughout 
the state.  Using data on the distribution of police officers in Mins Gerais, which has 853 cities, I 
showed that political factors are the driving force that determines the distribution of police 
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officers.  When the state’s military police force is growing, governors send more police officers 
to those municipalities that are large and give them many votes.  Meanwhile, when the police 
force is shrinking, these cities lose fewer police officers.  In other words, governors direct 
resources to those cities that are most important for their electoral success.  These additional 
resources, however, come at the expense of neighboring cities that receive fewer police officers. 
I also demonstrate that governors support important political allies by sending more police 
officers to large municipalities that give more support to allied states deputies and those that 
have mayors from allied parties.   
 In the final chapter, I used quantitative evidence and case studies from the states of 
Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro to examine how gubernatorial crime fighting tools affect 
municipal homicide rates.  Using homicide data from 1997 to 2014, I found that homicide rates 
decline in cities that provide more support for the governor.  I attribute this decline to these cities 
receiving more police resources.  This effect, however, is only present when the state spend a 
minimum of R$100 per person on law enforcement.  This spending floor suggests that governors 
from poor states, states that lack resources, will have minimal success in rewarding supporters 
with lower crime rates.  I also showed that homicide rates decline when states spend more on 
education and when the state has a governor from a right party.  However, there is no evidence 
that governors reward political allies in state and local government with more security resources. 
Taking into account the four stages of the politics-violence cycle, my research provides strong 
support for the overarching claim that politics play an important role in public security policies 
and outcomes in Brazil.  Politicians are career-oriented actors and local political conditions drive 
public security policies.  Using a rational-choice approach, I showed that governors implement 
security policies and distribute security resources based largely on how crime affects their career 
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success, rather than relying on technical criteria designed to minimize crime rates.  These 
resources, in turn, help explain changes in violence within municipalities and across states.   
6.1 CONTRIBUTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
On a broader level, this project is the first effort to analyze the cycle of violence and politics 
throughout Brazil and it has important implications for government policies and the study of 
Brazilian politics along with our broader understanding of security issues in Latin America.  
Research on violence in Brazil often asserts that patterns of violence and government security 
policies in one region or state can apply to all regions or states.  This is, however, a dangerous 
assumption that can lead state governments to copy successful policies from other states that are 
not well suited for their particular social and political context.  The problem has already affected 
Bahia, one of Brazil’s largest states.   
 With violence rising throughout Bahia in the 2000s, the state government began looking 
for programs to address the problem.  It turned its attention northward where Pernambuco had 
great success in reducing violence through the Pact for Life security program.  In 2011, Bahia 
followed Pernambuco’s example and implemented its own Pact for Life program.  While this 
program reduced violence in Pernambuco, it failed in Bahia despite similar policies and a large 
increase in the state’s law enforcement budget.  By showing how different public security 
policies affect crime and violence throughout the country, this project can help state government 
make better decisions, which take into account the local context, when attempting to reduce 
violence.  
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 At the federal level, Brazil’s constitution strictly limits the government’s role in law 
enforcement.  However, my study suggests that the federal government can implement policies 
that have minimal costs, yet have the potential to yield broad dividends in reducing violence.  
One of these policies is forcing states to provide more information about public security policies.  
As I discussed in Chapter 3, the federal government’s transparency law allows governors to keep 
basic security information, such as the number of total police officers in the state and each 
municipality, a secret since it is “vital to citizen security.”  Since there are no criteria for what 
constitutes a policy that is “vital to citizen security,” governors can hide or release this 
information at their convenience.     
 The federal government can modify the transparency law, forcing states to release this 
public security data.  Based on my research, this would show a vastly uneven distribution of law 
enforcement officers in municipalities across the country.  Given the importance of security for 
voters, this information has the potential to create political pressures that would force states to 
better allocate police officers based on technical factors, rather than simply sending more officers 
to municipalities important for the governor’s electoral success.  These changes, in turn, have the 
potential of helping the government reduce crime rates without incurring further costs.   
 The project’s emphasis on states also contributes to our broader understanding of politics 
in Brazil.  Scholars routinely view governors as some of the country’s most important political 
actors.  Since the country’s return to democracy, however, the study of Brazilian politics has 
primarily centered on how national politics affects state politics or how state politics affects 
national politics.  Strangely absent from the debate, have been efforts to understand how state 
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politics affect state policies and vice versa.105  With state governments controlling many public 
policies, state policies often play just as or an even more important role than national policies in 
the lives of many people.   
 The study of public security in Brazilian states also provides important insights into 
national politics.  While governors exercise vast power, their interactions with the federal 
government is likely to vary depending on states’ security situations.  In states where governors 
are vulnerable due to rising levels of crime and violence, governors may be more willing to 
pressure national legislators from their state to support government actions that they would 
otherwise oppose in exchange for more resources to address security problems or to buy support 
through other policies.  However, in situations where successful state security policies have 
helped elevate their popularity, they may be able to extract more concessions from the federal 
government or even oppose its policies.  Studying violence, which is a major electoral issue for 
governors, can in this way further our understanding of the federal legislative process.     
  Beyond its policy and research implications for Brazilian scholars, the project provides 
insights into how politics and government policies may affect violence in countries throughout 
Latin America.  In Chapter 5, I showed that governors must reach a minimal level of spending 
(approximately US$33 per capita) on law enforcement before more security resources help 
reduce violence.  In contrast, more resources for education help reduce violence at all levels of 
spending.  From a political standpoint, poorer countries in the region may not have sufficient 
resources to tackle crime through law enforcement, regardless of which party is in power.  In 
                                                     
105 I suspect that the paucity of research on state politics is due to the financial and research burdens of traveling to 
multiple locations, developing contacts in each location and obtaining data that are often unavailable in electronic 
format.  My own interviews with politicians and state officials often required multiple visits to the same office over 
the course of several weeks.  Even when I was able to obtain interviews with government officials, people would 
promise to send data via email but then they would either ignore my subsequent emails or suddenly indicate that 
they did not have the data.   
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these situations, it may be more advantageous for them to focus on reducing violence through 
education, which addresses the long-term social structures that lead to higher crime rates.     
 Finally, while this project focused specifically on Brazil, it also suggests that it can be 
fruitful to compare public security in Brazilian states and other countries in the region.  Cross-
national research often compares countries of widely varying size and wealth, where capacity to 
implement security policies may vary greatly.  However, Brazilian states are a more natural 
comparison to many countries in Latin America.  Rio de Janeiro has the same income level as 
Guatemala, while the state of Ceará is comparable in population and wealth to Nicaragua.  
Comparing states to countries of similar size and wealth can provide a better understanding of 
how differences in political systems and public security policies influence violence.   
6.2 STUDY LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE AREAS FOR RESEARCH 
Although this study provides critical insights into public security and politics in Brazil, it is not 
without limitations that future research should address.  The first limitation stems from the unit 
of analysis.  I primarily use municipalities as the unit of analysis since more localized data on 
economic conditions and violence are unavailable in many states even today.  When I requested 
local crime data from the state of Mato Grosso in 2014, officials told me that they were still in 
the processing of building a system that would allow them to provide this information. Utilizing 
homicide data spanning a 24-year period imparts a better understanding of how public security 
policies have changed over time.  It also provides major advancements in making causal claims 
over the current body of literature that primarily focuses on security policies at the state, 
provincial or country level, often during a single electoral cycle.   
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 Cities, however, are not monolithic.  There are likely to be vast differences in how 
governments allocate resources to different sectors of the city, how police officers interact with 
residents in different neighborhoods and the effect that more policing versus spending on other 
policies, such as education, have on crime.  While my project data enables me to analyze broad 
public security policies in Brazilian states, it does not allow me to address these micro-level 
differences within cities.  
 The second limitation is that this study measure crime using homicide data.  The use of 
homicide data to study security policies is a common and well-supported practice in the 
literature.  Homicide data suffer from the fewest reporting biases and are available for a long 
period, making it possible to make comparisons across states and cities.  In addition, homicides 
are the most visible type of crime.  The news media and political rivals regularly use homicide 
statistics to highlight the government’s security successes and failures.  However, homicides do 
not occur evenly throughout the population.  They overwhelmingly occur in poor areas and 
involve low-income male victims.  Residents of middle-class and wealthier areas grapple with 
other crimes, such as auto theft and street robberies.  Using homicide data to measure the success 
of security policies may overlook successes or failures in reducing other crimes that are 
important to the public and influence their voting behavior.    
 Addressing these limitations, will require moving beyond the municipal-level indicators 
that I utilize in this project.  Future research should focus on these issues through in-depth 
studies on a few cities or even a few neighborhoods within a single city.  This will require a 
different methodological and theoretical approach than the one I used in this project and will 
include techniques including neighborhood surveys, focus groups, one-on-one interviews and 
geo-mapping the local provision of government services.   
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 Moving forward, there are also a variety of other avenues for future research on violence 
and politics in Latin America.  One of the most promising involves the study of violence and 
electoral campaigns.  The credibility of democratic elections rests on the premise that candidates 
are able to freely campaign for office.  In recent years, there has been a growing body of research 
on how armed non-state actors affect elections.  Scholars have focused primarily on electoral 
interference by ideologically oriented armed groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) (e.g. Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos 2013).  Since the Third Wave of 
democratization swept through the region, however, non-ideological criminal groups have been 
the more prevalent threat.   
 The effect that these groups have on election is most visible when they publicly use 
violence.  Since 2006, criminal groups have assassinated 109 current, former and elected mayors 
in Mexico.106  Meanwhile, in Rio de Janeiro, gunman murdered 15 candidates in the 8 months 
prior to the state’s 2016 municipal elections.  However, the campaign effects extend beyond 
direct cases of violence.  Many candidates face threats that are unknown to the public.  One 
mayoral candidate in Rio de Janeiro, State Deputy Deodalto Ferreira, received a phone call 
telling him, “Either you stop [campaigning], or your family is going to pay the consequences. 
And it will be where you play ball in São Jose Park.”107  During my own interviews in Brazil, 35 
percent of state deputies said threats of violence caused them to alter their campaign strategies or 
avoid campaigning in poor urban communities.   
 Despite the impact that non-ideologically oriented armed actors have on democracy, there 
has been minimal research on how they operate.  However, non-ideologically oriented armed 
                                                     
106 Rosagel, Shaila. 2017. “El sexenio de EPN supera al de FCH en alcaldes asesinados: 60; urgen a Segob protocolo 
de seguridad.” December 31. SinEmbargo. http://www.sinembargo.mx/21-12-2017/3365581.  
107 Martín, María. 2016. “A campanha de “matar quem atrapalha” nas eleições municipais do Rio.” July 25. El País.  
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actors are likely to affect the electoral process differently than their ideologically-oriented 
counterparts.  These groups may support candidates across the ideological spectrum who will 
represent their interests in government, or they may simply “sell” their communities to the 
highest bidder, coercing voters into supporting a specific candidate.  Future research should 
analyze the various pathways through which violence and threats of violence against candidates 
affect political campaigns and electoral outcomes.  This will involve answering a variety of 
questions: How do threats of violence affect electoral campaigns? In which communities and 
which countries? Which candidates negotiate with criminal groups and which ones are 
threatened? 
6.3 A HOPEFUL FUTURE? 
In the classic work, Politics as a Vocation, Max Weber defines the state as the actor that has the 
“monopoly on the legitimate use of force.”  Modern states in Latin America, however, all often 
struggle to control violence within their territory.  Brazil has been no exception to this trend and 
its large size has led to more causalities than are experienced in many modern wars.  The more 
than 1.2 million homicides since the country’s return to democratization surpasses total deaths 
attributed to the Vietnam War.  Reducing violence in the coming years will require the country 
to take more proactive actions.   
 Throughout the country, states have been increasingly developing strategic public 
security plans, which have typically been missing in past years.  The federal government is also 
taking a growing interest in security; an issue that it has typically neglected.  There is reason to 
suspect that the focus on security will grow even stronger in coming years.  In October of 2018, 
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Brazilians elected Jair Bolsonaro, a conservative politician, who has called for tough-on-crime 
measures, to be the country’s president.  In addition, right-wing parties made major gains at the 
state level, electing 12 governors, marking a sharp conservative turn in state politics.  
 In recent months, the federal government has implemented a variety of new policies to 
tackle crime.  On February 16, 2018, the federal government announced a takeover of Rio de 
Janeiro’s public security system that will last at least through the end of the year.  During this 
time, a military general is in charge of the state’s security and military personnel will work 
alongside police officers.  Just 10 days later, it also created a new federal cabinet post, the 
Extraordinary Ministry of Public Security, led by the country’s former defense minister.  The 
government followed this decision with another announcement on March 1 that it will make 
R$42 billion (US$13.53 billion) in loans available over the next five years for states to 
reorganize and strengthen their public security systems.108  These policies have the potential to 
help reduce violence in the short term.  However, the government’s plan does not include any 
efforts to address the long-term issues driving rising crime rates.  It remains to be seen, therefore, 
how the politics of public security will play out in the coming years.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
108 Paraguassu, Linsandra, and Ricardo Brito. 2018. “Governo federal anuncia R$42 bi a Estados para reorganizar 
segurança pública; R$ 5 bi serão liberados este ano.” March 1. Reuters. 
https://br.reuters.com/article/topNews/idBRKCN1GD5U2-OBRTP  
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APPENDIX A 
Semi-Structured Interview Script 
 
 
 
1. How do you define “public security? 
 
2. Do you think that ideology influences how deputies think about public security or do 
positions depend on other factors?  
a. What other factors? 
 
3. What impact did violence have on your electoral campaign? 
a. Is it an important them? 
b. Are their neighborhoods or locations where you were unable to conduct your 
campaign due to lack of security? 
 
 
4. Which group of voters, if any, appear to be the most worried about this problem? 
 
5. How do they want the State to resolve the problem? 
a. More spending on social programs? 
b. More spending on the police? 
c. Other policies?  
 
6. What impact does crime and violence have on the state’s politics? 
a. Legislation 
b. Political debates 
 
7. When you talk with voters, who do they blame for crime and violence? 
a. Governors 
b. Mayors 
c. State deputies 
d. Political parties from the left and right 
 
8. What factors explain the distribution of military police in the state? Put another way, are 
there political factors that affect which municipality receives more police officers? 
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9. Are there other people who you recommend that I contact? 
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APPENDIX B 
 
POLITICAL PARTY IDEOLOGY AND CHAPTER 2 SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES  
 
 
 
Left Political Parties 
 
Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B) 
Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) 
Partido da Causa Operária (PCO) 
Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT) 
Partido Geral dos Trabalhadores (PGT) 
Partido da Mobilização Nacional (PMN) 
Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) 
Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB) 
Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL) 
Partido Social Trabalhista (PST) 
Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado (PSTU) 
Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) 
Partido Verde (PV)  
Centrist Political Parties 
Partido dos Aposentados da Nação (PAN) 
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Partido Humanista da Solidariedade (PHS) 
Partido Liberal (PL) 
Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) 
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) 
Partido Social Liberal (PSL) 
Partido da Solidariedade Nacional (PSN) 
Partido Trabalhista do Brasil (PT do B) 
Partido Trabalhista Nacional (PTN) 
Right Political Parties 
Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL) 
Democratas (DEM) (Formerly the PFL) 
Partido Progressista (PP) 
Partido Progressista Brasileiro (PPB) 
Partido Progressista Reformador (PPR) 
Partido Republicano Brasileiro (PRB) 
Partido da Reconstrução Nacional (PRN) 
Partido da Reedificação da Ordem Nacional (PRONA) 
Partido Republicano (PR) 
Partido Republicano Progressista (PRP) 
Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro (PRTB) 
Partido Social Cristão (PSC) 
Partido Social Democrático (PSD) 
Partido Social Democrata Cristão (PSDC) 
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Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) 
Partido Trabalhista Cristão (PTC) 
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Table B.1: Changes in Violence and Support for Right Parties 
         
 1998 2002 2006 2010 
     
Right Incumbent -14.177* -17.185+ -42.345** -18.316** 
 (6.696) (9.991) (13.778) (5.226) 
Viable Right Candidate 16.838* -3.843 6.581 5.525 
 (7.209) (4.810) (5.283) (5.835) 
Right Incumbent x Viable Right Candidate  38.031** -5.620  
  (11.886) (18.176)  
Homicide Rate Change (log) 0.491 -0.821 -0.400 0.428 
 (0.823) (0.569) (0.317) (0.491) 
Right Wing Incumbent x Homicide Rate Change (log) -0.866 1.087+ 2.465*** -0.592 
 (2.272) (0.590) (0.395) (0.791) 
Viable Right Candidate x Homicide Rate Change (log) -1.845 1.804* -1.124 0.643 
 (1.316) (0.768) (0.906) (0.940) 
Right Incumbent x Viable Right Candidate x Homicide   -2.587+ -2.373+  
Rate Change (log)  (1.362) (1.172)  
Population (log) Change 0.355 -8.208* 6.528+ -2.531 
 (3.120) (3.227) (3.585) (2.206) 
Population Minimum Salary Change 0.758* 0.124* -0.102 -0.192 
 (0.310) (0.056) (0.090) (0.167) 
GDP Capita (log) Change 2.231 2.513 -1.684 -6.797+ 
 (1.409) (1.975) (1.703) (3.747) 
Unemployment Rate Change -1.857 1.608+ -1.040 -3.972** 
 (1.824) (0.961) (1.429) (1.312) 
Lost Incumbent Candidate   17.392 -21.617** 
   (16.593) (6.690) 
Gained Incumbent Candidate 8.856 24.619   
 (11.488) (15.658)   
Right Incumbent Candidate Change -5.936 -3.593 21.226** 5.755 
 (15.358) (4.804) (6.195) (7.057) 
Right Coalition Parties Change 0.434 1.404* 3.846*** 4.929*** 
 (1.334) (0.573) (0.659) (0.748) 
Total Left Candidates Change -0.491 0.644 8.701** 5.615*** 
 (1.611) (1.177) (2.913) (1.282) 
Total Right Candidates Change 11.533** 5.132* 0.368 -4.474+ 
 (3.215) (2.316) (1.575) (2.219) 
Total Center Candidates Change -2.369 -1.442 0.100 -1.964+ 
 (2.198) (1.266) (2.149) (1.049) 
Constant 6.624 -3.626 4.680* -6.872 
  (5.888) (3.359) (2.046) (4.745) 
N 3905 4633 5560 5564 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.810 0.635 0.808 0.796 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table B.2: Changes in Violence and Support for Center Parties 
          
 1998 2002 2006 2010 
     
Centrist Incumbent -66.938*** -28.909+ -23.560* -18.651 
 (9.627) (15.000) (10.006) (16.947) 
Viable Center Candidate  1.623 16.495** 17.189 19.577 
 (10.276) (5.914) (14.914) (16.991) 
Center Incumbent x Viable Center Candidate 75.628*** 30.891+ -0.547 5.963 
 (12.584) (17.531) (14.112) (18.198) 
Homicide Rate Change (log) 2.265+ -0.746 -0.811 2.837*** 
 (1.247) (0.641) (0.810) (0.364) 
Centrist Incumbent x Homicide Rate Change (log) -3.691** 1.471 -2.010 -3.153*** 
 (1.259) (1.092) (1.210) (0.551) 
Viable Center Candidate x Homicide Rate Change (log) -2.986+ 0.393 1.360 -4.774*** 
 (1.561) (0.856) (1.215) (0.958) 
Center Incumbent x Viable Center Candidate x  4.575** -1.740 1.305 4.344** 
Homicide  Rate Change (log) (1.574) (1.656) (1.661) (1.292) 
Population Change (log) -1.059 -9.542* -8.773 4.257 
 (2.585) (4.399) (7.715) (3.921) 
Population Minimum Salary Change (%) -0.180 -0.067 0.205 0.231 
 (0.427) (0.083) (0.190) (0.221) 
GDP Capita Change (log) -2.488 1.718 -10.083** 3.799 
 (2.080) (1.850) (2.993) (2.697) 
Unemployment Rate Change -3.245 1.444 -4.403 -5.245* 
 (2.332) (1.367) (3.519) (2.419) 
Lost Incumbent Candidate Change   -43.148+ -43.399*** 
   (20.997) (9.735) 
Gained Incumbent Candidate Change 40.169*** 19.449+ 36.324*** -3.225 
 (8.350) (9.498) (8.177) (16.514) 
Center Incumbent Candidate Change -15.508** 8.810** 6.375 7.893 
 (4.611) (2.806) (6.310) (4.656) 
Center Coalition Parties Change -0.384 -0.577 -0.270 -1.030+ 
 (0.536) (0.375) (0.759) (0.575) 
Total Left Candidates Change -4.740 1.399 5.895 4.937* 
 (3.176) (1.240) (6.561) (2.375) 
Total Right Candidates Change -14.667*** -2.053 -4.052 -14.521*** 
 (1.437) (2.087) (3.487) (3.760) 
Total Center Candidates Change 5.969+ 4.665+ 9.719** 7.109** 
 (3.201) (2.425) (3.451) (2.077) 
Constant 7.883 -11.499 11.952 -28.546+ 
  (5.219) (5.824) (7.598) (15.100) 
N 3905 4633 5560 5564 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.800 0.565 0.692 0.710 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table B.3: Changes and Violence and Support for Left Parties 
          
 1998 2002 2006 2010 
     
Left Incumbent -37.438** -8.880 -10.349 -19.168** 
 (12.793) (4.447) (15.283) (6.531) 
Viable Left Candidate 2.080 27.652*** 6.292 26.014*** 
 (5.888) (4.459) (9.844) (5.304) 
Left Incumbent x Viable Left Candidate   0.326 -0.731 
   (18.898) (9.366) 
Homicide Rate Change (log) 0.519 -0.365 0.430 0.008 
 (1.089) (0.607) (0.498) (0.242) 
Left Incumbent x Homicide Rate Change (log) -2.677* -0.509 3.638 1.668*** 
 (1.295) (1.401) (3.101) (0.343) 
Viable Left Candidate x Homicide Rate Change (log) 0.046 0.188 -0.108 0.836 
 (1.222) (0.665) (0.581) (0.539) 
Left Incumbent x Viable Left Candidate x Homicide  -2.586  -3.020 -1.954+ 
Rate Change (log) (3.658)  (3.421) (1.033) 
Population (log) Change -0.519 3.538 3.243 -4.423 
 (3.371) (4.216) (6.987) (2.629) 
Population Minimum Salary Change -0.309 0.057 0.185 -0.461+ 
 (0.238) (0.054) (0.206) (0.247) 
GDP Capita (log) Change -0.006 -1.404 1.424 -0.338 
 (0.906) (2.389) (2.636) (2.129) 
Unemployment Rate Change 2.463 -1.272 4.359 3.332* 
 (2.059) (1.016) (2.657) (1.587) 
Lost Incumbent Candidate Change 17.298 -37.333*** -42.514*** -46.446*** 
 (19.075) (8.268) (10.560) (7.061) 
Gained Incumbent Candidate Change   78.327*** 33.669*** 
   (13.242) (6.619) 
Left Incumbent Candidate Change 1.792 15.908* 21.054+ 12.191* 
 (5.862) (6.353) (10.861) (4.944) 
Left Coalition Parties Change 3.054* 1.236* 1.177 1.287** 
 (1.349) (0.490) (0.833) (0.443) 
Total Left Candidates Change -1.780 1.148 -10.394* -2.066 
 (4.007) (2.208) (4.488) (1.599) 
Total Right Candidates Change -1.991 -1.427 -0.955 -0.369 
 (1.174) (1.076) (1.910) (2.696) 
Total Center Candidates Change 8.305 -3.896+ -4.389 2.541 
 (5.274) (2.263) (3.773) (1.693) 
Constant -13.910* -11.739* -8.268 -10.186+ 
  (6.635) (5.687) (8.888) (5.979) 
N 3905 4633 5560 5564 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.618 0.598 0.542 0.635 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table B.4: Changes in Political Competition and Violence and Support for Right Parties 
          
 1998 2002 2006 2010 
     
Right Incumbent -9.325 -18.74 -55.25** -4.693 
 (7.327) (9.723) (16.31) (6.798) 
Left Incumbent -7.555 -2.489 -11.03 10.32* 
 (6.234) (5.316) (6.337) (4.568) 
Viable Right Candidate 14.74* -3.869 6.680 -2.190 
 (7.046) (4.875) (4.668) (4.357) 
Right Incumbent x Viable Right Candidate  38.43** 6.374  
  (11.76) (17.98)  
Homicide Rate Change (log) 0.125 -1.173 -0.246 0.459 
 (0.681) (0.578) (0.282) (0.449) 
Right Incumbent x Homicide Rate Change (log) -0.422 1.445* 2.305*** -0.263 
 (2.202) (0.584) (0.313) (0.946) 
Left Incumbent x Homicide Rate Change (log) 2.093 1.677 -0.655 0.145 
 (1.634) (1.009) (0.798) (0.998) 
Viable Right Candidate x Homicide Rate Change (log) -1.800 1.858** -0.970 0.235 
 (0.961) (0.650) (0.593) (0.956) 
Right Incumbent x Viable Right Candidate x Homicide   -2.606 -2.830**  
Rate Change (log)  (1.306) (0.903)  
Population (log) Change 0.586 -8.157* 6.204 -4.863 
 (3.164) (3.201) (3.304) (2.533) 
Population Minimum Salary Change 0.686* 0.129* -0.0373 -0.318 
 (0.275) (0.0549) (0.124) (0.175) 
GDP Capita (log) Change 1.967 2.415 -1.064 -8.033* 
 (1.326) (2.000) (1.270) (3.546) 
Unemployment Rate Change -1.827 1.581 0.0396 -4.971*** 
 (1.789) (0.949) (1.336) (1.243) 
Lost Incumbent Candidate   24.69 -31.79** 
   (17.71) (9.403) 
Gained Incumbent Candidate 14.93 26.59   
 (13.43) (16.70)   
Right Incumbent Candidate Change -10.67 -3.412 20.63*** 1.398 
 (15.55) (4.856) (3.880) (5.714) 
Right Coalition Parties Change 0.568 1.244 3.790*** 6.028*** 
 (1.316) (0.703) (0.618) (0.647) 
Total Left Candidates Change -1.301 0.717 7.154** 8.187*** 
 (1.595) (1.152) (1.942) (2.055) 
Total Right Candidates Change 11.52** 5.612* 0.492 -7.558*** 
 (3.252) (2.543) (1.643) (1.724) 
Total Center Candidates Change -0.342 -1.445 2.326 -2.799* 
 (2.402) (1.282) (2.822) (1.149) 
Constant 7.387 -3.192 6.256* -13.74* 
  (5.996) (3.444) (2.756) (5.309) 
N 3905 4633 5560 5564 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.813 0.636 0.823 0.811 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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Table B.5: The Effect of Political Competition and Violence on Support for Right Parties 
          
 1998 2002 2006 2010 
     
Centrist Incumbent -58.085*** -28.249+ -7.827 -18.442 
 (15.233) (15.340) (16.763) (17.131) 
Right Incumbent 10.083 0.883 16.374 5.846 
 (11.317) (4.104) (14.321) (5.044) 
Viable Center Candidate  5.445 16.542** 33.046 19.764 
 (10.396) (5.919) (20.637) (17.118) 
Center Incumbent x Viable Center Candidate 70.500*** 30.883+ -16.596 6.327 
 (13.930) (17.566) (20.216) (18.342) 
Homicide Rate Change (log) -1.516 -0.449 -1.443 2.885*** 
 (3.327) (0.802) (1.989) (0.374) 
Centrist Incumbent x Homicide Rate Change (log) 0.050 1.174 -1.378 -3.221*** 
 (3.344) (1.080) (2.167) (0.548) 
Right Incumbent x Homicide Rate Change (log) 3.980 -0.473 0.640 1.489 
 (3.042) (1.187) (2.170) (1.027) 
Viable Center Candidate x Homicide Rate Change (log) 0.188 0.436 1.816 -4.911*** 
 (2.931) (0.944) (1.859) (1.063) 
Center Incumbent x Viable Center Candidate x Homicide 1.479 -1.784 0.824 4.455** 
 Rate Change (log) (2.886) (1.730) (2.068) (1.419) 
Population Change (log) -0.912 -9.455* -7.796 4.399 
 (2.593) (4.488) (6.913) (3.964) 
Population Minimum Salary Change (%) -0.313 -0.066 0.214 0.288 
 (0.381) (0.083) (0.187) (0.226) 
GDP Capita Change (log) -2.617 1.711 -9.628** 3.816 
 (2.086) (1.852) (2.858) (2.710) 
Unemployment Rate Change -2.875 1.461 -4.882 -5.027+ 
 (2.280) (1.380) (3.421) (2.515) 
Lost Incumbent Candidate Change   -43.867* -43.525*** 
   (21.207) (9.587) 
Gained Incumbent Candidate Change 43.597*** 19.458 27.988* -3.182 
 (9.317) (9.510) (13.274) (16.501) 
Center Incumbent Candidate Change -15.693** 8.817** 5.957 7.712 
 (4.721) (2.817) (6.294) (4.595) 
Center Coalition Parties Change -0.290 -0.580 -0.386 -1.058+ 
 (0.496) (0.374) (0.749) (0.572) 
Total Left Candidates Change -5.740+ 1.400 6.526 5.086* 
 (3.181) (1.238) (6.664) (2.328) 
Total Right Candidates Change -15.142*** -2.065 -4.093 -14.239*** 
 (1.463) (2.093) (3.511) (3.799) 
Total Center Candidates Change 7.169* 4.617+ 9.508* 6.800** 
 (3.104) (2.449) (3.504) (2.171) 
Constant -1.116 -12.196+ -3.387 -28.684+ 
  (11.064) (6.797) (15.242) (15.350) 
N 3905 4633 5560 5564 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.803 0.565 0.696 0.711 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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Table B.6: The Effect of Political Competition and Violence on Support for Center Parties 
          
 1998 2002 2006 2010 
     
Centrist Incumbent -58.085*** -28.249+ -7.827 -18.442    
 (15.233) (15.340) (16.763) (17.131)    
Right Incumbent 10.083 0.883 16.374 5.846    
 (11.317) (4.104) (14.321) (5.044)    
Viable Center Candidate  5.445 16.542** 33.046 19.764    
 (10.396) (5.919) (20.637) (17.118)    
Center Incumbent x Viable Center Candidate 70.500*** 30.883+ -16.596 6.327    
 (13.930) (17.566) (20.216) (18.342)    
Homicide Rate Change (log) -1.516 -0.449 -1.443 2.885*** 
 (3.327) (0.802) (1.989) (0.374)    
Centrist Incumbent x Homicide Rate Change (log) 0.050 1.174 -1.378 -3.221*** 
 (3.344) (1.080) (2.167) (0.548)    
Right Incumbent x Homicide Rate Change (log) 3.980 -0.473 0.640 1.489    
 (3.042) (1.187) (2.170) (1.027)    
Viable Center Candidate x Homicide Rate Change (log) 0.188 0.436 1.816 -4.911*** 
 (2.931) (0.944) (1.859) (1.063)    
Center Incumbent x Viable Center Candidate x Homicide 1.479 -1.784 0.824 4.455**  
 Rate Change (log) (2.886) (1.730) (2.068) (1.419)    
Population Change (log) -0.912 -9.455* -7.796 4.399    
 (2.593) (4.488) (6.913) (3.964)    
Population Minimum Salary Change (%) -0.313 -0.066 0.214 0.288    
 (0.381) (0.083) (0.187) (0.226)    
GDP Capita Change (log) -2.617 1.711 -9.628** 3.816    
 (2.086) (1.852) (2.858) (2.710)    
Unemployment Rate Change -2.875 1.461 -4.882 -5.027+ 
 (2.280) (1.380) (3.421) (2.515)    
Lost Incumbent Candidate Change   -43.867* -43.525*** 
   (21.207) (9.587)    
Gained Incumbent Candidate Change 43.597*** 19.458 27.988* -3.182    
 (9.317) (9.510) (13.274) (16.501)    
Center Incumbent Candidate Change -15.693** 8.817** 5.957 7.712    
 (4.721) (2.817) (6.294) (4.595)    
Center Coalition Parties Change -0.290 -0.580 -0.386 -1.058+ 
 (0.496) (0.374) (0.749) (0.572)    
Total Left Candidates Change -5.740+ 1.400 6.526 5.086*   
 (3.181) (1.238) (6.664) (2.328)    
Total Right Candidates Change -15.142*** -2.065 -4.093 -14.239*** 
 (1.463) (2.093) (3.511) (3.799)    
Total Center Candidates Change 7.169* 4.617+ 9.508* 6.800**  
 (3.104) (2.449) (3.504) (2.171)    
Constant -1.116 -12.196+ -3.387 -28.684+    
  (11.064) (6.797) (15.242) (15.350)    
N 3905 4633 5560 5564    
Adjusted R-Squared 0.803 0.565 0.696 0.711    
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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Table B.7: The Effect of Political Competition and Violence on Support for Left Parties 
          
 1998 2002 2006 2010 
     
Left Incumbent -38.177** -5.570 -8.418 -16.051*   
 (11.265) (4.683) (15.454) (6.860)    
Right Incumbent 1.912 11.492* 8.371+ 10.595*   
 (9.904) (4.630) (4.225) (4.288)    
Viable Left Candidate 3.027 34.667*** 7.732 28.292*** 
 (7.202) (6.682) (9.672) (5.214)    
Left Incumbent x Viable Left Candidate   -0.054 -4.147    
   (19.118) (9.847)    
Homicide Rate Change (log) 1.304 -0.385 0.210 0.233    
 (1.133) (0.920) (0.671) (0.338)    
Left Incumbent x Homicide Rate Change (log) -3.484* -1.005 4.279 1.514**  
 (1.411) (1.350) (3.369) (0.455)    
Right Incumbent x Homicide Rate Change (log) -3.128+ 0.298 1.546 -0.356    
 (1.766) (0.835) (0.946) (0.362)    
Viable Left Candidate x Homicide Rate Change (log) -0.400 0.471 -0.294 0.546    
 (1.280) (0.639) (0.674) (0.571)    
Left Incumbent x Viable Left Candidate x Homicide  -2.228  -3.298 -1.775    
Rate Change (log) (3.710)  (3.637) (1.062)    
Population (log) Change -0.556 7.188* 3.863 -4.674+    
 (3.336) (3.271) (6.439) (2.639)    
Population Minimum Salary Change -0.332 0.021 0.070 -0.408    
 (0.215) (0.050) (0.160) (0.241)    
GDP Capita (log) Change 0.015 -1.416 1.675 -0.806    
 (0.933) (1.959) (2.507) (2.121)    
Unemployment Rate Change 2.511 -0.932 4.226 3.360+    
 (2.158) (1.224) (2.698) (1.643)    
Lost Incumbent Candidate Change 18.918 -33.365*** -44.408*** -46.197*** 
 (17.089) (7.645) (11.196) (7.183)    
Gained Incumbent Candidate Change   80.116*** 33.087*** 
   (13.384) (6.700)    
Left Incumbent Candidate Change 1.476 15.353* 20.967+ 12.562*   
 (5.917) (6.130) (10.644) (4.838)    
Left Coalition Parties Change 3.038* 1.119* 0.834 1.215*   
 (1.396) (0.446) (0.900) (0.453)    
Total Left Candidates Change -1.854 1.461 -9.676* -1.603    
 (3.808) (1.617) (4.438) (1.710)    
Total Right Candidates Change -2.050 -1.662 -1.667 0.275    
 (1.218) (1.229) (1.615) (2.842)    
Total Center Candidates Change 8.962+ -5.002* -4.754 2.243    
 (4.614) (1.996) (3.713) (1.760)    
Constant -15.212 -22.885*** -12.001 -11.399+    
  (9.908) (5.827) (8.613) (5.884)    
N 3905 4633 5560 5564    
Adjusted R-Squared 0.619 0.650 0.555 0.641    
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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Table B.8: Violence and Support for Right Parties, Panel Models 
        
 Fixed Effects Political Competition Arellano-Bond 
    
Homicide Rate (log) 0.867+ 0.302 -0.165 
 (0.474) (0.483) (0.317) 
Right Incumbent -11.356** -13.050** -31.635*** 
 (3.785) (4.240) (6.608) 
Left Incumbent  -5.896 -14.138*** 
  (3.633) (1.769) 
Viable Right Candidate 24.027*** 23.309*** 36.417*** 
 (4.194) (4.223) (3.707) 
Right Incumbent x Viable Right Candidate 17.037+ 16.664+ 10.729 
 (9.181) (8.789) (6.541) 
Homicide Rate (log) x Right Incumbent 0.209 0.711 -2.021* 
 (0.560) (0.609) (0.804) 
Homicide Rate (log) x Left Incumbent  2.204+ 1.702*** 
  (1.264) (0.459) 
Viable Right Candidate x Homicide Rate (log) -2.572** -2.443** 0.092 
 (0.850) (0.852) (0.501) 
Viable Right Candidate x Right Incumbent  -4.874*** -4.661***  
x Homicide Rate (log) (1.288) (1.202)  
Population Size (log) -0.710 -0.058 1.981 
 (2.098) (2.035) (1.270) 
Poverty Reduction 0.108+ 0.133* 0.180*** 
 (0.054) (0.058) (0.054) 
GDP per Capita (log) -0.036 0.292 -0.662 
 (0.787) (0.791) (0.711) 
Unemployment Rate -0.508 -0.302 -0.791 
 (1.006) (1.028) (0.531) 
Lost Incumbent Candidate 0.040 0.179  
 (7.096) (7.004) 
 
Gained Incumbent Candidate 0.577 6.073  
 (7.218) (8.326)  
Incumbent Candidate -0.861 -0.539 10.234* 
 (4.612) (4.350) (4.279) 
Left Candidates 1.254 1.048 8.136*** 
 (1.219) (1.197) (0.666) 
Right Candidates 0.399 0.783 -11.959*** 
 (1.357) (1.386) (1.302) 
Center Candidates -2.865** -2.627* -3.118** 
 (1.021) (1.063) (1.185) 
Coalition Parties 1.333** 1.268** 3.966*** 
 (0.473) (0.449) (0.222) 
Inflation Rate (log) 0.525 0.268  
 (0.933) (0.905)  
Within R-Squared 0.7276 0.7327  
Between R-Squared 0.8533 0.8314  
Overall R-Squared 0.7811 0.772  
N 25,120 25,120 9,776 
robust standard errors in parentheses,   * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table B.9: Violence and Support for Center Parties, Panel Models 
        
 Fixed Effects Political Competition Arellano-Bond 
    
Homicide Rate (log) -2.258 -5.151 2.853**  
 (2.051) (3.029) (0.916)    
Center Incumbent -4.616 -2.733+ 66.115*** 
 (5.431) (6.613) (8.754)    
Right Incumbent  1.688 27.067*** 
  (5.872) (5.187)    
Viable Center Candidate 12.869* 13.823 59.333*** 
 (5.925) (6.851) (5.075)    
Center Incumbent x Viable Center Candidate 1.339 0.494 -103.620*** 
 (6.554) (7.379) (7.862)    
Homicide Rate (log) x Center Incumbent 2.211 4.883 -3.833**  
 (2.443) (3.546) (1.360)    
Homicide Rate (log) x Right Incumbent  4.929* -0.039    
  (2.334) (0.822)    
Viable Center Candidate x Homicide Rate (log) 1.578 3.312 -3.038*** 
 (2.683) (2.782) (0.923)    
Viable Center Candidate x Center Incumbent -1.816 -3.485 4.069**  
x Homicide Rate (log) (2.616) (2.828) (1.391)    
    
Population Size (log) -3.684 -3.307 1.069    
 (3.862) (3.952) (1.485)    
Poverty Reduction 0.001 0.029 0.185**  
 (0.087) (0.102) (0.064)    
GDP per Capita (log) 1.195 1.653 1.198    
 (1.597) (1.355) (0.864)    
Unemployment Rate -0.950 -0.802 8.650*** 
 (1.061) (1.045) (1.165)    
Lost Incumbent Candidate -35.461*** -33.112***  
 (5.316) (5.174)  
Gained Incumbent  31.619*** 32.311*** 7.310    
 (6.038) (5.537) (4.225)    
Incumbent Candidate 4.568 4.259 5.713**  
 (4.887) (4.730) (1.757)    
Left Candidates -0.959 -1.046 -6.903*** 
 (2.365) (2.278) (1.448)    
Right Candidates -6.169*** -6.299*** 8.200**  
 (1.576) (1.470) (2.843)    
Center Candidates 4.201* 4.311* -0.807    
 (1.618) (1.639) (2.098)    
Coalition Parties 1.728*** 1.685*** 5.043*** 
 (0.311) (0.332) (0.564)    
Inflation Rate (log) 0.241 -0.025  
 (1.264) (1.359)  
Within R-Squared 0.6658 0.6697  
Between R-Squared 0.5668 0.5717  
Overall R-Squared 0.6199 0.6222  
N 25,120 25,120 9,776 
robust standard errors in parentheses,   * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   
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Table B.10: Violence and Support for Left Parties, Panel Models 
        
 Fixed Effects Political Competition Arellano-Bond 
   
 
Homicide Rate (log) -0.859 -1.361 -2.268** 
 (0.862) (0.953) (0.735) 
Left Incumbent Party 9.052 9.572 52.967*** 
 (8.252) (8.411) (6.736) 
Right Incumbent  0.867 -6.516*** 
  (3.775) (1.878) 
Viable Left Candidate 10.896*** 10.897*** 79.853*** 
 (2.719) (2.594) (5.055) 
Left Incumbent x Viable Left Candidate -7.827 -8.093 -51.788*** 
 (9.719) (9.879) (4.750) 
Homicide Rate (log) x Left Incumbent -0.648 -0.139 2.545 
 (1.906) (1.860) (4.783) 
Homicide Rate (log) x Right Incumbent  1.428 4.429*** 
  (1.881) (1.073) 
Viable Left Candidate x Homicide Rate (log) 2.062+ 2.371* 2.148* 
 (1.070) (0.925) (0.846) 
Viable Left Candidate x Left Incumbent -2.575 -2.885 -3.924 
x Homicide Rate (log) (2.554) (2.432) (4.862) 
Population Size (log) -4.029 -4.068 -4.793* 
 (2.560) (2.438) (1.911) 
Poverty Reduction -0.012 -0.008 -0.371*** 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.084) 
GDP per Capita (log) -0.644 -0.548 -1.801 
 (1.284) (1.179) (1.104) 
Unemployment Rate 2.093+ 2.075+ -18.406*** 
 (1.035) (1.032) (1.615) 
Lost Incumbent Candidate -31.331*** -31.596*** -83.904*** 
 (8.312) (8.376) (6.416) 
Gained Incumbent  42.614*** 43.556***  
 (5.484) (5.423)  
Incumbent Candidate 17.169*** 17.373*** -5.278* 
 (3.486) (3.497) (2.277) 
Left Candidates 0.900 0.998 13.103*** 
 (1.587) (1.561) (1.130) 
Right Candidates 1.321 1.307 -8.681*** 
 (0.857) (0.827) (2.568) 
Center Candidates -2.500* -2.515* 19.147*** 
 (1.152) (1.176) (1.587) 
Coalition Parties 1.482** 1.482** 0.200 
 (0.449) (0.451) (0.446) 
Inflation Rate (log) -0.419 -0.452  
 (1.276) (1.263)  
Within R-Squared 0.6146 0.6154  
Between R-Squared 0.3439 0.3512  
Overall R-Squared 0.4964 0.5001  
N 25,120 25,120 9,776 
robust standard errors in parentheses,   * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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APPENDIX C 
CHAPTER 3 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
 
 
 
As discussed in the research design section of the chapter, I tested the robustness of my results 
by substituting per capita spending on security policies for the percentage of the budget devoted 
to these policies.  As I show in Table 3.9 and 3.10, the change in operationalization does not 
affect spending on education spending.  The empirical analysis continues to show that left parties 
do not spend more on education than their counterparts in right parties.  However, it does modify 
the findings regarding the impact of ideology on law enforcement and education spending.  More 
specifically, it shows that right governors do not spend more per capita on law enforcement than 
their leftist counterparts, regardless of their electoral competition.  However, governors from 
right parties spend more on the judiciary when they face right competitors.   
 The differing findings are most likely due to changes in state budgets over time.  Between 
1991 and 2014, the average per capita state budget grew in real terms from R$597 to R$1175.  
Right governors were in office primarily in the 1990s when state budgets were lower.  In 
addition, they tended to control the poorest states in northern and northeastern Brazil where 
small increases in per capita security spending required major changes in their budgetary 
allocations.  Given these factors, it is unsurprising that using per capita expenditures shows that 
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right governor do not spend more on security than their leftist counterparts do since they entered 
the government under different financial conditions.   
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Table C.1: Per Capita Police and Judiciary Spending 
  
 Policing Policing Policing Judiciary Judiciary Judiciary 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
       
Security Budget (t-1) 0.80*** 0.45*** 0.46***    
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.12)       
Judiciary Budget (t-1)    0.44*** 0.12 0.12    
    (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)    
Right Governor -4.44 -5.74 -8.07    -14.17 -3.52 -9.10    
 (3.97) (5.06) (6.68)    (8.98) (9.15) (11.85)    
Center Governor 3.08 2.02 0.29    -2.60 -0.17 -3.95    
 (2.38) (2.65) (2.82)    (3.98) (4.44) (5.95)    
Right Competitor   1.09      -0.08    
   (3.80)      (6.44)    
Left Competitor   2.71      5.58    
   (3.15)      (4.52)    
Right Governor     2.93      10.77*   
x Right Competitor   (6.65)      (5.43)    
Right Governor     4.69      -0.29    
x Left Competitor   (9.44)      (12.06)    
Reelection Run  2.66* 2.58+    -0.82 -0.67    
  (1.33) (1.43)     (1.78) (1.71)    
Political Office  1.15 1.04     -0.67 -1.00    
  (1.92) (1.77)     (1.64) (1.83)    
Close Election  -1.57 -0.96     -6.38+ -5.85+   
  (2.36) (2.17)     (3.75) (3.49)    
Election Year  -20.13* 1.52     -24.51*** -23.42*   
  (9.48) (5.59)     (6.66) (10.30)    
Homicides  -0.00 -0.00     0.00 0.00    
  (0.00) (0.00)     (0.00) (0.00)    
Homicide Rate  0.02 0.04     -0.15 -0.10    
  (0.17) (0.15)     (0.19) (0.18)    
Inequality  12.00 12.21     71.74 73.99    
  (21.85) (23.13)     (59.19) (67.15)    
Population  -0.00 -0.00     -0.00** -0.00*   
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 (0.00) (0.00)    
Population Density  0.16 0.17     -0.36 -0.29    
  (0.47) (0.49)     (0.41) (0.40)    
Per Capita Budget  0.03*** 0.03***  0.01 0.01    
  (0.01) (0.01)     (0.01) (0.01)    
Debt Repayment (%)   -0.02 -0.02     0.01 0.01    
  (0.01) (0.01)     (0.02) (0.02)    
Ex-Territory  -4.83 -6.34     13.44+ 10.77    
  (24.23) (23.89)     (8.00) (11.84)    
Constant 19.26*** 23.61 22.80    39.01*** 88.89* 85.12+   
 (4.81) (36.52) (34.68)    (11.19) (44.98) (45.57)    
       
N 558 473 473    569 487 487    
+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 ***.001, robust standard errors in parentheses  
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Table C.2: Per Capita Education Spending 
  
 Education Education Education 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Education Budget (t-1) 0.45*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)    
Left Governor -0.45 -0.30 0.48    
 (0.37) (0.53) (0.85)    
Center Governor -0.24 -0.27 -0.46    
 (0.51) (0.60) (0.57)    
Right Competitor   0.92    
   (0.77)    
Left Competitor   0.86    
   (0.83)    
Left Governor   -1.22+   
x Right Competitor   (0.65)    
Left Governor   -0.88    
x Left Competitor   (1.10)    
Reelection Run  0.09 0.03    
  (0.24) (0.25)    
Political Office  0.08 -0.03    
  (0.40) (0.38)    
Close Election  0.18 0.25    
  (0.31) (0.36)    
Election Year  0.76 0.99    
  (1.02) (1.08)    
Homicides  0.00 0.00    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Homicide Rate  -0.05* -0.05*   
  (0.02) (0.02)    
Inequality  -10.93* -10.52**  
  (4.27) (3.99)    
Population  0.00 0.00    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Population Density  0.00 -0.00    
  (0.03) (0.03)    
Per Capita Budget  -0.00 -0.00    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Debt Repayment (%)  -0.01** -0.01**  
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Ex-Territory  1.05 1.16    
  (1.30) (1.70)    
Constant 9.69*** 20.90*** 20.62*** 
 (1.19) (4.94) (4.96)    
    
N 578 498 498    
+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 ***.001, robust standard errors in parentheses    
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APPENDIX D 
POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN SMALL MUNICIPALITIES 
 
Table D.1: Effect of Politics on Violence in Small Municipalities, 1997-2014 
 
 Fixed Effects Multi-Level Arellano-Bond 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
  Homicide Rate (t-1)     0.017** 0.019** 
     (0.006) (0.006) 
  Homicide Rate (t-2)     0.009 0.010+ 
     (0.006) (0.006) 
  Homicide Rate (t-3)     0.014* 0.015** 
     (0.005) (0.005) 
  Right Governor -0.207* -0.205* -0.197*  -0.072+ -0.069+ 
 (0.089) (0.090) (0.091)  (0.042) (0.042) 
  Center Governor -0.037 -0.037 -0.036  0.024 0.028 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.056)  (0.032) (0.032) 
  Personal Share 0.092 -0.002 0.010 -0.026 0.105 -0.098 
 (0.118) (0.173) (0.124) (0.179) (0.147) (0.205) 
  Personal Share x   0.001  0.001  0.002 
  Per Capita Security  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  Security Spending 0.003* 0.003* 0.003** 0.003* 0.002* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Same Party -0.028* -0.028 -0.041* -0.041* -0.045* -0.045* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023) 
  Reelection  0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.033 0.034 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.022) (0.022) 
  Education Spending -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 (0.0006) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
  Infant Death Rate 0.002** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
  Population (log) 0.067 0.052 0.70*** 0.70*** -0.484** -0.480** 
 (0.108) (0.105) (0.048) (0.049) (0.162) (0.162) 
  Population Density 0.004** 0.004** 0.0006* 0.0006* 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  State Unemployment Rate 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.060 0.007 0.007 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)*** (0.008) (0.008) 
  Constant 0.357 0.523 -4.827*** -4.799*** 5.097*** 5.089*** 
  (1.12) (1.09) (0.465) (0.463) (1.397) (1.401) 
N 67,727 67,727 67,727 67,727 62,404 62,404 
Within R-Squared 0.0397 0.0397     
Approximate Level 1 R-Squared   0.1086 0.1087     
Robust standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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